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Abstract  
There has been a tremendous civil society presence at the UNFCCC negotiations. However, 
the extent to which they work strategically to influence the negotiations have varied. In this 
thesis, I consider the following research questions:  
1) Which channels of influence are available for the Norwegian non-state actors into the 
UNFCCC negotiations from 2009-2014?  
2) What type of strategies do these NGOs apply?  
3) To what extent do they succeed in reaching their strategic goals?  
There is a growing academic literature on NGO influence in the climate negotiations, 
particularly looking at transnational networks. However, there is limited research on the 
Norwegian civil society specifically, that sheds light on their efforts to influence the 
international negotiations. The ambition of this thesis is therefore to contribute to the 
academic debate from this angle. In order to allow that and increase the applicableness to 
further research, the analytical framework on NGO influence in environmental negotiations 
developed by Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corell is applied.  
In this qualitative case study three different type of Norwegian non-state actors were chosen: 
a) a membership based activist environmental NGO, the Norwegian Society for the 
Conservation of Nature; b) an intellectually based advisory environmental NGO, Bellona 
Foundation and; c) a lobbyist business NGO that represents an important sector in the national 
economy, Norwegian Shipowners' Association.  
Based on informant interviews, document analysis, fieldwork, and former research, I find that 
these organisations apply a wide repertoire of strategies in order to influence various policy 
levels with an implication for the UNFCCC negotiations. Although the thesis started with a 
pessimistic perspective, through the empirical data and analysis, I conclude that there are in 
fact evidence of influence – at times quite significantly so.  
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1 Introduction 
International security and global economics have traditionally been the core topics in world 
politics; nevertheless, some scholars argue that the environment has emerged as the third 
major issue (Porter et.al. 2000 in Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p. 261). The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) organises its Conference of Parties 
(COPs) in December every year. The member states follow up their commitments from the 
first and second period of the Kyoto Protocol, and negotiate what should be the next 
agreement to be adopted in 2015. The climate negotiations between states have received 
substantial attention from civil society, and until 2009 about half of the hundred thousand 
delegates to the COPs were civil society representatives (Muñoz Cabré, 2011, p. 10). COP15 
in Copenhagen marked the peak with unprecedented numbers of representatives from non-
state actors present (approximately 15,000) (Spain, 2009). While the number of NGO 
delegates remain high, participation since COP15 has been restricted. Furthermore, the 
notable presence aside, the question remains whether these various civil society actors have 
the opportunity and the capability to affect the climate negotiations.  
This thesis will thus study the channels of influence available for the Norwegian civil society 
organisations in the UNFCCC negotiations, specifically focusing on the time frame from 
COP15 in Copenhagen, Denmark, to COP20 in Lima, Peru. A ‘broad’ definition of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) will be applied in this regard – including both 
environmental NGOs and business associations. The reason for this is simple: amongst the 
Norwegian civil society actors with accreditation to the UNFCCC, there are three Business 
and industry non-governmental organisations (BINGOs1), six Environmental non-
governmental organisations (ENGOs), and one Trade unions non-governmental organisation 
(TUNGO), in addition to a few research institutions (RINGOs). This is also the definition of 
NGOs applied by Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 66): “we use the term “NGOs” to refer to all 
these types of organisations, as long as they are involved in international environmental 
negotiations”. Skodvin (2012, p. 3) on the other hand makes a clear distinction between 
NGOs and “non-state actors” in her analysis – the peculiarity of NGOs being that they are 
organised, while non-state actors also includes “scientific communities and other forms of 
                                                 
1 These abbreviations are also the names used for the NGO constituencies in the UNFCCC. The complete list can 
be found under section 1.5. 
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knowledge based networks”. As this thesis will study organised actors, it will thus apply both 
the limited term NGO and the broader term non-state actor interchangeably.   
The relevance of the topic to political science is firstly due to the way in which climate 
change is currently affecting the world, and will most likely do so in the future. Changing bio-
diversity will influence the livelihood of people, including access to energy and key resources 
such as water. Furthermore, without appropriate measures, climate change has the potential to 
trigger resource conflicts, migration due to increasing sea levels and desertification, as well as 
influence the agricultural sector, to mention some possible consequences. The global level for 
policy making is key to finding ways to face these challenges, as it is a “borderless” question.  
Secondly, civil society organisations have been actively present at the COPs, albeit with 
varying degrees of access to, and impact on, the decision-making processes. Thus, it is 
interesting to look into the COPs as a negotiation field and examine which strategies the 
various non-state actors apply in order to affect the outcome. Moreover, although there is 
extensive research on NGOs at COPs in general, there is a knowledge gap regarding 
Norwegian NGOs in particular. The Norwegian governments have generally had a positive 
and inclusive attitude towards civil society, facilitating arenas to influence government policy. 
Concurrently, it is an auspicious time to study the topic of civil society influence on the COPs 
from a Norwegian perspective, as the right wing government that was elected in 2013, 
removed the observers to the delegation (also called the “extended delegation”) which was 
introduced by the former centre-left government. This alteration shed light on a formal change 
in NGO access to the negotiations, which could followingly shed light on changes in NGO 
influence.  
More generally, COP15 to COP20 also marks the period from the last attempt to reach a 
binding agreement at COP15 up to the negotiations leading up to the next top level meeting in 
Paris at COP21. Specifically for this study, it is also a significant period to study because 
changes in the NGO access have been introduced. One of the key alterations is that the 
number of NGO delegates has been significantly capped.  
Last but not least, Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 68) describe findings of NGO influence in 
international environmental negotiations as “an interesting empirical puzzle”. Treaty making 
has been the domain of states, as UN members are the only ones with formal decision-making 
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power. Identifying the traces of influence from Norwegian NGOs and putting the puzzle 
together is therefore a key ambition of this thesis.  
1.1 Research Questions   
The research questions of this thesis are thus: 
4) Which channels of influence are available for the Norwegian non-state actors into the 
UNFCCC negotiations from 2009-2014?  
5) What type of strategies do these NGOs apply?  
6) To what extent do they succeed in reaching their strategic goals?  
The first research question concerns UNFCCC, and particularly its COPs, as a negotiation 
playing field for non-state actors, while the second question is related to the actors’ choices of 
strategies in that particular structural framework, and the last is an assessment of their success 
in influencing the negotiations in the various channels they approach.  
There are more than 1,400 organisations and institutions with accreditation to the UNFCCC. 
Among these, there are sixteen registered in Norway. This thesis will focus on the following 
business and environmental organisations: Bellona Foundation (Miljøstiftelsen Bellona), 
NNV – Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature (Naturvernforbundet)2, and NSA – 
Norwegian Shipowners' Association (Rederiforbundet). These non-state actors are of 
particular interest, as they have worked for climate policies from dissimilar thematic angles, 
channels, and strategies. Acknowledging the types of NGOs is key to understanding these 
differences.  
Environmental NGOs can be distinguished by the type of approach they have. Lars H. 
Gulbrandsen and Steinar Andresen (2004, p. 56) differentiate between “activist” and 
“advisory” organisations. The first is a classic membership based organisation that achieves 
its legitimacy through popular support, while the latter is more expertise based and aims to 
provide legal, technical and scientific policy advice to the decision makers. Thus, to highlight 
the different types of green NGOs, NNV and Bellona have been chosen to represent these 
                                                 
2 This organisation uses the names “Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature” and “Friends of the 
Earth Norway” interchangeably. I have chosen to use the Norwegian abbreviation NNV (Norges 
Naturvernforbund) that my interview objects used besides the full Norwegian name.  
4 
 
categories respectively. Furthermore, they also differ in terms of whom they try to influence. 
Bellona has worked towards the EU on a greater scale than NNV, which instead focuses on 
the Norwegian government.  
Regarding NSA, shipping continues to be an important business sector in Norway. 
Furthermore, the industry makes Norway one of the fifteen largest shipping states 
internationally (Department for Transport, 2015). Globally, the maritime transport covers 
“around 80 per cent of global trade by volume and over 70 per cent of global trade by value” 
(UNCTAD, 2014b). The sector alone makes up between 2-3 per cent of global greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. Furthermore, shipping is tightly connected with the fossil industry as 
tanker trade (crude oil, petroleum products and gas) accounts for 29.8 per cent of the seaborne 
trade globally (UNCTAD, 2014a, p. 4). In Norway, 80 per cent of the ships built and/or 
equipped in the country’s shipyards are connected to the offshore oil and gas industry (Norges 
Rederiforbund, 2010a). As it is a highly globalised sector, one-sided national regulations may 
distort the competition, and global regulations (if any) concerning emissions are therefore 
preferred by NAS and others. NSA is thus an interesting business organisation case from a 
Norwegian as well as an international climate perspective. 
The actors’ success will be studied using the term NGO influence. There is to a large extent a 
divide in the academic literature between research looking into BINGO and ENGO influence 
in climate negotiation. There are some notable exceptions such as Depledge (2005) and 
Vormedal (2008). This study is hence also a contribution in the efforts to bridge the gap. It 
must be specified that looking at the NGOs’ abilities to meet their goals, means that the actors 
themselves define the targets. This implies that the thesis is not limited to studying influence 
on the negotiation text but also other types of activities such as showcasing aimed at the 
involvement of target groups or success in indirect channels such as changing the Norwegian 
government’s position.  
1.2 Previous Research and Theoretical Framework 
There is extensive research on civil society and the UN climate negotiations. However, the 
research on the Norwegian civil society in the international climate regime specifically is 
more limited, and thus provides a research opportunity. There are several studies looking into 
transnational ENGOs’ and BINGOs’ activities and influence in climate regimes. Michele 
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Merrill Betsill and Elisabeth Corell are two of the most prominent scholars in the field of 
NGO influence in international climate negotiations. In a study on ENGOs’ influence in the 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations, Betsill (2008, p. 65) makes note of the need for further research 
on “how institutional rules, the nature of the issue, and the selection of particular strategies 
mediate between NGO activity and influence in international treaty negotiations”. To study 
this link is a key ambition for this thesis by looking at the channels, strategies, and influence 
of various types of NGOs.   
In international relations, including in regime theory, state-centric ideas have dominated. This 
is why it is interesting to consider how and when non-state actors may influence, as it may 
nuance this picture. In canvassing the channels available, the arenas defined by Andresen and 
Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 171) will be a starting point: 1) international negotiations and 
processes; 2) domestic climate policy and ratification; 3) target groups’ climate policy and 
behaviour and; 4) public opinion. This will be adjusted for the purpose of answering the 
research question.  
Like states, nongovernmental organisations have access to various resources that can enable 
them to influence international environmental negotiations (Betsill & Corell, 2008, pp. 22-
26). To approach the second research question, the thesis will first look into the types of 
resources possessed by each NGO. Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2004; 2005) 3 carry out a 
systematic research on “green” NGOs’ strategies and influence. Their conceptualisation of 
activist and advisory NGOs, and insider and outsider strategy will be the theoretical basis in 
analysing the non-state actors’ strategies. In order to incorporate the BINGO perspective, Irja 
Vormedal’s (2008) concept of grey and green BINGOs in the climate regime will be 
integrated to form the theoretical framework on the topic of NGO strategies.  
Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 71) points out that “examining the effects of NGOs on 
international environmental negotiations is not the norm”. They argue that many scholars 
have rather studied activities, access and resources but not influence itself. In order to 
approach the third research question, a definition of influence will be developed in the next 
chapter, before applying and adjusting Betsill and Corell’s theoretical framework for NGO 
influence for the purpose of this thesis.  
                                                 
3 The research from 2005 will mostly be applied, and content will be drawn from the 2004 article to 
supplement the prior when the latter provides more in-depth analysis, and contributes to shed light on a topic.   
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1.3 Research Design  
This research will be a case study of a selection of Norwegian NGOs at COP15-COP20 
(2009-2014). In case study research, the focus is on “finding the conditions under which 
specified outcomes occur, and the mechanisms through which they occur, rather than 
uncovering the frequency with which those conditions and their outcomes arise” (George & 
Bennett, 2005, p. 31). What is the process leading towards a certain outcome?  
The research question will be addressed both from a structural as well as an agency 
perspective. Firstly, the thesis will explore the structural level – the UNFCCC climate 
negotiations, with a particular interest in the channels available for civil society influence. 
Secondly, the actors’ choices of strategies will be discussed in light of the structural ‘playing 
field’ they are in. It is essential to both study the actors the NGOs decide to lobby (political 
parties/parliamentarians, Norwegian and other governments, EU etc.), in addition to the tools 
they apply (pressure through media, participation through the delegation, alliances etc.). In 
regards to the strategy, it is also necessary to evaluate the topics within the climate 
negotiations the various civil society organisations decide to focus on, and how ambitious 
their goals are. Have they chosen to focus on progressive approaches necessary to limit the 
temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius (or less) or policies that are more plausible to 
become adopted by the politicians – given that this is a contradiction. Thirdly, the perspective 
on agency is then drawn back to the structural level by studying whether the NGOs have 
impacted this level.  
Data  
Interviews with key actors from the aforementioned NGOs (Bellona, NNV, and NSA), 
government officials, and bureaucrats were conducted. Furthermore, publicly available 
documents from the NGOs, UNFCCC, and the ministries, and media monitoring reports 
served as sources of information for the document analysis. Furthermore, documents were 
also requested directly from the NGOs and the Norwegian government such as the position 
papers acquired from the Ministry of Climate and Environment (Klima- og 
miljødepartementet, 2014; Miljøverndepartementet, 2010, 2011, 2013a). Klimaspillet (The 
Climate Game) by Bård Lahn from NNV, who was the only NGO delegate on the Norwegian 
delegation (not the extended delegation) for several years, will be an additional source of 
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insight. Moreover, existing academic research will supplement the first-hand information 
collected.  
1.4 Outline 
The following chapter two will present previous research and the theoretical framework. 
Subsequently, chapter three will discuss the methods applied in this thesis. What are the 
benefits and challenges of the selected approaches, and how can these challenges be tackled? 
The following three chapters will approach each research question successively. The fourth 
chapter will thus study the channels available for the NGOs to influence the climate 
negotiations. Chapter five will look into the resources each organisation has, which channels 
they target, and the strategies they apply. The sixth chapter will based on these findings look 
into key strategic goals of each organisation, in order to consider whether they have had 
influence on these selected topics. As the research questions will be addressed directly in the 
concluding section of the three aforementioned chapters, the seventh and final chapter will 
thus shortly summarise the findings and highlight the explanatory value and analytical 
implications, before concluding and encouraging further research.  
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2 Previous Research and Theoretical 
Framework  
“[I]t is critical to deepen our concerns for the pervasive role of the non-state actors as 
players in the process of regime creation, implementation and operation of regimes. […] No 
issue area constitute a better laboratory in which to study these developments than 
international environmental affairs.” – Oran R. Young & Konrad von Moltke (1994, pp. 361-
362). 
There is limited in depth research on Norwegian actors’ strategies and influence towards the 
UNFCCC negotiations. This thesis’ mission is thus to explore how three selected actors can 
contribute to the existing theories on NGO channels, strategies, and influence in international 
climate negotiations. Through such an analysis, the study aims to engage in the ongoing 
academic debate by matching the research on non-state influence towards the UNFCCC 
negotiations with a concrete case study. This chapter will present and discuss the existing 
academic literature and theories relevant for each research questions before concluding with 
theoretic approaches.  
In order to set the theoretical framework for the research questions, theoretical background on 
non-state actors’ place in international relations and literature review will be presented before 
going more specifically into the arenas of influence available to NGOs. The second section 
will thus explore the concrete theories relevant to the first research question: the channels of 
influence. Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005) highlight four such arenas that will serve as the 
basis which will be adjusted for the purpose of this thesis.  
The following section will approach the second element of the research questions: strategies 
applied. The framework of “activist”/”advisory” ENGO types by Andresen & Gulbrandsen 
(2004; 2005) will be presented, and adapted to encompass BINGOs as well by supplementing 
it with the theoretical framework on “green”/”grey” BINGOs developed by Vormedal (2008). 
This synthesis will serve as the theoretical framework for analysing the strategies. Finally, the 
last research question on the success of the NGOs’ in reaching their goals will be addressed. 
To study this question, the term NGO influence is firstly defined, before moving on to present 
the analytical tool developed by Betsill and Corell (2008) that will be adjusted in order to suit 
this thesis’ aim.  
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2.1 Theoretical Background and Literature Review  
Liberal internationalists challenged the realist idea of state-centric international relations, 
including theories about international cooperation. On the other hand, states can also 
dominate within that international cooperation. The growing engagement from civil society on 
the international arena, therefore presents an interesting aspect of the debate in international 
relations. Analysts started to see “the increasing presence of NGOs at the international arena 
as indication of a more fundamental change in the basic features of the international system 
itself and as a change to the state-centred paradigm of international relations theory” (Risse 
2002 in Skodvin, 2012, p. 2) 4.  
The growing international political scene represents an arena of influence in itself with its 
own dynamics; nevertheless, with only a few exceptions5 states remain the actors with formal 
power (such as voting rights). State-centric perspectives have thus been dominant in 
understanding global environmental politics in international relations (Paterson, 1996; Saurin, 
1996). Risse (1995, p. 13), however, suggests that it is not necessarily a contradiction to 
recognise that states are significant actors while also acknowledging transnational actors’ 
influence in state interests and relations. Peter Willetts, an authoritative scholar in the field of 
civil society in international relations, examined non-state influence and found that NGOs did 
in fact challenge the state-centric view, and that states no longer were gatekeepers who 
controlled the interactions in their environment but rather communicated, negotiated, and 
cooperated with NGOs (Willetts, 1982, 1993, 1996).  
The literature on NGOs’ in international regimes is to a great extent influenced by social 
movement theories (Della Porta & Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow, 2005), constructivist theories (Keck 
& Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 1995, 2000), and organisational theory on networks (Powell, 1990). 
Peter Newell is one of the scholars that challenge the state-centric perspective specifically in 
terms of the climate regime. Newell (2000, p. 161) builds his research on the transnationalist 
projects of the neoliberal Keohane & Nye’s (1972) and further development by the 
constructivist Willetts. He argues that non-state actors (ENGOs, researchers, industry groups, 
and media) have formed and developed the international climate regime. As we shall see in 
                                                 
4 Formerly Risse-Kappen. 
5 For example Skodvin (2012) point out that non-state actors, particularly researchers, have increased their 
formal power in international environmental negotiations.  
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the following sections, Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corell are also key scholars who 
systematically explored how to analyse NGO influence in international environmental 
negotiations.  
The case studies in this thesis are three primarily domestic NGOs, nonetheless, the presented 
literature will be relevant and valuable in understanding how these organisations navigate in 
the international climate negotiations. Furthermore, the starting point of this thesis is the 
NGOs and not a topic. Thus, it has a different starting point than much of the research 
presented here, and adjustments to the theoretical framework must be carried out respectively. 
Let us now look into the theoretical perspectives and literature more specifically linked to the 
three research questions regarding channels, strategies, and influence in the climate 
negotiations. 
2.2 Channels: Intergovernmental State-centric? 
In this landscape, Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 171) identify four channels that they 
assume that NGOs, depending on the type, will attempt to impact the climate regime through: 
1) international negotiations and processes; 2) domestic climate policy and ratification; 3) 
target groups’ climate policy and behaviour and; 4) public opinion. These points are rather 
self-explanatory, except the third that Andresen and Gulbrandsen exemplifies with companies 
and BINGOs. Adding to that, scientists and other opinion-makers (such as think tanks) will be 
included in that category. A problem with Andresen and Gulbrandsen’s framework for the 
arenas that NGOs address is that it does not encompass the regional level nor foreign 
governments. Foreign government delegations at the negotiations itself are of course covered 
by their first point, but some NGOs do operate in foreign countries as well as in the regional 
arena (such as in Brussels to impact EU policies). These arenas will be incorporated in the 
second category for the purpose of this thesis, making it: 2’) national and regional policy and 
ratification.   
Yamin and Depledge (2004) list up the following NGO activities available in the international 
negotiation channel: a) lobbying government delegates; b) circulating information and 
position papers; c) working with the media; d) hosting side events; e) making interventions 
during debates and; f) monitoring developments in the negotiations. It must also be noted that 
NGOs use various coalitions (in addition to direct contact) in order to lobby the governments 
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(activity ‘a’ in Yamin & Depldge 2004). Instead of trying to approach delegates directly at the 
COPs, competing for attention with the tremendous amount of other delegates present and a 
tight schedule, NGOs may choose to navigate and canalise their efforts through alliances and 
networks (such as Climate Action Network or International Chamber of Shipping) and/or the 
recognised UNFCCC constituencies. 
In many cases, it will be natural for NGOs to work with their own country’s delegation in 
international negotiations. However, if this channel is blocked Keck and Sikkink (1998) 
explain that another channel can be created. They call it the boomerang pattern. The 
boomerang effect occurs when the NGOs bypass their domestic government to ally 
themselves with foreign states, in order to influence an intergovernmental organisation and/or 
their own government (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).  
Having access to these channels however will not in itself suffice in making an impact. A 
“significant conceptual  confusion  exists  in  the  global  governance  literature” between 
access and participation (Uhre, Tallberg, Duit, & Beyers, 2013, p. 15). Hence, there is a need 
to first look into the ways of participating – the strategies, before moving on to understanding 
how influence occurs.  
2.3 Strategy: Activists, Advisors or Lobbyists   
In order to understand the strategies available, one must firstly map the terrain and then 
evaluate the type of organisation and followingly the tools available. The former section gave 
the analytical foundation for studying the setting that the non-state actors navigate in, and this 
section will therefore first look into the types of NGOs before elaborating on the theories on 
the strategies that can be expected from the environmental and business NGOs.  
NGO Types 
Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005) differentiate between “activist” vs. “advisory” types of 
environmental organisations. While activist organisations “obtain funding and legitimacy 
through membership and popular support”, the advisory organisations obtain these “through 
their ability to give policy recommendations and provide decision makers with legal, 
technical or scientific advice”. Somewhat similar to this distinction but with other terms, 
NGOs (more generally) can also be distinguished by how radical their stance is on climate 
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change. Jackson and Sørensen (2010, pp. 261-263) point to the “modernist” versus 
“ecoradical” approach to the issue of environment. Briefly explained, the modernist view is 
that improvement in science will be sufficient to protect the environment while the 
ecoradicals’ opinion is that human activities are challenging the planet’s capacity and 
ecosystem, and therefore, technology is not sufficient and drastic changes in modern lifestyles 
are required in order to face these problems. This can affect how close the NGOs’ approach is 
to what is acceptable for some governments, and thus the potential of their impact. This 
distinction between ecoradical and modernist ENGOs, is complementary, rather than 
incompatible, to Gulbrandsen and Andresen’s model, due to the similarities between the 
ecoradicals/activist NGOs and modernist/advisory NGOs.   
NGO Strategies  
While states can exercise various tactics of influence, such as those Holsti (1995) points to: a) 
persuasion; b) offering rewards; c) granting rewards; d) threatening with punishment; e) 
inflict non-violent punishment and; f) use of force, these cannot be directly applied to NGOs 
in UN negotiations. Firstly, there are formal restrictions for those who attend the UNFCCC 
negotiations, thus, using force would simply get the NGO delegate(s) expelled from that 
meeting or even permanently. As such, it is an option but not a relevant one. Betsill and 
Corell (2001, p. 74) argue that a) persuasion is the only way for non-state actors to influence 
government representatives. Based on this argument, they apply David Knoke’s definition to 
their study on NGOs’ influence in international environmental negotiations and define NGO 
influence as “when they intentionally transmit information to negotiators that alters both the 
negotiation process and outcome from what would have occurred otherwise” (Betsill & 
Corell, 2001, pp. 66, 74). The key element of their definition is information that creates 
influence. It must also be noted that not only the outcome (eg. final negotiation text) is 
considered, but also the negotiation process (eg. the agenda).  
However, d) punishment as enlisted in Holsti’s definition of state influence can also be 
applied to NGOs; for example, NGOs can punish governments through ‘shaming’ in the 
media and/or through actions in order to affect the public opinion – and ultimately create 
pressure that could change a state’s position. Conversely, rewards (b and c) can also be given 
to some extent. Although states usually have more financial resources, non-state actors can 
offer other types of resources as a reward. For example, they can promise to use their 
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exclusive network (ie. CAN) in order to promote/speak positively about a country’s position. 
The non-state actors can also offer “faming” by embracing a country’s policy or even carry 
out so called “greenwashing” (deceptive green marketing). In the updated theoretical 
framework, Betsill and Corell (2008, pp. 23-24) now recognise the other tactics as well for 
NGOs. More specifically Princen and Finger (1994, p. 37) for example argue that NGOs’ 
leverage can be linked to “expertise, grass-roots support, a transnational base or network, the 
ability to rectify information imbalances, and, above all, public legitimacy”.  
According to Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 172) “relationship between [green] NGO 
types and resources, levels targeted and strategies” can be summarised as below:  
 Activist NGO Advisory NGO 
Critical resources Membership base Intellectual base 
Arenas targeted International negotiations 
Domestic policy 
Target groups  
Public opinion 
International negotiations 
Domestic policy  
(Target groups) 
Strategy  Dual strategy: insider and outsider Insider only 
Table 2.1 “Relationship between NGO type and resources, levels targeted and strategies” (Andresen & 
Gulbrandsen, 2005, p. 172).  
The critical resource is the source of leverage that can contribute to influence. Andresen and 
Gulbrandsen (2005, pp. 171-172) list up the following resources: 1) intellectual base which is 
issue-specific knowledge and the ability to give expert advise; 2) membership base is simply 
the NGOs’ number of members; 3) political base is the NGO’s access to decision makers and 
lastly; 4) financial base is financial resources that can be channelled into “campaigns, 
lobbying, participation at conferences, commissioning of expert reports etc.”. This list is not 
exhaustive, but its purpose is to “show that the types of leverage an NGO can apply will 
contribute to defining the organisation’s opportunity set” (Andresen & Gulbrandsen, 2005, p. 
172).  
Insider strategy focuses on knowledge construction, research-based reports, policy solutions, 
and expert advice (Gulbrandsen & Andresen, 2004, p. 56).  In this strategy, NGOs work 
closely with the negotiators and decision makers. Outsider strategy, on the other hand, applies 
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tactics aiming at influencing the public opinion in order “to induce states to be more flexible 
in international negotiations, to push governments to comply with international commitments 
and to give polluters and environmentally harmful corporations negative public exposure”. 
This is carried out through pressuring governments and negotiators, and target groups through 
various means such as “campaigning, letters of protest, rallying, direct actions, boycotts, and 
even civil disobedience”. According to Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005), activist NGOs 
combine the two strategies while advisory NGOs mainly apply the insider strategy.  
How does the BINGOs fit into this picture? Irja Vormedal (2008) studies the influence of 
business and industry NGOs (BINGOs) in promoting carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) within the UNFCCC negotiations. She develops an 
analytical framework that encompasses both the formal and informal channels, and argues 
that the BINGOs influenced regulatory design, particularly based on their corporate 
technological power. In an effort to bridge the divide between the business lobby and NGO 
influence literature, she bases her analytical framework for BINGOs on methodology that 
originates from the analysis of ENGO influence at environmental negotiations (Vormedal, 
2008). Her analytical approach is also compatible with the theory on influence by Betsill and 
Correll that will be presented later, as Vormedal also bases her framework on their model.  
Vormedal (2008) first distinguishes the types of BINGOs from “grey” to “green” BINGOs, 
according to how they view climate change mitigation, the strategies and mandate they apply, 
and their tactics, as illustrated in table 2.2 below:  
 
Table 2.2. “Gray-Green Continuum of BINGOs in the Climate Regime” (Vormedal, 2008, p. 41).  
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As can be seen in table 2.2, she has four categories that indicate how pro-climate a BINGO is, 
and which implications she expects for the mandates, strategies and tactics chosen. Vormedal 
applies Alpin and Hegarty’s notion of information-based political strategies to define 
information-based lobbying as something that “may involve providing governments with 
expert advice, technical reports and position papers, and assisting decision-makers directly 
with policy formulation and the writing of legal texts”, and later adds networking with key 
decision-makers, and discursive tactics (Vormedal, 2008, p. 43). 
Based on table 2.1, the following table 2.3 illustrates an adaption of the table by Andresen and 
Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 172) to encompass the business actor by supplementing the theory 
from Vormedal (2008) as presented in table 2.2:  
 Activist ENNGO Advisory ENNGO Lobbyist BINGO 
Critical resources Membership base Intellectual base Financial base 
Arenas targeted International negotiations 
Domestic policy 
Target groups  
Public opinion 
International negotiations 
Domestic policy  
(Target groups) 
International negotiations 
Domestic policy 
Strategy  Dual strategy: insider and 
outsider 
Insider only Insider only 
Table 2.3. Analytical Framework for the NGOs’ Strategies.  
This study will use this as an analytical framework in order to understand the strategies of the 
selected NGOs. Looking at the critical resources, NNV falls under the activist ENGO 
category, while Bellona is more an advisory ENGO, and NSA a green or grey BINGO. NSA’s 
position on the green/grey continuum will be assessed through the empirical findings. The 
policy arena and the theories on strategies based on the types of NGO have been presented, so 
let us now move on to explore how NGO influence can be understood.  
2.4 Theory on Non-state Actors’ Influence  
Paradoxically, the term “influence” has not been properly defined in many studies focusing on 
NGO influence in international negotiations (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 68). One issue is that 
it will be difficult to compare across cases, while another is that it causes the risk of over-
determination – the research only focuses on successes and not the failures. Furthermore, as a 
related matter to lack of definition in the academic literature, Andresen and Gulbrandsen 
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(2005) point out that some scholars confuse NGO “access” with “influence”. Similarly, NGO 
“activity” and “resources” have also been presented as evidence of influence.  
Let us look into some examples. Many NGOs have access to the negotiations but their 
primary goal is not necessarily lobbying for their policies into the negotiation texts but rather 
to gain knowledge about the UNFCCC process and communicate that to their target audience. 
Access for some NGOs is simply access to knowledge – not necessarily the wish to influence. 
Hence, access to the UNFCCC and activities at COPs can be indications of how attempts to 
influence may happen, but are not alone evidence on whether NGOs have an intention to 
influence or succeed in affecting the negotiations. 
In “Activists Beyond Borders” Keck and Sikkink (1998, pp. 25-26) point out that it is 
necessary to study goal attainment at several different levels. However, this will not be 
sufficient to prove isolated influence by single actors. Although there are overlaps between an 
actor’s policy and the outcome, the influence could originate from other sources. Thus, 
correlation must not be confused with causation.  
NGO influence can be mapped out by “building a logical chain of evidence linking NGO 
transmission of information, actors’ use/non-use of that information, and the effects/non-
effects of that information” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, pp. 71-72). They argue that this chain of 
evidence can be established by looking at the NGO’s access, activities and resources, and 
goal attainment. Adding to this, response by the negotiators and politicians should be added 
as a perspective to their model. This is because, in general, behaviour by an NGO in one 
context may affect the receiver’s perception of the same NGO’s message in a later instance of 
lobbying. Additionally, although the information is not transmitted immediately due to 
restrictions that the negotiators/politicians/bureaucrats face, the idea may be brought back to 
light at a later stage. Hence, though the focus is on 2009-2014, broader perspectives must be 
considered when relevant. The logical chain of evidence can be summarised as presented in 
the illustration 2.1 below.  
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Illustration 2.1. Chain of evidence on NGO influence 
This line of thought is also reflected in and supports the research questions: which channels of 
influence are there (access), which strategies are applied (activities and resources), and do the 
NGOs succeed in reaching their goals (response and goal attainment)? However, access alone 
does not give the whole picture on the environment in which the NGOs operate. Hence, in 
studying the channels, it is essential to also understand how an actor stands among other 
potential influencers.  
In NGO Diplomacy – the Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International 
Environmental Negotiations, Betsill and Corell (2008, p. 24) argue that the definition of NGO 
influence in environmental negotiations occurs “when one actor intentionally communicates 
to another so as to alter the latter’s behaviour from what would have occurred otherwise”. 
Betsill and Corell (2008) notes that communication encompasses a variety of methods (from 
technical information to threats etc.). This updated definition therefore accommodates 
criticism from amongst others Skodvin (2012) towards their 2001 article. Vormedal (2008, p. 
44) on the other hand, criticise Betsill and Corell’s definition as it “fails to define the type of 
behaviour being caused”.6 She points to Dahl’s relational concept of power: “A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do” (Dahl, 
1957, pp. 202-203). The argument is that it is contingent that the change in behaviour reflects 
the intentions by the sender of the message. Hence, taking Vormedal’s criticism into 
                                                 
6 Vormedal addresses Betsill and Corell’s article from 2001 but the criticism is also valid for the updated 
definition in the book from 2008.  
Access
• which decision makers and decision making processes are available 
(ie. accredtitation to UNFCCC, meetings with 
politicians/negotiators/bureaucrats)?
Activities & 
resources
• which activities are carried out with which resources in attempting 
to influence (ie. lobby meetings, position papers, activism, use of 
media)
Response
• what are the reaction by the reciever of the political message? 
Goal 
attainment
• use/non-use of transmitted information by decision makers. Altered 
behaviour. 
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consideration, NGO influence can be defined as: when A intentionally communicates to B so 
as to alter B’s behaviour from what would have occurred otherwise and bringing about A’s 
intended effects.  
Betsill and Corell (2008, pp. 34-35) develop their analytical framework and a system to assess 
NGO influence as illustrated in the table 2.4 below:  
 Influence 
indicators 
Evidence NGO 
influence? 
(yes/no) Behaviour of other actors… 
…as caused by NGO 
communication 
Influence on 
negotiation 
process  
Issue framing How was the issue 
understood prior to the start 
of the negotiations?  
Was there a shift in how the 
issue was understood once 
the negotiations were 
underway? 
What did NGOs do to 
bring about this 
understanding? 
 
 Agenda 
setting  
How did the issue first 
come to the attention of the 
international community? 
What specific items were 
placed on or taken off the 
negotiation agenda?  
What were the terms of 
debate for specific agenda 
items? 
What did NGOs do to 
shape the agenda?  
 
 Positions of 
key actors 
What was the initial 
position of key actors? 
Did key actors change their 
position during the 
negotiations? 
What did NGOs do to 
shape position of key 
actors?  
 
Influence on 
negotiation 
outcome 
Final 
agreement/ 
procedural 
issues 
Does the agreement create 
new institutions to facilitate 
NGO participation in future 
decision-making processes?  
Does the agreement 
acknowledge the role of 
NGOs in implementation? 
What did NGOs do to 
promote these procedural 
changes?  
 
 Final 
agreement/ 
substantive 
issues 
 Does the agreement reflect 
the NGO position about 
what should be done on the 
issue?  
What did the NGOs do to 
promote these 
substantive issues?  
 
Table 2.4. “Indicators of NGO influence” (Betsill & Corell, 2008, pp. 34-35) 
As this thesis’ research questions has a broader scope than the UNFCCC as an arena (as it 
will also study indirect channels to the international negotiations), this table will purely serve 
as a foundation to assist the analysis of influence. Together with the definition on NGO 
influence, it will guide the analysis of influence based on the collected data. 
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3 Method 
This chapter will firstly present the case selection suited to answer the research questions, 
followed by challenges and benefits of the choices. Secondly, the description and discussion 
of methods will be presented before considering threats to validity and reliability and how that 
can be counteracted.  
3.1 Case Selection  
The potential sample was first narrowed to the organisations with a consultative status to the 
UNFCCC, then following some initial research, three organisations were selected on the basis 
that they apparently used different strategies and channels of influence. George and Bennett 
(2005, p. 83) stress that the selection must match the research objective. The following 
section will thus shortly present how the cases were narrowed down and finally selected, by 
discussing their relevance and feasibility to answer the research questions.  
3.1.1 Consultative Status to the UNFCCC 
Firstly, media sources and impressions from previous participation at COP15 were used in 
order to gather a general picture of the Norwegian non-state participation. However, neither 
media exposure nor visibility at a COP are not necessarily the most effective strategy and/or 
accessible for all organisations. Therefore, the list of accredited Norwegian organisations to 
the UNFCCC appeared as a natural starting point of case selection.  
As this thesis does not solely focus on the UNFCCC negotiation as an arena of influence, it 
can be argued that limiting case selection to organisations with consultative status would 
exclude non-state actors that also engage in the topic through other channels. Some 
Norwegian environmental NGOs, such as Zero and Future in Our Hands (Framtiden i våre 
hender), work domestically to influence Norwegian climate policy but not in the UNFCCC 
negotiations.   
The consultative status, however, can be considered as a sign of active interest to the 
UNFCCC negotiations, and not simply Norway’s climate policy. Many actors participate in 
the domestic climate debate; nevertheless, there is arguably less discussion more concretely 
on the Norwegian delegation’s strategies or international targets and how those should be met. 
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Furthermore, the application procedure for the UNFCCC is somewhat comprehensive; the 
applicant is among other things required to present documentation on relevant activities to 
indicate the organisations’ competence on UNFCCC related topics, and the applicant must 
apply more than a year prior to a COP (UNFCCC, 2015). In other words, organisations must 
decide whether it is a priority worth the efforts. Other channels, such as own national 
governments and the media are supplementary in the context of this thesis – they are means 
by which organisations try to influence what happens with the Norwegian delegation’s 
position as well as the overall outcome of the international negotiations. The most relevant 
actors in this regard are thus those that have decided that UNFCCC is a platform they choose 
to use.  
Another perspective potentially neglected in this case selection is that certain non-state actors 
will partake in the UNFCCC negotiations through another organisation’s accreditation. 
Nature and Youth (Natur og ungdom), youth parties7 and the Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise (NHO) do not have direct accreditation, but still participate through other NGO 
delegations or through international umbrella organisations. To eliminate these in the 
selection was a conscious choice in order to limit the scope of the research. It would not be 
feasible for the purpose of this thesis to get in touch with the over 1,500 organisations with 
consultative status to UNFCCC to seek out Norwegian delegates. Some NGO delegates are 
even included in national delegations from countries other than their own. Thus, selecting 
cases from the organisations directly accredited and registered in Norway is a purposeful 
starting point for case selection. Lastly, the Norwegian Council for Children and Youth 
(LNU) does not have accreditation, but has a youth delegate on the Norwegian delegation to 
the UNFCCC (LNU, 2015a, 2015b; Rotevatn, 2015). As I am currently involved with LNU as 
the UNFCCC youth delegate for 2015, this could potentially affect the academic distance 
needed, and LNU was thus eliminated as a case. 
3.1.2 The Different NGO Types 
Three organisations were selected on the basis that they use different strategies and channels 
of influence. As presented in the former theoretical chapter, Andresen and Gulbrandsen 
(2005) distinguish between member based and intellectually focused environmental 
                                                 
7 In Norway, the youth parties are mostly organisations independent from their mother parties rather than 
integral youth wings of political parties.  
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organisations. In order to reflect this perspective, Norwegian Society for the Conservation of 
Nature (NNV) and Bellona Foundation were respectively obvious choices among the 
Norwegian ENGOs with accreditation. Furthermore, NNV is an interesting case as it has a 
unique channel of influence through a delegate on the official Norwegian delegation (and not 
just the extended delegation). In order to highlight a different perspective and dynamics that 
could illustrate another approach than ENGOs, Norwegian Shipowners' Association (NSA) 
was selected. Shipping is a key industry in Norway and is as such an interesting case to 
explore. Moreover, as this particular business sector is highly exposed to international 
competition and is a topic under discussion in the UNFCCC since it is responsible for 2-3 per 
cent of global CO2 emissions, NSA has an interest in influencing potential international or 
country specific regulations.  
As presented in the introduction, there are other constituencies such as research NGOs 
(RINGOs), trade union NGOs (TUNGOs), and youth NGOs (YOUNGOs) as well. However, 
ENGOs, researchers and BINGOs are “considered to be among the most long-standing and 
active observer constituencies participating in the climate regime” (Depledge 2005 in 
Vormedal, 2008, p. 37). As this thesis studies organised interests, RINGOs were excluded. 
Moreover, increasing the number of organisations to study would affect the time available to 
study each individual case, and as the purpose of this study is to supplement the existing 
research that mainly looks into the non-state influence on the global level, it is more suitable 
to allow in depth qualitative research by limiting the number.  
Beyond the question on the number of interviews practically feasible, an important aspect of 
these particular research questions was an aim to gain an in-depth understanding of all the 
topics that each organisation worked on in the climate negotiations. UNFCCC is often 
described as a highly technical negotiation process with a complex structure of alliances. 
Adding to that, proper understanding of for example mitigation targets, Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), deforestation and forest degradation, the shipping industry, Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS), etc. (that are some illustrations of the topics NNV, NSA and 
Bellona work on) was essential in order to be able to carry out the interviews effectively. 
Therefore, an understanding of the intricate negotiation process and all the topics connected to 
each organisation’s strategy was also taken into consideration when deciding on the number 
of organisations to study.  
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Accessibility was another reason for the actors chosen. Of the business NGOs (BINGOs), I 
had a contact within NSA who could introduce me to those working on climate issues. Other 
BINGOs would require efforts that would not necessarily bear fruits. In addition to 
representing a key industry, the choice of NSA was therefore also of a pragmatic nature 
taking into consideration the feasibility for this thesis.  
3.1.3 Time Frame  
The period that this thesis will study is mainly from 2009 (COP15 in Copenhagen) to 2014 
(COP20 in Lima). COP15 was a decisive moment as it was supposed to lead to a new 
international agreement that would replace the Kyoto Protocol, and failed to do so. More 
specifically for the purpose of the thesis’ research questions, it was the peak year in non-state 
participation with approximately 15,000 non-state delegates (Spain, 2009). Since then, the 
number of delegates from observer organisations has been highly restricted. However, due to 
the nature of the topics studied in this thesis the period is indicatory. As previously 
mentioned, influence happens over varying amount of time. Therefore, activities from other 
periods will also be considered when relevant to the primary time frame.  
3.2 Description of Method 
This thesis is a case study in which data is collected through field study, informant interviews 
and document analysis. Additionally, relevant existing research will supplement the first-hand 
data. This method will allow for a holistic image of the channels of influence available, the 
strategies applied and the influence of NNV, NSA, and Bellona.  
The various sources and the different methods of data collection (particularly whether the 
researcher has an active or passive relation to the data) affect the results that surface. While 
documents are static, interviews and fieldwork require a more active researcher role. Keeping 
this in mind, it is important to have a clear understanding of how to benefit from the 
complementary nature of the data. These sources were therefore approached in the following 
manner: 1) the first phase starts as the more “passive” document analysis in addition to 
studying former research which establish a firm foundation for; 2) the field study that allows 
first hand active information-gathering that further strengthens the background knowledge 
that helps prepare; 3) the informant interviews in which further active data is collected and 
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former impressions adjusted and finally; 4) the last phase returns to the document analysis, 
former research, and follow-up communication whenever necessary. Let us now look into 
each data type.  
3.2.1 Document Analysis 
Organisations’ position papers, strategy documents, and annual reports are some of the key 
documents essential to mapping out and understanding the strategies and positions of each 
organisation. Official government documents, such as white papers, Norwegian submissions 
to the UNFCCC, and speeches by the Prime Minister and Environment Ministers, will be 
studied in order to look into the policies of the government. The Norwegian delegation has a 
detailed position paper for the COPs and inter-sessional meetings. Not all of these were 
published, and were hence acquired directly from the Ministry for Climate and Environment. 
Official UN documents such as treaties and conventions will also be studied.  
Media sources and newsletters by organisations will be subjects for analysis, in order to 
understand the organisations as well as the decision makers. Carrying out targeted searches in 
the media database Atekst owned by Retriever (a leading media monitor supplier in the 
Nordic countries that covers almost two hundred news sources) will allow thorough 
examinations. This will be a source of information on concrete statements by the three NGOs 
and the decision makers, as well as a way to gain an overview of the media activity by these 
organisations during the UNFCCC negotiations. Additionally, bulletins that cover the daily 
activities in the negotiations such as ECO and Earth Negotiations Bulletin are useful sources 
that allows specific insight into the detailed negotiation process.  
3.2.2 Field Study 
Although this thesis researches climate conferences back to COP15 in 2009, it was still 
essential for the development of this research with a field study at COP20 in Lima, Peru. I 
have previously participated at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 through an international NGO 
delegation from the International Federation of the Liberal Youth (IFLRY). This was a source 
of inspiration for the research questions, and a source of several assumptions prior to my 
research. The field study at COP20, however, was an indispensable part of this research, 
particularly due to the fact that it countered many of my a priori assumptions in regards to 
Norwegian non-state participation.  
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Although I participated in COP15, I had almost no direct interaction with Norwegians outside 
my own delegation. Thus, the subjects were not exposed to my previous role that could 
potentially affect their impression of my role as a researcher. On the other hand, it was an 
important background experience both to navigate efficiently at a complex event and to 
interpret the situation. After the end of the field work and the interviews I have asked some of 
the subjects who I met during the field study whether they were aware of my former 
background, and those who I asked had not noticed.  
A moderate type of participant observation was chosen in order to balance the insider and 
outsider perspective. In practice, this meant participating in formal and informal settings; 
nevertheless, staying somewhat passive in conversations in the sense that I would rather ask 
questions than give my own opinions in discussions, and in meetings I would simply stay in 
the background.  
A principal purpose of the field work was of course to accumulate an impression of the work 
of the Norwegian organisations through observations and talks, but it also became an 
indispensable part of the study in that such comprehensive participation over two weeks 
allowed for access to unique information that could not have been achieved solely from 
interviews. Through the field study experience, I was able to highlight nuances in the 
interview setting later, as I had established concrete ideas about what I should ask beyond the 
standard questions. In addition to contributing to the formulation of pointed questions, the 
fieldwork was also useful in helping the subjects to refresh their memories if their memory 
halted.  
3.2.3 Informant Interviews 
Gerring (2009, p. 45) points out that case study research can “offer insight into the intentions, 
the reasoning capabilities, and the information-processing procedures of the actors involved in 
a given setting” in studying decisional behaviour. Furthermore, Dennis Chong argues that the 
advantage of in-depth interviews in this regard, is that the researcher can more fully record 
how subjects arrive at their opinions (Chong 1993 in Gerring, 2009, p. 45).  
The informant interviews were qualitative and in-depth, carried out in a semi-structured 
manner. The interview guide thus covers a series of questions, however without a strict order 
and also including questions with open-ended answers. The prepared questions will allow 
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certain standardisation to the acquisition of information while also allowing the informants to 
speak freely – opening for added perspectives to what is covered in the interview guide. In the 
interview setting, an active researcher role was selected. Active in this context does not imply 
overriding or asking leading questions to the subject. Rather, while being an attentive listener, 
it is about taking the initiative when suited in order to test the researcher’s own assumptions 
or the basis of the subject’s observations, descriptions, and assessments (Andersen, 2006, p. 
280). During the interview with the Norwegian Head of Delegation (2013-) Aslak Brun stated 
that he had not noticed much of NSA’s influence directly, however, later in the interview he 
was well aware of the shipowners’ interests in the negotiations (Brun, 2015). That interview 
moment is an illustration on how an active researcher role and a semi-structured interview 
format were useful to explore the origins of Brun’s source of knowledge which he had not 
initially reflected on, in order to examine whether it could be understood as indirect political 
influence from NSA.  
The informants were chosen through the “position method” – meaning that they have a certain 
power, influence, and knowledge due to a formal position, instead of the “reputation method” 
that seeks out influencers through their reputation (Engelstad, 2010, pp. 174-175). Engelstad 
points out that although the latter could contribute to uncovering actors who affect decision-
making indirectly, it could also contribute to unnecessarily clouding the results. The 
institutions to be studied in this thesis have divisions of labour that allow an effective 
selection of relevant subjects; hence, the position method appeared most appropriate.  
The informants chosen in NNV, NSA and Bellona were thus presidents and other key 
employees/representatives working specifically on the UNFCCC negotiations. To highlight 
the authorities’ recipient perspective, former and current Heads of Delegations and 
Environment Ministers (in one case the Minister’s Political Adviser), the President of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Energy and Environment, and negotiators/bureaucrats working 
on topics related to the three NGOs strategic goals, were chosen as subjects. Additionally, the 
UNFCCC NGO Liaison Officer was an important source who could supplement the 
knowledge gained from official documents. Other key informants were a representative from 
The Norwegian Forum for Development and Environment (ForUM) who has coordinated 
civil society meetings with the Norwegian delegation and authorities. Additionally, third party 
perspectives were obtained through interviews and talks with Norwegian researchers who 
have followed the negotiations.  
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3.3 Discussion of Method 
Case study was selected as the approach for this thesis.  Robert K. Yin argues that case study 
research is “the preferred method, compared to the others, in situations when (1) the main 
research questions are ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions; (2) a researcher has little or no control over 
behavioural events; and (3) the focus of study is a contemporary (as opposed to entirely 
historical) phenomenon.” (Yin, 2014, p. 2). Case study thus appears as a suited method to 
answer the research questions. Mitchell (2004, p. 122), on the other hand, is critical to this 
method stating that “[t]he findings of carefully designed case studies often fit the case studied 
well but cannot be convincingly extended to many, and sometimes to any, other cases”.  As 
presented in the previous chapter, a substantial amount of research has been developed 
particularly on transnational NGOs and networks, however less so on Norwegian NGOs work 
directed at the UNFCCC. The in-depth understanding provided by a case study, is hence 
valuable in this phase in a research field. Furthermore, by applying the analytical framework 
by Betsill and Corell (2008) as presented in the previous chapter, it allows the researcher to 
highlight the uniqueness of each case while also being able to draw more generalised 
conclusions, and letting others apply the findings in this study in a comparative analysis.  
The research questions ask for the channels available for the civil society, strategies applied, 
and the evaluation of the outcome of their tactics. Thus, it is essential to find key informants 
who have proper insight into these topics within their organisation/institution, and are able to 
share knowledge in a comprehensive manner. Accordingly, informant interviews appear as a 
suitable choice of method. However, there are several potential pitfalls in carrying out an 
interview – particularly with the elite. Firstly, informants in general are often inclined to 
create a positive portrayal of their self-image, and speak from their own point of view 
(Goffman, 1992). Consequently, the civil society representatives may present a favourable 
picture of their own accomplishments. Also, the civil servants and the politicians may as well 
opt for such a positive description of the non-state actors’ influence in decision-making, if 
they are motivated to present themselves as having an open approach towards civil society.  
Secondly, elites will have a stronger ability to control the interview situation, and potentially 
neglect the interviewer’s perception (Engelstad, 2010, p. 185). They are also more 
accustomed to presenting an official statement.  
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Several counter strategies were set in place in order to withstand these difficulties. One sided 
and potentially too positive (or negative) portrayals of civil society’s accomplishments, will 
be avoided by matching the information gathered from one interview with statements from 
other informants (including third parties) and document analysis, in order to 
verify/modify/contradict claims. Regarding the elite’s influence over the interview situation, 
this must be countered by doing comprehensive background research and also being aware of 
the interview subject’s power. Given the value of informants’ insights, and with these counter 
measures in place, the informant interviews were a productive way to answer the research 
questions.  
3.4 Threats to Validity and Reliability 
A key threat to the validity and reliability in this research is that due to the informants being 
very resourceful, there is a higher risk that the subjects may attempt to steer the direction of 
the interview. Svein S. Andersen (2006, p. 279) argues that a conscious and active research 
role can increase the analytical control, and thus improve the validity and reliability. If for 
example, there are topics that are more sensitive, the informants may try to avoid it. In the 
case of NSA, there is an internal disagreement within the shipping industry, particularly 
between shipbrokers and shipowners, regarding the speed of the ship, which has implications 
for climate friendliness/energy efficiency and delivery efficiency. Thus, it was important to 
accumulate sufficient knowledge of the industry and carefully ask the question in order to 
highlight a topic with implications for their strategic thinking (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). 
This is one of many examples in which an active research role contributed to tackle the threat 
to validity and reliability in an interview setting. 
Particularly for the interviews that dealt with negotiations a few years back, memory of the 
informants could contribute to a reduced reliability and validity (Andersen, 2006, pp. 292-
293). Andersen points to psychological research that shows unique memories, particularly on 
complex subjects, are more difficult to reconstruct correctly compared to situations 
characterised by routines. This issue did in fact occur in some of the interviews; however, this 
threat was tackled through the previously mentioned verification procedure.  
Informants are naturally inclined to present themselves in a preferable light. It does not 
necessarily occur consciously; nevertheless, people have a tendency to highlight their own 
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efforts over others’ as those are easier to oversee (Plous 1993 in Andersen, 2006, p. 293). 
Therefore, it was essential to compare the informant’s perspectives with other sources, and 
whenever possible explore those topics during the actual interview. The credibility is about 
putting statements and thoughts of the informants in a coherent context (Ochs & Capps 2002 
in Andersen, 2006, p. 294).  
In assessing influence, there is naturally the question of perception. Andresen and 
Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 178) points out “discrepancy between ego and alter perceptions about 
NGO influence”. For example, the Norwegian Head of Delegation from 1995-2007, Harald 
Dovland, expresses that on the topic of compliance NGOs have had limited impact on the 
design, while Andresen and Guldbransen notes that there is nonetheless, unclear direction of 
causation due to the close interaction between NGOs and delegates. This must be tackled by 
building the analysis on a robust set of indicators from various sources. Furthermore, the 
triangulation method called the EAR instrument can contribute to increased validity (Arts & 
Verschuren, 1999, pp. 416-419). The instrument can be summarised as in the table 3.1 below:  
 
Table 3.1. “Three Dimensions of the EAR Instrument” (Source: Arts & Verschuren, 1999, p. 417) 
Being conscious of these challenges, these were approached by researching a variety of 
sources and data types in order to verify the information received and build a robust research. 
Let us now move to the three chapters that will directly address the three research questions.  
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4 Canvassing the Channels 
This chapter will first explain the framework of civil society participation in the UNFCCC 
process, thereby assessing the first part of the research question. What are the direct channels 
through the UN system, and what are the indirect channels through, for example, national 
governments, regional organisations such as the EU, and other alliances? This will be 
highlighted through the findings in the interviews, official document sources, and existing 
academic literature.  
This section is structured in such a way to reflect each of the arenas of influence as laid out 
by Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 171) and as presented in the theoretical framework. 
First, the channels in the international negotiations and processes will be considered, before 
studying the domestic/foreign/regional climate policy and ratification arenas. Thirdly, the 
target groups – as a channel of influence, is looked into. Finally, the public opinion is 
considered. The main emphasis will be on the first topic on the international negotiations 
itself. Empirical data will be presented for each of the aforementioned sections before moving 
directly into the analysis of that specific arena.  
4.1 International Negotiations and Processes: 
UNFCCC 
‘If you want to go quickly, go alone - if you want to go far, go together. Maybe we 
were slow, but will make it together.’ – Dan Reifsnyder, Co-Chair, ADP, UNFCCC (2015). 
UN processes can be very deliberate, as illustrated in the quote from the Co-Chair of the inter-
sessional negotiations in Geneva in February 20158. The UNFCCC negotiations are a so-
called “party-driven process”, indicating that the participating state parties must be included 
throughout the process and have a sense of ownership of the outcome. Thus, in the UNFCCC, 
consensus is sought rather than quick decision-making through majority voting. It is 
understandable that it requires comprehensive effort to reach consensus among almost two 
hundred states with diverging interests. In this context, the NGOs can give a push to the 
negotiations by asserting pressure in an attempt to create a momentum to move the 
negotiations forward. The NGOs can also use the party-driven process to their advantage as it 
                                                 
8 The quotes and paraphrases from the Geneva meeting in 2015 used here, and later, are taken from my own 
notes from that meeting which I attended in a different capacity than as a master student.  
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increases the relevance of greater number of states. Followingly, more delegations can be 
lobbied and/or made alliances with. Let us now look into the access – both formal and 
informal to the international climate negotiations.  
4.1.1 Data 
Access to the UNFCCC negotiations 
Formal and informal access and limitations 
In article 71 in the UN Charter from 1945, NGOs are granted a “consultative arrangement”. 
This implies that various UN bodies have a system for giving NGOs a consultative status that 
ensures some degree of access to the policy-making processes – if not otherwise required by 
the member states. As a consequence, the NGOs are granted a “secondary role” to the states 
(Skodvin, 2012). The UNFCCC has its own accreditation system in addition to the UN 
Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) consultative status that grants access to several 
UN bodies, including UNFCCC. The Article 7, paragraph 6, in the Convention on Climate 
Change states that:  
“Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-
governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has 
informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the 
Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present 
object.  The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of 
procedure adopted by the Conference of the Parties.” (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 12). 
Similarly, on Contact Groups (negotiating groups that report to the plenary meetings):  
“The Conference of the Parties […] Decides that the presiding officers of Convention 
bodies may invite representatives of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations 
to attend as observers any open-ended contact group established under the Convention 
process, unless at least one third of the Parties present at the session of the Convention body 
setting up that contact group object, and on the understanding that the presiding officers of 
such contact groups may determine at any time during their proceedings that they should be 
closed to intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations” (UNFCCC, 1998b, p. 66). 
These decisions are two of the key decisions that cement NGO access to the UNFCCC 
negotiations. Additionally, Rule 6-8 in the draft Rules of Procedure from COP2 (that is 
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applied albeit being a draft)9 reflects the aforementioned decisions and adds to the formal 
structure for NGO participation at UNFCCC negotiations (UNFCCC, 1996, p. 4). 
Furthermore, regarding Rule 30 that states that COPs are public while its subsidiary bodies 
normally have private meetings, it is specified in an interpretation that accredited observers 
are also permitted to attend “private meetings” (UNFCCC, 1996, p. 9). Consequently, media 
are the only actors at the negotiations excluded from these meetings.  
In order to achieve consultative/observer status, an NGO can go through the ECOSOC 
consultative status as mentioned previously. Applying directly to UNFCCC requires an 
organisation to submit information on their relevance to topics in the UNFCCC, and formal 
documentations (such as tax-exempt status and proof that they are non-profit) (UNFCCC, 
2015). The Secretariat screens the applications and complies a list that is considered by the 
COP Bureau which then submits it to the COP (or an inter-sessional meeting for provisional 
admission) (Yamin & Depledge, 2004, p. 435).  
While some Norwegian non-state actors apply directly through this system to achieve this 
consultative status, others access the negotiations through other national or international 
accredited organisations or directly through the national delegation. There are also examples 
internationally of organisations that have been invited to be advisors for or directly part of, 
national delegations from countries affected by climate change but with limited negotiation 
resources of their own (Newell 2000 & Oberthür 2002 in Andresen & Gulbrandsen, 2005, p. 
173).  
As a reaction to the tremendous NGO presence at COP15, the numbers have since been 
limited. NGOs that had over a hundred delegates to COP15 were sometimes reduced to a 
delegation of less than ten representatives. The UNFCCC’s NGO Liaison Megumi Endo 
(2014) explained that the number of delegates are decided on the basis of the size of the 
organisation and a merit system based on previous participation – active use of the delegates 
allocated were rewarded. Furthermore, negative behaviour, particularly non-authorised 
actions were penalised, with expulsion as the most severe consequence.  
                                                 
9 The Convention (in Article 7.3) decided that the Parties would adopt its own rules of procedure as well as 
those of the subsidiary bodies, however, as Parties are unable to agree on the voting rule (Rule 42), the rules of 
procedure remain a draft.  
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The number of participants represents an opportunity for alliances as well as competition for 
attention from decision-makers and journalists.  
The NGOs in the UNFCCC negotiations are categorised in the constituencies as listed below: 
1. Business and industry non-governmental organisations (BINGO);  
2. Environmental non-governmental organisations  (ENGO); 
3. Farmers non-governmental organisations  (Farmers)10; 
4. Indigenous peoples organisations  (IPO); 
5. Local government and municipal authorities (LGMA); 
6. Research and independent non-governmental organisations  (RINGO); 
7. Trade unions non-governmental organisations  (TUNGO); 
8. Women and gender non-governmental organisations  (Women and Gender); 
9. Youth non-governmental organisations  (YOUNGO). 
These groups are identified as stakeholders in Agenda 21, the comprehensive plan of action 
for the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. This status allows “plenary 
interventions, time permitting, are made per constituency, and their focal points interact with 
the secretariat as channels of communication with large groups of constituents” (UNFCCC, 
2013a, p. 1). For some NGOs, this is thus an important channel to voice their opinions.   
According to a UN official Betsill interviewed, access to the negotiation area was limited as a 
consequence of an action by a BINGO from the oil industry that sent notes to OPEC countries 
in an attempt to orchestrate the debate (Betsill in Betsill & Corell, 2008, p. 48). Furthermore, 
Yamin and Depledge (2004, p. 436) explain that a code of conduct for NGO participation was 
“prompted by a small number of disruptive incidents involving individuals admitted as 
environmental NGOs”. The UNFCCC Secretariat made the code of conduct for NGO 
participation with the consultancy of the NGO constituencies. The guidelines are on access, 
                                                 
10 Farmers are recognised as a constituency on a provisional basis at the time of the COP19 (UNFCCC, 2013a, p. 
2) 
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etiquette and safety, participation, and the distribution of information materials (UNFCCC, 
2003). Particularly the latter is of relevance for NGOs opportunities, as it regulates the limits 
to document distribution and unauthorised demonstrations. The consequence of any 
infringement of these guidelines is formulated diplomatically as it “would normally be 
resolved following consultations between the secretariat and the responsible organisations and 
individuals” (UNFCCC, 2003); however, the uttermost consequence is exclusion of the 
individual and/or organisation.  
In regards to access to international negotiations, the informal talks in which actual decisions 
are taken must certainly be addressed. In addition to informal talks facilitated officially during 
a meeting, there are also “‘informal  informals’ – too  informal  for  NGOs  to  participate,  
but  indeed where  the  decisions  were  made” (Enge  and  Malkenes 1993 in Raustiala, 1997, 
p. 733). These are normally not available to the NGOs, and only indirect channels through 
participating states may allow of influence.  
A climate happening 
While the negotiations naturally are at the centre of any COP, it has also become a meeting 
place for the “international climate community”. The non-state actors “engage in networking, 
holding meetings among peers, finding quick and effective solutions, debating new ideas and 
approaches and presenting novel research findings” (Schroeder & Lovell, 2012, p. 34). In 
other words, the UN climate negotiations have become “mega-conferences” (Gaventa 2010 in 
Neeff, 2013, p. 154). It has become a hub where impact occurs – beyond influencing decision 
makers in the negotiations directly, as we shall see under the channel described under 4.3 on 
target groups.  
Side events and showcasing are a prominent part of this climate ‘happening’. There are 
numerous parallel side events throughout the day for two weeks mostly hosted by NGOs but 
sometimes also state parties. Schroeder and Lovell (2012) found that 60-75 % of the side 
events did directly relate to the negotiation items.  Furthermore, non-state actors also use the 
UNFCCC arena as an opportunity to present problems and solutions through exhibitions and 
excursions. The fact that significant personalities in the international ‘climate community’ are 
gathered in one place allows for relatively cost-efficient usage of this channel. Additionally, 
the location of the COP may contribute to opportunities for excursions. At COP20 in Peru for 
example, the Norwegian Rainforest Foundation (NRF) brought a targeted audience into the 
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Amazon to meet with indigenous people affected by oil spills, while Bellona benefited from 
the Doha location at COP18 in order to bring selected guests to the opening of the Sahara 
Forest Project facility that produced vegetables in the desert (Goldenberg, 2014). 
Adding to these, actions and demonstrations are organised both inside and outside the 
negotiation venue, as global attention is directed at the UNFCCC. There are formal 
procedures through the Secretariat in order to carry out demonstrations, and failing to meet 
these requirements may lead to consequences for the individual(s) as well as the accredited 
organisation.  
Norwegian delegation 
The Norwegian delegation to the UNFCCC includes representatives from various ministries 
(UNFCCC, 2009a, 2010b, 2011a, 2012, 2013b, 2014b). A bureaucrat from the Ministry of 
Climate and Environment11 leads the delegation, except when the Climate and Environment 
Minister arrives at the end of each COP. In the period of this research from 2009-2014 the 
Head of Delegation (HoD) has had his/her background from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs12, 
though they would work from the Ministry of Climate and Environment during their period as 
HoD. This is a notable fact, as there are internal disagreements in the governments between 
the ministries and the fields of interests each of them represent. These disparities are not 
available for the public, but were noticeable during the field study mainly in informal talks 
with various delegates, and is an internal dynamic in the Norwegian delegation confirmed by 
several of the interview subjects. These altering lines of conflict within the government are 
relevant particularly for NGO representatives on the delegation as well as for non-state actors 
that lobby various ministries. In order to influence the Norwegian position, it is beneficial to 
have various ministries’ support, as will be presented in the next section 4.2 on the non-state 
actors’ strategies.  
Access to the international policy-making through national delegations is also a key channel 
of potential influence for non-state actors. On the Norwegian delegation there has been an 
ENGO representative, and from 2014 a youth representative. The former is elected on behalf 
of the members of the Norwegian Forum for Development and Environment (ForUM) – a 
                                                 
11 Previously the Ministry of Environment (Miljøverndepartementet). The name changed 1st January 2014. 
12 Except Audun Rosland who stepped in as the Acting Head of the Delegation after Aud Lise Norheim left only 
ten days before COP16 (Blindheim & Ruud, 2010). Rosland worked for the Norwegian Pollution Control 
Authority (SFT – Statens forurensningstilsyn) at the time.  
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network of fifty environment and development organisations while the latter is selected from 
the Norwegian Youth Council (LNU) covering about hundred organisations. Bård Lahn and 
Ola Elvevold have filled the ForUM position consecutively on behalf of NNV and the 
Norwegian Rainforest Foundation (NRF). This is to be distinguished from the extended 
delegation that will be explained in the next paragraph. While not being negotiators, these 
NGO representatives are integrated into the Norwegian delegation to a greater extent formally 
and informally, and have access to meetings that are closed to other non-state actors.  
Extended delegation 
The Minister of Development and Environment Erik Solheim introduced the so-called 
extended delegation in 2009 (E. Solheim, 2015). Non-state actors were invited to be observers 
on the delegation while not having complete access as negotiators. This implied that these 
NGO delegates on the Norwegian delegation would have meetings regularly with selected 
Norwegian negotiators, but normally be excluded from the internal meetings and daily work 
during the negotiations. The observers are formally under the Norwegian Head of 
Delegation’s (HoD) authority, and are not allowed to make public statements on behalf of 
Norway (Miljøverndepartementet, 2013b). The badge indicating that they are on a national 
delegation would allow representatives on the extended delegation to access negotiation areas 
closed to those on NGO delegations or journalists. However, the instructions from the 
Ministry of Environment explicitly stipulate that, as a general rule, the NGOs representatives 
shall only attend plenaries and Contact Groups (subsidiary meetings that report to the plenary) 
and not the smaller meetings in which most of the actual negotiation take place 
(Miljøverndepartementet, 2013b). In the meetings they are allowed to attend, they are 
moreover required to sit separately from the Norwegian negotiators, and they are also 
excluded from the Norwegian delegation’s office at the negotiations (Miljøverndepartementet, 
2013b). 
A formal limitation was introduced at COP17 in 2011, still under Solheim’s term, in which 
the NGO representatives on the extended delegation were visibly marked as “Party Overflow” 
on the conference badge – indicating a secondary positioning in the state delegations. 
Consequently, the UNFCCC Secretariat could ask for and the country delegations could 
demand this group’s limited access to the negotiations. The extended delegation was finally 
abolished from COP20 about a year after a new right wing government had replaced 
Solheim’s Centre-left government. Some negotiators pointed at negative media coverage from 
36 
 
Norwegian media on the size of the delegation as part of the reason for this decision. 
Furthermore, the Political Adviser at the Ministry of Climate and Environment in the new 
government, Jens Frølich Holte (2015), explained that it was due the overall number of 
delegates at COP20 being tremendously cut compared to previous COPs, and that regular 
meetings with the Norwegian civil society would ensure sufficient interaction.  
Meetings between the Norwegian civil society and the state delegation  
Despite the removal of the extended delegation, regular meetings between the Norwegian 
civil society and the Norwegian negotiators (often the HoD) endured. There is normally one 
such meeting prior to a COP and the inter-sessional meeting in June, followed by meetings 
throughout the negotiations. A Norwegian umbrella organisation, Forum for Development 
and Environment (ForUM) facilitated the contact between the Norwegian delegation and the 
NGOs. The meetings observed during the fieldwork can be characterised as having a positive 
and open atmosphere most of the time, with updates from the Norwegian delegation and 
questions and inputs from the non-state representatives. However, towards the critical end 
phase of COP20, with heightened stress-level and patience running thin amongst the state 
delegations, the negotiators’ receptiveness appeared to decline. The patience for ‘progressive 
appeals’ instead of concrete inputs on the negotiations seems to be lowered among the 
negotiators. On the other hand, whenever a new draft text was put on the table during COP20, 
it had been considered internally in the delegation for a limited time prior to meeting the civil 
society organisations; in this context, the negotiators often seemed keen to hear the opinions 
of the civil society representatives. 
That leads to a more general finding. Many of the negotiators appeared interested in inputs as 
long as it was constructive, relevant, and filling a policy vacuum. This was further confirmed 
through interviews and through talks with negotiators during the fieldwork. In addition to the 
aforementioned civil society meetings, this was similarly so in the context of direct lobby 
meetings, the distribution of policy papers, and seminars organised (both at the negotiations 
and in other contexts).  
Alliances 
In UNFCCC, there are two ENGO networks: Climate Action Network (CAN) and 
International and Climate Justice Now! (CJN). Two principal distinctions between these 
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organisations are that CJN is to a greater extent confrontational rather than collaborative from 
a tactical perspective, and CJN focuses more on North-South climate justice (Lahn, 2013, pp. 
93-98). Both organisations have daily coordinating meetings, and the ENGO office at the 
negotiation venue is divided in such a way that CAN and CJN use it half a day each. 
Additionally, CAN has an executive branch that meets every morning, and working groups on 
various topics related to the negotiations. CAN is very strict about who is allowed into their 
meetings (in contradiction to other constituencies such as RINGO and YOUNGO), and has a 
formal procedure and requirements, even for researchers, to access their meetings. CAN 
coordinates lobby efforts among its network members, carry out actions/stunts, and distribute 
ECO – a daily bulletin during COPs and inter-sessional meetings that gives updates on the 
negotiations and also on CAN’s consideration. The main CAN action is the Fossil of the Day 
ceremony in which countries are ‘shamed’ for hindering progress in the negotiations. 
‘Faming’ also occurs (though rarely) through the Ray of the Day which highlights remarkable 
efforts by countries to move the negotiations forward.   
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is the contact point for the BINGO constituency 
in the UNFCCC, and coordinates the formal BINGO inputs (UNFCCC, 2013a). The BINGO 
group is very diverse with delegates representing everything from the fossil industry to green 
businesses. The most relevant network for NSA is hence the International Chamber of 
Shipping (ICS). However, ICS only sent a few representatives to the UNFCCC negotiations.  
NGO alliances are often based on thematic interests as has been illustrated above. 
Nonetheless, for Norwegian NGOs (except the BINGOs), the daily Norwegian civil society 
meetings are also an important place to gain knowledge, disseminate information and 
encourage action. Arvid Solheim, Senior Advisor at the Norwegian Forum for Development 
and Environment (ForUM), facilitates these meetings. ForUM is a Norwegian umbrella 
organisation comprised of more than fifty ENGOs, human rights NGOs, and development 
related NGOs that promote global justice, solidarity, and sustainability (ForUM for Utvikling 
og Miljø, 2014). Arvid Solheim explained that non-ForUM members are also invited to these 
daily meetings (A. Solheim, 2015).  
Secretariat 
There has been increasing focus in the academic literature on the UN Secretariat’s power. 
Although neutrality is a key for the UNFCCC Secretariat to carry out its job, particularly in a 
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party driven negotiation like the climate negotiations, the Secretariat can for example 
influence the direction of the negotiations through its administrative role. This means that the 
Secretariat’s formal role contributes to challenge the state-centric perspective and draw a 
multifaceted picture. Biermann (2010, p. 285) argues that the complexity of the climate 
negotiations (both the system and the issue itself), informing governments about actions and 
commitments by other actors, reporting on the overall problem assessment, and providing 
compromise solutions are ways in which the intergovernmental bureaucracies can influence 
the climate negotiations. However, only “to the extent that these bureaucracies manage to 
maintain the trust [from the states] upon which their formal and informal influence relies” 
(Biermann, 2010, p. 285). Within these limits, the UNFCCC Secretariat can thus be a channel 
for NGOs as well in their effort to affect the outcomes of the UNFCCC processes.  
Other Intergovernmental Organisations  
The most relevant intergovernmental organisations are the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) and the EU. The latter will, however, as it is a party in the COP, be dealt 
with later under domestic/foreign/regional channels. In Article 2.2 in the Kyoto Protocol, the 
states agreed that the developed countries, so-called Annex I parties, “shall pursue limitation 
or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from 
aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation 
Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively.” (UNFCCC, 1998a). 
IMO has 170 of the UN member states, and the exceptions are mostly landlocked countries. 
IMO report for the international maritime sector to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) under the UNFCCC  (UNFCCC, 2014a). In influencing the 
marine climate agenda, IMO is thus a key actor, particularly for NSA.  
An important distinction to note between IMO and UNFCCC principles, is that while IMO’s 
founding document emphasises non-discrimination as stated in Article 1 of the IMO 
Convention, the climate regime is built on the principle of Common But Differentiated 
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) as enshrined in Principle 7 of the 
Rio Declaration of 1992 (UNGA, 1992; United Nations Maritime Conference, 1948). This 
implies an equal or differentiated contribution from countries to meet the climate change. 
Another notable difference is that, since IMO has closer ties to the industry, the approach to 
emissions is quite dissimilar to the UNFCCC. Framing climate change in terms of market 
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mechanisms and energy efficiency (as is done in IMO) is an approach that is more acceptable 
for the shipping industry itself since it does not necessarily contradict with profit making 
(Norges Rederiforbund, 2012, p. 8; Oftedal, 2015).  
4.1.2 Analysis  
At the inter-sessional negotiations in Geneva in February 2015, the Russian Head of 
Delegation Oleg Shamanov stated in the plenary discussions that ‘Mr. Co-Chair, we are not 
going to turn into pumpkins at 6 PM’. He was making an analogy to the Cinderella fairy tale, 
implying that negotiations may continue even after closing the official meeting. In the 
UNFCCC process, there is a variety of significant arenas in addition to the plenary 
discussions.   
Access to the UNFCCC negotiations 
Formal and informal access and limitations 
Some scholars interpret the observer status simply as evidence of lack of influence. Compared 
to those who have party status in the UNFCCC, those with observer status are limited in the 
way that they lack formal rights such as voting, taking the floor (with the exception of 
designated interventions allowed by the parties), access to some negotiation rooms etc. 
However, access does not equal influence – both in the sense that evidence of access is not 
proof of influence, and in the way that limited access does not equal no influence. It is a 
question of whether the available channels are applied efficiently.  
Although the formal structure is in place to access the UNFCCC negotiations, participation 
will still depend on an organisation’s resources. Financially, it is expensive to attend meetings 
around the world for a few weeks at the time. If an NGO wishes to organise a side event or 
rent an office at the COP venue, there are additional costs related to that. Consequently, 
though the formal structure is present to enforce NGO participation, other structural issues 
hinder equal participation due to the way this channel is arranged. Accordingly, the NGOs 
from the richer part of the world are more heavily involved than their counterparts in 
developing countries.   
Another issue of access despite the formal structure established in the UNFCCC is the 
informal informals. Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 70) argue that increasing use of inaccessible 
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meeting arenas requires the NGOs to alter their strategies towards an indirect one. One 
channel into these closed arenas is through country delegations (or others invited) that attend 
these meetings. Another is pressure from the outside. Both of these indirect channels, 
however, also depend on the knowledge that such closed discussions are taking place. At 
COP15 for example, towards the end of the negotiations, the information screen that normally 
announces where various meetings are taking place, simply showed “No meetings scheduled” 
(Lahn, 2013). Significant parts of the final discussions leading to the Copenhagen Accord 
actually occurred when US President Barrack Obama and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton 
barged into a meeting of the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) that 
they were not invited to (Landler & Cooper, 2010). Needless to say, it was not a meeting 
NGOs would have had access to. Although informal meetings are often key to finding 
consensus and common solutions allowed by the more discreet setting, increasing use of 
closed meetings are a great obstacle to NGO access.  
A climate happening 
The fact that important stakeholders are gathered in one place naturally allows for valuable 
and time efficient networking and exchange of ideas. As an illustration, Bellona has been the 
most active organiser of side events at COPs amongst the three selected NGOs. NNV on the 
other hand, would normally co-host at least one such event, nevertheless, Elvevold (2015) 
argued it was not always an efficient tool to affect the negotiators as they would not always 
have the time to set aside to attend these. While some Norwegian negotiators actually 
mentioned side events as an important learning ground, this does not seem to be the case for 
the majority of Norwegian negotiators. Schroeder and Lovell (2012) note that “their current 
format and purpose as being events ‘on the side’ does not offer a sufficient framework for 
coordination between the work of [non-state actors and UNFCCC] process”. This is hence, 
primarily a channel to reach (non-negotiator) stakeholders. Showcasing and excursions on the 
other hand, may reach decision makers (and indirectly negotiators), especially if it garners 
media attention.  
Norwegian delegation 
During the fieldwork, many Norwegian negotiators expressed a rather negative attitude 
towards NGOs. There are several potential explanations for this. The criticism was mainly 
about NGOs’ lack of understanding of decision-making processes (when to lobby for what), 
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unrealistic demands, and too uncritically supporting developing countries. On the last point, it 
seemed to be a sense of unfairness in that Norwegian efforts were not recognised enough 
while developing countries, on the other hand, were not scrutinized adequately. A few went as 
far as saying that the Norwegian delegations’ interaction with the civil society was not about 
NGO influence but rather an information channel for the Norwegian delegation. Another 
perspective is that the ministries have different cultures for interaction with civil society 
actors. This is interesting in light of the formal interviews that were carried out. When asked 
concretely about the three NGOs in this study, the impressions were mostly more positive or 
neutral. This will be discussed further under each organisation in the next chapters on 
strategies and influence.  
The ENGO representative (NNV in this case) on the Norwegian delegation certainly has a 
higher degree of access to the negotiators through formal and informal contact. The 
representative therefore has information that is not available to other non-state actors. 
Simultaneously, they are also more limited in their role in regards to public behaviour, and 
professional secrecy.  
Extended delegation 
The explanations for the changes vary, and there is probably a combined reasoning for 
implementing, adjusting, and finally abolishing the extended Norwegian delegation. An 
official stance (to the extent that one can call it that, as there is no official documentation on 
the removal of the extended delegation) is that the UNFCCC Secretariat asked the states to 
limit their delegation size. On the other hand, some Norwegian NGO representatives at 
COP20 argued in a meeting with Norwegian parliamentarians that this was not reflected in 
other countries’ delegations.  
Trust is essential in understanding this matter. The detailed instructions that were presented, 
indicates that the Norwegian authorities experienced a need to remain in a certain degree of 
control over those carrying the conference badge, signifying that they represent Norway. 
There is certainly a risk in letting people who are not part of the government seemingly 
“represent” Norway. Interestingly, some of the NGOs (including Bellona) have paralleled 
experience in cases where they have allowed representatives outside their organisation to 
benefit from their accreditation and join their delegation.  
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Another aspect is that the ministries have varying traditions and levels of interaction with civil 
society. On a related topic, the Minister of Environment (2012-2013) Bård Vegar Solhjell 
(2015) pointed out that this had affected the discussion around whether to continue to have a 
civil society representative on the delegation after Bård Lahn from NNV ended his term. 
According to him, it was ultimately decided politically by his government to continue to have 
an NGO representative as a member of the delegation (Solhjell, 2015).  
A scholar familiar with the negotiations and the Norwegian civil society plainly described the 
extended delegation as politicians ‘channelling noise into one space’. Instead of meeting more 
than ten Norwegian organisations separately, a coordinated arena allows for concentrated and 
time efficient interaction. This applies to both the extended delegation as well as the civil 
society meetings with the Norwegian delegation.  
On whether the extended delegation was an effective channel from the non-state perspective, 
there was an intriguing difference in opinion. While NSA highlighted this as a central reason 
for not attending the COPs after it was dissolved, representatives from NNV and Bellona 
point to the fact that it allows you access to certain closed meetings while it may also limit 
your activity – as has been highlighted through the Norwegian delegation’s instructions 
(Elvevold, 2015; Lahn, 2015; Søyland, 2015). Particularly after being marked as “Party 
overflow”, the risk of exclusion from certain meetings increased, and hence, the point in 
remaining on the extended delegation was even more limited according to the NNV President 
Lars Haltbrekken (2015). NSA appears to value this channel higher due to their insider lobby 
strategy as will be presented in the next chapter.  
Meetings between the Norwegian civil society and the state delegation  
As the negotiators are professional bureaucrats, and present at the negotiations to put their 
uttermost effort in promoting and protecting Norway’s interests, they may be more critical to 
lack of timeliness among NGO representatives. Although the political leadership have the 
same mandate, they also have a stronger interest in keeping good relations to the non-state 
actors. That may be a reason for why they appeared more receptive to (from a Norwegian 
government’s point of view) “unrealistic” demands. On the other hand, the negotiators 
keenness to hear non-state actors’ opinions following new drafts of the negotiation text can 
indicate a policy window. Alternatively, they are just assessing the reactions of the civil 
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society organisations to evaluate the terrain, and see if there is a need for adjustment – not 
necessarily on the content but on how they present the Norwegian stances.  
The Environment Minister from 2012-2013, Bård Vegar Solhjell (2015), explained that not all 
of the Norwegian positions and evaluations are shared at the meetings with the civil society, 
but that they still go in-depth at these meetings. The ForUM Senior Advisor also emphasises 
the fact that media are aware of these meetings but not present (A. Solheim, 2015). 
Accordingly, these meetings are based on trust, as well as mutual interests and openness as a 
democratic value. The latter is underlined by many of the informants – even some of those 
negotiators who are critical to the NGOs’ involvement.  
Nevertheless, this channel is strongly limited by what is already discussed and adopted in the 
government or parliament. Solhjell (2015) argues that NGOs will not have decisive influence 
on Norwegian position during the negotiations – rather they can affect which positions are 
emphasised, and if new topics are introduced during the negotiations, they may influence 
when presenting their considerations of the new element.  
Alliances 
The restricted access to the CAN daily meetings can imply that their meetings are of a more 
strategic nature and hence more secretive. The CAN daily meeting that I observed at COP20 
was dominated by a few persons who shaped the agenda. This is an impression that NNV 
representative Elvevold (2015) also shared, and he added that many are there mostly to gather 
information and that a lot of the important decisions were in actuality taken in the morning 
meetings in the CAN Executive Committee. The CAN bulletin ECO is widely read by state 
and non-state actors at COPs and inter-sessional meetings, and is therefore a potentially 
effective channel to reach out. The Fossil of the Day, not surprisingly, receives a mixed 
response. Some negotiators frown at this as ‘noise’. On the other hand, it is efficient in 
reaching the media – as it is highly camera-friendly (in an otherwise ‘monotone’ negotiation 
scenery).   
Regarding ICS, there are several reasons for it being an efficient channel for NSA. Vormedal 
(2008, p. 38) lists up UNFCCC Secretariat’s wish to coordinate, the business’ attempt to 
increase legitimacy, cost sharing, knowledge pooling, effective communication with policy 
makers, and access to policy arenas they would not single-handedly have had access to, as 
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reasons for the business and industry to organise itself. Similar arguments can be applied to 
the other constituencies as well.  
The daily Norwegian NGO meetings were an essential arena for knowledge sharing, and for 
coordinating the questions and inputs to the civil society meetings with the Norwegian 
delegation. In this regard, the ForUM Senior Adviser Arvid Solheim’s role is key. He is an 
important source of knowledge, as he is one of the most experienced Norwegian NGO 
representatives, asserting procedural knowledge particularly to new civil society 
representatives. By carrying out practical facilitation as well as the coordination of the 
questions and inputs to the negotiators and politicians, he bridged the Norwegian delegation’s 
meeting with the civil society in an efficient manner.  
Secretariat 
To the extent that the Secretariat can affect the negotiations, this is a relevant channel. The 
Secretariat functions as a bridge between the state parties and NGOs in several matters, and 
also has a power through their screening of NGOs in the application process and allocation of 
number of delegates. Hence, the Secretariat represents another potential channel of influence. 
However, for ENGOs and BINGOs, they remain rather dependent on the states’ formal power 
in impacting the actual negotiation outcomes in the UNFCCC. The Secretariat is thus, a 
supplementary channel.  
Other Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) 
It is also interesting how NSA has decided not to put efforts into the COPs in the recent years. 
Their argument was based partly on how they assessed the access to the decision-making and 
negotiations, and also due to most shipping discussions now being carried out in the IMO 
where they have decided to insert a greater effort to influence (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). A 
key element to consider regarding the issue de-linkage13 of shipping from UNFCCC, leaving 
it mostly to the IMO, is that the business sector itself has a greater potential for influence – 
with both the positive and negative consequences that may have for the climate. On the 
positive side, the negotiations may become more efficient as the technological competence on 
                                                 
13 Issue de-linkage is a term used in international negotiation theory when topics are subtracted from the 
agenda for example when it is controversial, prevent an agreement, and/or to simplify a negotiation process 
(Sebenius, 1983, pp. 288-289).  
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shipping is higher in a specialised forum such as the IMO, allowing greater knowledge on the 
set of alternative solutions available. On the negative side, in terms of climate change, 
business interests regarding profit (if it conflicts with climate friendly solutions) may succeed 
over climate interests. Additionally, various IGOs are based on different founding principles 
that may affect the nature of the climate debate. As previously presented, the UNFCCC is 
based on the idea of differentiation (the CBDR-RC principle) while IMO follows the principle 
of non-discrimination. In the context of the maritime sector that is vulnerable to flagging out 
of ships, applying climate regime principles to shipping can have severe consequences for 
some countries and distort competition significantly. The maritime sector in developed 
countries therefore has an interest in keeping their sector out of the UNFCCC framework. 
The whole UNFCCC framework is not necessarily perceived as the most efficient arena to use 
in order to achieve a desired outcome. This is reflected not only in the fact that the NSA 
deprioritises the COPs, but also how Bellona President Hauge (2015) said he prioritised 
working with EU’s 2030 goals over attending COP20. This COP was also deprioritised by 
NNV’s Haltbrekken (2015) who explained it was decided based on costs as well as low 
expectations to the significance of this meeting. Let us now move on to study the separate, 
though complementary, domestic, foreign, and regional arenas as indirect channels to the 
UNFCCC negotiations.  
4.2 Domestic/foreign/regional climate policy 
As explained in chapter two, Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 171) speak of the domestic 
channels. The adapted version in this thesis, however, also includes foreign governments and 
the regional arenas in this section, as those channels are relevant for NGOs.  
4.2.1 Data 
Norwegian decision-making processes 
As briefly mentioned in the analysis of the Norwegian delegation as a channel, negotiators 
and politicians alike, stressed the domestic decision-making. There are several channels to 
influence the Norwegian position – communication with ministers, bureaucrats, and 
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parliamentarians, and also lobbying the parties (for example in their internal policy 
formulation processes such as adoption of party programs).  
The government has their official channels, such as hearings and inputs to the state budget. 
Additionally, both the bureaucrats as well as the politicians in the various ministries have 
meetings with stakeholders. Furthermore, the negotiators who are mostly bureaucrats in their 
daily lives attend seminars organised by NGOs that represent another type of channel.  
Similarly, Members of Parliament (MPs) are relevant in the Norwegian political arena, as 
Norway has mostly had minority governments in the last decades. For the period that this 
thesis studies (2009-2014), however, this channel was somewhat limited as there was a 
majority government from 2005 to 2013. Nevertheless, in a consensus democracy such as 
Norway, there were still opportunities to make an impact, especially if the MPs settled for a 
broad political compromise with most/all parties (often the case if there was a wish for 
longstanding policies that would survive elections).  
Related to this, the processes in the political parties can be essential as well. Many of the 
parties in Norway have had inclusive processes when developing/updating their manifestos, 
inviting NGOs to submit their inputs. In between those processes, NGOs have access to 
political parties locally and nationally, and can give their inputs through statements, lobby 
meetings seminars, and so on.  
Lobbying regional institutions and foreign governments 
In addition to the domestic and international level, the regional level (mainly the EU) can be a 
relevant channel for influencing climate policy globally. EU is a key actor in the UNFCCC 
and their position will subsequently have an impact on the outcome of the international 
climate negotiations. As Norway is not a member of the EU, but rather associated to it 
through the European Economic Area (EEA), Norwegian NGOs have arguably used the 
European level to a lesser degree than what their European counterparts have. Nevertheless, 
of the three cases in this thesis, both NSA and Bellona are directly represented in Brussels 
with their own offices.  
Both relating to the regional level but also independent of this aspect, contact with foreign 
governments can be a channel of influence. Gulbrandsen and Andresen (2004, pp. 59, 72) 
studied NGO influence in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and found that NGOs 
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relied heavily on alliance with key state actors. On the European level, alliances can be made 
with member states sympathetic to the non-state actor’s view, in order to affect EU policies 
relevant to the UNFCCC negotiations. In the UNFCCC meetings itself, there have been 
various alliances between non-state actors and state delegations. Many ENGOs share views 
with developing countries while the fossil industry has often sought out more likeminded in 
actors in oil rich countries and Western countries that fear the costs of climate policies (Lahn, 
2013; Skodvin, 2012, pp. 11-14).  
4.2.2 Analysis 
Norwegian decision-making processes 
The domestic context is essential, particularly due to its accessibility – from a geographical, 
costs, and relational perspective. There are both formal and informal channels available for 
NGOs. Politicians and bureaucrats seem particularly open to receiving input in the policy 
formulation stage.  
The party manifestos, on the other hand, were according to the interview subjects not the 
main platform in which the specifics of Norway’s positions in the UNFCCC were handled. 
Policy on this topic was instead formulated in the parliament or government. On the other 
hand, the relevance of the political party level appears to be to promote general Norwegian 
and global targets, and climate solutions.  
In addition to the political proximity to the decision makers, the domestic channel may be 
advantageous for many domestic oriented NGOs due to the leverage they possess. ENGOs 
may have a public legitimacy and ability to mobilise pressure, which is usually not equally 
applicable in the international context. From a BINGO perspective, the possibility of 
influence may be higher in a domestic rather than international context due to the political 
standing a BINGO can have when it represents a key sector in the domestic economy 
(Newell, 2000).  
Lobbying regional institutions and foreign governments 
Although UNFCCC is a party driven process in which all states supposedly partake as equals, 
parts of the negotiations are sometimes solved amongst a few key states (such as at COP15 in 
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Copenhagen). Single countries, including Norway, can thus be excluded from some closed 
negotiation arenas. In this context, foreign delegations and the EU have, for example, been a 
relevant institution for non-state actors from Norway in their effort to affect the outcome of 
the negotiations.  
Furthermore, these channels can be highly relevant in building alliances with likeminded 
actors with the purpose of affecting the Norwegian government, or simply in order to build a 
stronger alliance in favour of a policy. This leads to the boomerang effect. Keck and Sikkink 
(1998) conceptualised this term to illustrate when NGOs bypass their domestic governments 
and target other state parties (and regional actors such as the EU) to affect the international 
negotiation and/or their own government. This can be an effective channel to build fruitful 
alliances.  
4.3 Target groups’ climate policy and behaviour  
Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 171) who looked at ENGO influence in the development 
of the compliance regime under the Kyoto Protocol highlighted affected parties such as the 
companies or a certain sector in this arena. In this thesis, affected companies are certainly 
relevant target groups. Additionally scientists are also important for some to engage in order 
to establish support for policies and/or technological solutions.  
4.3.1 Data  
Seeking support from target groups, such as businesses that are affected by a certain policy, 
may strengthen the NGOs success. In promoting clean energy, businesses that work with 
clean energy themselves – or have the potential to expand to that field – are relevant allies. 
Furthermore, in promoting cleaner technologies for existing businesses, the industry’s support 
is very valuable, as can be seen in the case of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).  
Tora Skodvin (2012, pp. 8-9) highlights the legitimacy scientific knowledge can give to 
climate policies for decision makers to use or misuse. Keeping this in mind, scientific 
legitimisation of policies can also be applied by non-state actors in order to support their 
position on a topic. This does not imply that a scientific result is “ordered”. Rather, it is about 
directing more research into a certain field, or increasing the attention toward a certain 
existing research field.  
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4.3.2 Analysis 
Involving scientists and stakeholders such as businesses and industries, is an effective way to 
push for a certain policy in a desired direction, particularly as it will make it easier for 
politicians to support that option over others when there is a broader alliance. Moreover, 
involving business can contribute to the concrete application of a technology or other types of 
solutions. Additionally, inserting private funds will also ease potential financial demands 
directed at decision makers. Pulling business from a grey to a greener position (to apply 
Vormedal’s (2008) terminology) through collaborations – enabling them to take those steps, 
may furthermore contribute to making business actors more constructive or at least pacifying 
active opposition. Increasing environmental awareness among consumers in various parts of 
the world, and businesses’ fear for the consequences of climate change and/or its regulatory 
implications, have contributed to increase the incentives for businesses to move into a greener 
direction. Hence, cooperating with non-state actors that can assist them with solutions as well 
as green profiling can be a ‘win-win situation’ for businesses and the climate.  
Seeking alliances with researchers can also be a useful channel of influence for NGOs. 
Negotiations on climate change is a technically complex, and the UNFCCC uniquely has the 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to set the academic basis of the debate. IPCC 
aggregates scientific knowledge from various researchers to find an academic consensus. 
Despite IPCC’s academic authority, elements in the findings may be debatable (as in any 
scientific report), and even politicised. This was for example illustrated when India criticised 
emission reduction numbers from IPCC as ‘unscientific’ at the inter-sessional negotiations in 
Bonn in 2009. This happened as the IPCC had suggested 25-40 per cent emission reduction in 
developed countries by 2020 compared to 1990 levels – which indirectly implies what 
remains of the carbon budget for the developing countries (Lahn, 2013, pp. 82-93).   
IPCC, however, does in general have significant support from states. Hence targeting IPCC 
(or other) researchers to consider certain technologies, solutions, or principles can be a way to 
affect the premises for the climate debate. Although not from an NGO, the scientific report 
ordered by the Norwegian Socialist Left Party that considers what part of Norway’s targets 
should be based on historic responsibilities and current capabilities, is an illustration of how 
research can colour the climate debate (Kallbekken, Gloppen, Jansen, Nøstbakken, & 
Sørensen, 2014). Hence, engaging scientists in topics (for example by ordering reports), or 
exposing scientists with information and ideas, are channels that non-state actors can apply. 
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4.4 Public opinion 
Public opinion is the last arena in Andresen & Gulbrandsen’s scheme. They point out that this 
is the most diffuse target. According to them, this is mainly a channel for the activist NGO 
type, in order to achieve influence as well to attract new members (Andresen & Gulbrandsen, 
2005, p. 171). Additionally, activists NGOs also depend on keeping members, and addressing 
the public is also a way to signify to their existing members about their efforts.  
4.4.1 Data 
Media is the channel with widest outreach to the public. Depending on how important that 
particular COP (and sometimes inter-sessional meetings) appear, a number of Norwegian 
journalists attend the UNFCCC negotiations. As the negotiations are rather intricate and 
technical, it gives an opportunity for the NGOs to form the journalists’ perception both 
through formal and informal interaction.  Press conferences are held daily by state as well as 
NGO delegations, and journalists interview NGO representatives to cover their assessment of 
the ongoing negotiations. Moreover, the NGOs distribute press releases, as well as carrying 
out informal knowledge sharing. Some Norwegian NGOs also have such interaction with the 
international media. In the cases where these are used as a channel, it appears as it is mainly 
to affect the Norwegian position through distorting the government’s reputation 
internationally. The HoD Aslak Brun (2015) expresses that the media in fact is an effective 
channel that particularly those close to the political leadership take note of and discuss how to 
follow up. 
In Norway, as well as in many other countries, people are gathering information from a 
variety of sources, and increasingly so from social media. Social media such as Facebook, 
Twitter, blogging etc. are thus relevant for many NGOs in reaching the greater public with 
their opinions and policies. Own communication by NGOs such as newsletters and 
websites/blogs are also part of an effort to affect the public opinion.  
Mobilising demonstrations and other types of actions are also a channel to reach the public 
opinion directly and indirectly. Directly if citizens are actually mobilised to partake, and 
indirectly if it is communicated through traditional and social media. It must be noted that 
actions and demonstrations are limited by the UNFCCC regulations as explained under 4.1 on 
international negotiations.  
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4.4.2 Analysis 
Although Andresen & Guldbransen (2005) indicate that this channel is mainly targeted by 
activist NGOs, establishing and maintaining a public standing can equally be important for 
advisory NGOs that depend on external funding. The BINGOs can also have a strong interest 
being visible, as it can improve their image and relevance.  
In regards to the media, this channel appears to target the politicians to a greater extent than 
negotiators, as a they are part of the public debate. Keeping close ties to journalists is an 
effective channel to link journalists with information that an NGO is interested in making 
publicly known. Among the Norwegian journalists present at COP20, they differed in the 
extent to which they interacted with the Norwegian non-state actors.  
On the topic of social media as a channel, the reach depended quite heavily on which type of 
social media as well as how effective it is applied. Twitter has limited number of users 
compared to giants such as Facebook, however, if used correctly it can have an effect – 
largely due to the fact that the many of the active users in Norway are opinion-makers such as 
journalists, NGO representatives, and politicians. Similarly, environmental blogs itself have 
limited outreach compared to the top ranked Norwegian blogs. Nonetheless, they can have an 
effect if it reaches the relevant actors who spread the ideas further. NGOs’ newsletters and 
websites/blogs do vary greatly in their reach. Hence, it is most effectively applied in 
combination with other channels. Rather than reaching the greater public, these tools may 
have an indirect effect similar to that of social media, if they reach journalists and other 
opinion shapers.  
4.5 Concluding remarks: Considering Channels 
The research question approached in this chapter was:  
1) Which channels of influence are available for the Norwegian non-state actors into the 
UNFCCC negotiations from 2009-2014?  
The chapter started by studying NGOs’ formal and informal access, and restrictions, to the 
UNFCCC negotiations. The principles of NGO access is enshrined in the Convention. 
Nevertheless, restrictions have been gradually introduced to the channels. The NGOs also find 
ways to circumvent these limitations. This will be highlighted further in the next chapter on 
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strategies. Particularly, the COPs have become “climate happenings” that allow networking, 
exchange of ideas, and to a limited extent policy dissemination to decision makers. The 
domestic delegation is still a significant channel for many NGOs. Inclusion on the delegation 
appears to be a relevant channel for lobbying, but less so for activism. At the same time, the 
civil society meetings with the Norwegian delegation appear to serve the key purpose of the 
extended delegation. Internationally, networks such as CAN, ICS, and ForUM contribute to 
knowledge sharing, policy dissemination, as well as lobby coordination, and can benefit 
NGOs in collectively achieving what would be impossible singlehandedly. The Secretariat 
can be a beneficial channel, particularly on procedural matters, within their limits of 
neutrality. IGOs (or IMO in this case) are certainly arenas to be targeted when relevant topics 
are dealt with there.  
For many NGOs the domestic political processes remain the key channel to target – through 
the government, the bureaucracy, parliamentarians, and/or political parties. Moreover, when 
the domestic channel fails, NGOs have a boomerang channel in addressing foreign and 
regional (EU) decision makers. Target groups were also highlighted as a potential channel, 
particularly businesses and scientists. Finally, public opinion through media and mobilisation 
can serve a pressure and/or agenda setting purpose.  
Despite lack of certain formal rights and restrictions imposed by the state parties and the 
UNFCCC Secretariat, the NGOs nevertheless, have a varied set of channels available. It is 
important to note that NGOs develop new channels when one is blocked. This and other 
perspectives of NGO strategies will now be discussed.  
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5 Different NGO Types and Their 
Diverse Strategies 
During the debate towards the end of COP20, Singapore’s Minister for the Environment and 
Water Resources Dr Vivian Balakrishnan warned “We should be very careful in making 
changes to the current text. Only minor surgery is needed. Let me give another analogy, 
which I am sure many men can identity with. If you are submitting yourself for circumcision, 
be very careful that it doesn’t become an amputation!” (Balakrishnan, 2014). Dr. 
Balakrishnan’s statement could simply be a warning to other parties interested in amending 
the text but is also an illustrating metaphor about the ‘art of balance’ in the climate 
negotiations – how difficult it is to steady the diverging interests. This leads to the question of 
progressiveness versus constructiveness amongst the NGOs. This has been a source of 
conflict among particularly the ENGOs (Duwe, 2001; Lahn, 2013, pp. 93-98; Parks & 
Roberts, 2010). The basic question is whether to apply an insider or outsider strategy.  
This chapter will study more specifically the non-state actors’ strategies within the framework 
as presented in the previous chapter; followingly, this chapter addresses the second part of the 
research question. The chapter will study each NGO separately, by first looking into their 
critical resources (intellectual/membership/political/financial), then address the arenas 
(international/domestic/target groups/public opinion), and the strategies (insider/outsider) they 
apply. Hence, the structure reflects the analytical framework for strategy, based on Andresen 
& Gulbrandsen (2005) and Vormedal (2008), presented in chapter two. Lastly, these findings 
will be summarised and compared to the theoretical framework on NGO strategy.  
5.1 NNV – The “Necktie Activists”? 
A Norwegian magazine “Bistandsaktuelt” described some of the NGO lobbyists, amongst 
others the NNV representative on the Norwegian delegation Ola Elvevold, as the “necktie 
activists” (Håskoll-Haugen, 2014). The journalist pointed to the contrasts between the activist, 
often perceived as being loud, carrying out protests, and wearing everything else than a suit, 
and the ENGO representatives at the climate negotiations in suits, with a degree in higher 
education, lobbying in the corridors, and even giving positive statements about politicians 
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(Håskoll-Haugen, 2014). Have these ENGO activists simply become lobbyists? Let us now 
briefly look into NNV’s critical resources before addressing the arenas and strategies applied.  
5.1.1 Critical Resource 
Membership base: NNV is the largest ENGO in terms of number of members with 
approximately 20,000 members (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2010, p. 15; 2015a). This is much 
lower compared to their Danish and Swedish counterparts, and according to NNV President 
Lars brekken can be explained with a higher number of ENGOs in Norway competing for the 
attention (Martiniussen, 2011).  
Intellectual base: More than a dozen employees with relevant work experience and/or higher 
education (mostly at least a master degree) who work on various thematic areas (Norges 
Naturvernforbund, 2015b). They have one designated employee, co-sponsored with the 
Norwegian Rainforest Foundation (RFN), to work on REDD+ and UNFCCC.  
Financial base: The most significant part of NNV’s income originates directly from the 
government. Until 2014, they were the largest receiver of basic financial support for 
Norwegian ENGOs from the Ministry of Climate and Environment (only surpassed by 
Norwegian Association of Hunters and Anglers in 2014), and received from 2009-2014 
between NOK 6,793,000 - 7,496,000 (approx. USD 900,000 - 1 million) (Prop. 1 S: 2014-
2015, 2014, p. 46). Project based funding come in addition to this – such as the support for the 
NNV representative on the delegation, which is funded by the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (Norad). Their total income was approximately NOK 40-50 
million in the period, and roughly NOK 25-30 million of these were public funds (approx. 
USD 5-6.5 million and USD 3-4 million) (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2010, 2011b, 2012)14.  
Political base: NNV has had close relations to the Ministry of Environment, particularly 
during the centre-left government’s rule. The State Secretary15 under Solheim was former 
President of NNV and a friend to the current NNV President Lars Haltbrekken (Ertesvåg & 
Tjersland, 2012). Additionally, Haltbrekken is married to the person who was the Secretary 
General of the Socialist Left Party at the time the party was in government. These personal 
                                                 
14 In the 2012-2013 Annual Reports, the accounts were not included, and the 2014 report was yet to be 
published.  
15 Norwegian ministries have a political leadership consisting of the minister, followed in rank by the State 
Secretary (sometimes translated the Deputy Minister), and the Political Advisor.  
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relations have contributed positively to their access and influence, including on REDD+, 
according to a person who knows NNV well. They are also well connected to politicians in 
the Norwegian parliament. 
Critical resource: Globally, even compared to the neighbouring countries, NNV’s member 
base is not significant. However, relative to the other Norwegian NGOs, particularly the 
ENGOs, it is NNV’s member base that stand out compared to the other resources. They 
certainly have a substantial amount of financial, political, and even intellectual base; 
nevertheless, in the context of many competing ENGOs in Norway, the members are NNV’s 
stronghold, giving the organisation an essential legitimacy.  
5.1.2 Targeted Arena and Applied Strategies  
In NNV’s International Strategy for 2011-2020 they highlight how it is a priority for them to 
have coherence between their international projects, international and domestic lobbying, and 
that it should all be rooted in the organisational work in Norway (Norges Naturvernforbund, 
2011a, p. 9). On the international climate negotiations more specifically, the strategic 
document states that NNV should strive to influence topics with relevance to NNV, Norway, 
and NNV’s international partners (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2011a, p. 24).  
1) International negotiations and processes 
According to NNV’s President Lars Haltbrekken (2015), they increased their strategic efforts 
to influence the UNFCCC negotiations, following their joint proposal with the Rainforest 
Foundation Norway’s (RFN) on deforestation which was adopted by the Norwegian 
government. That was the background for the co-sponsored representative that NNV and RFN 
acquired through ForUM’s position on the Norwegian delegation. On a more general basis, 
NNV has had a decreasing number of participants at the COPs starting with five at COP15 
and down to only one at COP19 and COP20 (Elvevold & Lahn, 2015)16. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Lists of participants for each organisations were developed by searching for representatives on various 
delegations in the final participants list published by UNFCCC (as seen in 8.0 Bibliography). These lists were 
then sent to informants in each organisations, in order to clear out delegates who were on their delegation but 
from other organisations (this is practiced by several accredited NGOs).   
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Insider strategies 
NNV’s statements in the media were sometimes criticised by negotiators for not being 
constructive but when asked about the NNV representative’s role on the Norwegian 
delegation, the impression was either neutral (due to lack of interaction) or positive as being a 
constructive partner. The NNV representative on the Norwegian delegation from 2011-2014 
Ola Elvevold (2015) explained that while Norwegian ENGOs carried out the ‘walk out’, he 
stayed in the negotiation. These illustrate the dual approach by NNV – while the President is 
in the media criticising harshly, the representative on the other hand remains in a lobbyist 
role. The representative on the delegation serves as an important source of information to 
his/her organisation (and the Norwegian civil society more generally). Hence, this explain 
why some negotiators commented that while NNV’s statements in the media were often 
critical, it was still to the point and well informed.  
In addition to receiving useful information, the NNV representative also lobby the negotiators 
through meetings, policy papers, and informal interaction. The disagreements between the 
ministries are also a window of opportunity for an NGO delegate. In the interview with Bård 
Lahn (2015), he explained how NNV could benefit from this by building alliances with 
various ministries on the delegation depending on the topic.   
In the international strategy, NNV points out that they will contribute to ensure international 
accept for propositions from the Norwegian government through their networks, if the 
proposal is coherent with NNV’s policies (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2011a, p. 22). This is a 
leverage that is also highlighted from the HoD Aslak Brun (2015). This strategy is hence an 
effective way to promote climate policies while also improving NNV’s relation with the 
Norwegian government and its negotiators.  
Regarding the notion by Raustiala (1997, p. 733) of informal informals – the arenas too  
informal  for  NGOs  to  participate but where decisions are made, there was clear evidence of 
this at the UNFCCC negotiations as well. Elvevold (2015) pointed out that there were many 
dinners and other bilateral and multilateral meetings that were mentioned during the 
Norwegian delegation’s morning meetings in which the NGO representatives on the 
delegation were not welcome. Interestingly however, informal meetings are of course not only 
a tool used by governments. NNV and other NGOs organise informal workshops and (dinner) 
meetings during both COPs and inter-sessionals. The relatively relaxed atmosphere at the 
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inter-sessional negotiations in Bonn (compared to COPs), were occasions that NNV applied 
this strategy (Elvevold, 2015).  
The NNV representative from 2008-2011 Bård Lahn (2013, pp. 81-82) explains in his book 
about the UNFCCC negotiations that one of the first things he did was to get heavily involved 
with the Climate Action Network (CAN) and the Friends of the Earth network (FoE), in 
addition to general networking specific to NNV’s focus areas. FoE is a network of 75 ENGOs 
while CAN is a broader network but with a more limited scope and the most important in 
terms of UNFCCC activities.  Lahn highlights the CAN meetings as a place to exchange 
information, coordinate lobbying, and media stunts Lahn (2013, pp. 81-82). In addition to the 
daily meetings, CAN also has strategy meetings before and after UNFCCC negotiations, and 
extensive information sharing through the email list called “CAN Talk”. Lahn (2013, p. 97) 
explains that NNV is caught in the middle of the international ENGO network differences 
between CAN and Climate Justice Now! (CJN); while NNV is more sympathetic to CJN’s 
view that climate change is a matter of distribution of resources globally, and they differ from 
many large US based ENGOs in CAN as they are a grass-root movement, they are, however, 
more in line with CAN regarding a more reformist and consensus seeking tactical strategy.  
NNV among others recognises the boomerang effect that they can gain through coordinating 
lobby efforts in networks such as CAN in order to influence Norwegian positions indirectly in 
the negotiations (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2011a, pp. 23-24). They furthermore highlight 
that they will contribute to such boomerang strategies for their partners as well.   
Outsider strategies 
Being present increases the relevance for the Norwegian media at COPs to interview 
representatives from Norwegian NGOs. Moreover, the media monitor reports generally 
indicate high exposure for NNV around the COPs. At COP15 high mitigation targets, more 
political will in the negotiations, and finance were the key aspects of NNV’s demand as 
highlighted by Bård Lahn (2013, p. 129) in his account of the negotiations. Interestingly, 
while NNV was publicly pushing for a binding deal, Lahn (2013, p. 129) explains that he was 
very pessimistic about this, highlighting that the Norwegian Head of Delegation Hanne 
Bjurstrøm already stated at the Bangkok inter-sessional in September/October 2009 that 
“there will not be a treaty in Copenhagen”. Having that insight, they still chose to promote a 
legally binding treaty. This supports Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 75)’s argument that 
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“environmental NGOs are notorious for promoting extreme positions as a strategy for pushing 
state decision-makers in new directions or for distracting their attention”.   
At some COPs NNV carried out daily press conferences, which is a channel with strong 
potential for agenda setting, as the journalists present are eager to obtain information and 
angles for their stories. In addition to bringing non-confidential insights from the Norwegian 
delegation and their networks on the status and expectations to the negotiations, NNV is also 
able to convey their perspectives on that information, which contributes to their agenda 
setting (Haltbrekken, 2015; Lahn, 2013, p. 142). Another tool for awareness raising and 
influence that NNV applied during COP15 was a daily newsletter with 1,500 recipients with 
updates on the negotiations (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2010, p. 14).  
In addition to media, NNV has taken part in activism inside and outside the venue. At COP15 
a president of a local branch were among the 100,000 demonstrators outside the venue, and 
NNV’s national president joined the ‘walk out’ from COP19 in Warsaw when about 500 
NGO representatives left the venue as a protest to the unfruitful discussions (Roux, Sæveraas, 
& NTB, 2009; Sylte, 2013).  
2) Domestic/regional/foreign climate policy and ratification  
Insider strategies 
Furthermore, NNV was described from former/current HoDs and government officials as an 
organisation well acquainted with the political processes, and thus submitting their 
contributions at the right point of time. Policy papers are handed in, debates and seminars are 
organised, and bilateral meetings are held in order to influence the decision makers’ 
knowledge and stances. Their annual report and comprehensive set of position papers on 
among others hearing, also exhibit an insider approach.  
The way NNV worked on the Norwegian greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions target for 2020 is 
an example of how they applied these various channels strategically. On the government level 
for example, they, together with other environmental NGOs, lobbied and put pressure on the 
government negotiations leading to the Declaration of Soria Moria 2009 in which the 
minimum 40 per cent GHG emissions cut was adopted (though with some disclaimers). Lahn 
(2013, p. 123) argues that the aim was not only the Norwegian contributions itself but also in 
an attempt to make Norway to show leadership, so that other developed countries could put 
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forward increased ambitions as well. It was as such an endeavour to create a positive 
negotiation atmosphere at the Bangkok meeting only two months prior to the Copenhagen 
negotiations.  
A prime example of an insider strategy is on NNV’s work on REDD+. REDD+ stands for 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries (summarised as “plus”). NNV President Lars Haltbrekken and NRF President Lars 
Løvold sent a joint letter (sometimes called the ‘Lars & Lars letter’) to the Norwegian 
government and the parliament; the result was that Norway committed itself to finance NOK 
3 billion (USD 410 million) annually to REDD+ projects. From the letter was sent to Prime 
Minister Stoltenberg’s announcement, it merely took two months, and is arguably the quickest 
decision of this magnitude taken in modern Norwegian political history (Reed, 2015). 
Haltbrekken (2015) explained that they consciously targeted a way of thinking that they 
assumed both the Environment Minister Solheim as well as Prime Minister Stoltenberg would 
support. Stoltenberg is an economist, which has coloured his political stances, and in the 
letter, which is only two pages long, NNV and NRF argue with cost efficiency, amongst 
others referring to the prominent report by Nicholas Stern “The Economics of Climate 
Change: the Stern Review” in promoting REDD+ (Løvold & Haltbrekken, 2007). The Review 
argues that “curbing deforestation is a highly cost-effective way to reduce emissions; large-
scale international pilot programmes to explore the best ways to do this could get underway 
very quickly” (Stern, 2006, p. ix). A cost efficient climate policy that moreover can put 
Norway in the spotlight of the UNFCCC negotiation were two key aspects that made 
investing in REDD+ an attractive policy.  
In addition to targeting the governmental level both through the letter and lobbying, NNV and 
NRF also addressed the opposition in the Norwegian Parliament, particularly ensuring support 
from the Conservatives which is a key opposition party (Haltbrekken, 2015). While Solheim’s 
Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) and the Liberal Party (Venstre) in the 
opposition are considered as pro-environment parties, the most important resistance to such a 
large scale climate policy could appear from Stoltenberg’s Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) 
60 
 
and/or the Conservative Party (Høyre)17. NNV thus consciously targeted these with cost 
efficiency as a central argument. By building this foundation, they furthermore secured that 
the REDD+ initiative gained a broader political support, and would become a long-term 
Norwegian climate policy that would stand firm through changes in governments.  
Next to REDD+, the way in which NNV lobbied for a cross party climate agreement 
(Klimaforliket) is a significant illustration on an insider strategy. NNV lobbied the 
parliamentary parties, in order to secure a long-standing and ambitious climate agreement for 
Norway. In recent Norwegian politics, such broad compromises have been reached on topics 
that acquire thorough and stable frameworks such as on pension and tax reforms. The 
agreement was finally signed in 2008 with the support of the government and all opposition 
parties except the Progress party (Fremskrittspartiet) (Innst. S. nr. 145: 2007-2008, 2008; 
Klimaforliket, 2008). REDD+ was also cemented further, through this agreement 
(Klimaforliket, 2008, pp. 3-4).  
Former Minister of Environment Bård Vegar Solhjell (2015) explained that in his experience 
from the Socialist Left Party, ENGOs such as NNV take influencing the adoption of political 
party programmes very seriously, and that they submit both targets as well as solutions in that 
policy formulation process. NNV uses seminars as an insider strategy in approaching 
politicians. The Political Adviser in the Ministry of Climate and Environment Jens Frølich 
Holte (2015) expressed that he found a seminar that NNV contributed to in the Conservative 
Party called the “Conservative Nature Conservation” (as in NNV’s name Norwegian Society 
for the Conservation of Nature) was a very clever lobby strategy to influence the agenda in his 
party. NNV also invites negotiators to seminars in Norway, both for educational purpose as 
well to let their stances known. A negotiator expressed that this was a very fruitful strategy, as 
it was in a more relaxed atmosphere where it is easier to have a more open dialogue 
(Norwegian Negotiator, 2015).   
While Bellona and NSA work directly on the European level, NNV leaves that to its 
European networks CAN Europe and FoE Europe (Elvevold, 2015; Haltbrekken, 2015). 
Similarly, they use CAN as a channel to interact with foreign delegations rather than lobbying 
                                                 
17 The Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) was the largest opposition party but due to their history of “climate 
scepticism”, (internally they diverge from that approach to pragmatic political figures who are more willing to 
look at climate technologies etc.), it has not been an important target for NNV. 
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these governments directly. This reflect the natural labour of division that happen in networks 
that consists of many domestic oriented NGOs.  
Outsider strategies 
Visibility in media is not only a tool to communicate with existing and potential members but 
also a channel to put pressure on decision makers. According to NNV’s 2009 annual report, 
the media coverage was over 10,000, making them the most cited ENGO; for the following 
years, only the 2013 report indicates a concrete number which had dropped to roughly 8,000 – 
still a high rate (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2010, p. 10; 2014, pp. 22-23). In the 2013 report 
the numbers are divided into thematic areas, and climate has a small peak in June and the 
main peak from September to December (in both these periods climate surpasses other topics) 
(Norges Naturvernforbund, 2014, p. 23). This may indicate that their media exposure on 
climate is closely linked to the inter-sessional meeting in Bonn in June and the run up to the 
COP at the end of the year. Nevertheless, NNV’s annual reports also highlight several 
domestic climate issues on the domestic political agenda, which lead to visibility. More 
generally, NNV has been a critical voice in the media, using this channel to pressure decision 
makers as a supplement to the abovementioned insider strategies.  
3) Target groups’ climate policy and behaviour 
Looking at NNV’s annual reports, strategies, and interview subjects’ answers, target groups 
do not appear to be a prioritised area for NNV in influencing the international climate regime.  
4) Public opinion18 
Outsider strategies 
NNV’s communication strategy states that its main objective is to contribute to increased 
number of members, increased involvement, and gain support for NNV’s policies (Norges 
Naturvernforbund, 2013, p. 3). Their international strategy also highlights that NNV aims at 
increasing the Norwegian public’s understanding of the climate issue through communication 
measures (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2011a, p. 24). Consequently, it supports the notion by 
                                                 
18 On public opinion, the insider strategy is not applicable. 
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Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 171) that activists ENGOs that has membership as a key 
resource, will perceive the public opinion as an important channel to be targeted.  
NGOs may seek high levels of activities envisaging influence through visibility, however, if 
the message is implausible, it will not be received as a relevant message for the negotiators 
and simply ignored. On the other hand, during the fieldwork, some of those who participated 
in actions within the negotiation arena with a message that seemed overly ambitious 
compared to the ‘realistic’ outcomes from COP20 argued that actions were sometimes 
indirectly aimed at negotiators and politicians through media and the public. Thus, it was 
rather to create public pressure through the public opinion by carrying out ‘camera friendly’ 
actions.   
At the domestic level, NNV President Lars Haltbrekken (2015) pointed out the activities in 
the local branches are limited with mainly the Bergen branch organising an annual streaming 
event of the COPs. With the high expectations to COP15 on the other hand, several debates 
were organised across the country and a demonstration were held in Oslo and Kristiansand 
according to their annual report (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2010, p. 14). Additionally, local 
NNV representatives and activists were also present in Copenhagen, partaking in activities 
and demonstrations outside the negotiations. These events amongst other aim at increasing the 
public pressure towards politicians and negotiators. 
5.1.3 Summary: the Activist ENGO?  
NNV’s levels targeted and strategies applied can be summarised as illustrated in table 5.1:  
Strategies Levels targeted 
 
Insider strategies 
UNFCCC Domestic Foreign Regional Target 
group 
Public 
opinion 
Lobby decision makers Yes Yes Yes No No n/a 
Lobby the bureaucracy19 No Yes No No No n/a 
Lobby through alliances Yes Yes No Yes No n/a 
Formal intervention/submissions Moderate Yes No Yes No n/a 
Scientists/other opinion-makers Yes Yes Yes No No n/a 
       
                                                 
19 The negotiators are in this table included as the bureaucrats of domestic/foreign/regional IGOs, while 
bureaucracy at the UNFCCC level is considered as the UNFCCC Secretariat.  
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Outsider Strategy       
Mobilising activists Moderate Yes No No No Yes 
Media  Moderate Yes Moderate No No Yes 
       
Mixed Strategy       
Showcasing No No No No No Yes 
Seminars Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Table 5.1. Strategies and levels targeted – the case of NNV 
 
With this in mind, NNV does fit into the activist type of ENGO that Andresen and 
Gulbrandsen’s (2005) developed, which can be summarised as shown in table 5.4 below: 
 Activist ENNGO 
Critical resources Membership base 
Arenas targeted 
International negotiations 
Domestic policy 
Target groups  
Public opinion 
Strategy  
Dual strategy: insider and 
outsider 
Table 5.4 Relationship between NGO type and resources, levels targeted and strategies – Advisory ENGOs. 
NNV’s critical resource is the membership base, and they have a dual strategy. However, 
target groups as an arena is not utilised as the other three channels. Consequently, though with 
some discrepancy, Andresen & Gulbrandsen’s (2005) activist ENGO type does have a high 
explanatory value for NNV.  
5.2 Bellona – Technological Solutions over  
“Comma Fucking” 
A significant distinction from many classical ENGOs, is that Bellona does not care for 
“comma fucking” as their president Frederic Hauge (2015) bluntly called working on the 
negotiation text. At the COPs, they rather focus on showcasing technological solutions.  
Bellona was founded in 1986 by the current president Frederic Hauge and Rune Haaland who 
both left NNV’s youth organisation Nature and Youth. It is an environmental foundation with 
activist roots that originally focused on ‘environmental crimes’, and has since changed the 
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course to concentrate on environmental solutions – through direct cooperation with businesses 
and decision makers (Bellona & Sæther, 2006). Following this line of thought, they therefore 
focus on existing technological solutions as a policy window for decision makers or business 
opportunity for the private sector. Consequently, the key topics and projects that Bellona has 
promoted from 2009 to 2014 are Carbon Capture and Storage and renewable energy 
projects/products (such as the Sahara Forest Project and electric cars) (Bellona, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014).  
5.2.1 Critical Resource20 
Membership base: Bellona is one of the ENGOs in Norway with a limited membership base. 
It follows a general trend in the Norwegian civil society that has occurred in the last decades. 
The number of members are less defining characteristic, and smart strategic figures and 
opinion shapers are more significant for an organisation’s power (NOU 2003:19, 2003, pp. 
21-22). Bellona only has approximately 2,500 passive members (Sandberg, 2013).  
Intellectual base: The Oslo headquarter, and the offices in Brussels, Murmansk, St. 
Petersburg, and Kiev, have altogether roughly fifty employees. Most of these are listed as 
experts – with a variety of background from marine biologists, engineers, social scientists, 
and physicist, and Bellona has in the last decade focused on developing an intellectual 
stronghold (Bellona, 2015a; Bellona & Sæther, 2006; Smith, 2007).   
Financial base: Bellona’s income has had a turbulent period. It was at its highest in 2010 
with NOK 56,7 million and its lowest in 2012 with NOK 39,5 million (USD 7,5 million and 
5,2 million respectively) (Bellona, 2012, 2013, 2014; Miljøstiftelsen Bellona, 2011; Ree & 
Helgesen, 2011). Until 2012 the Ministry of Environment did not give base support  to 
environmental foundations and Bellona therefore did not receive funds from directed to civil 
society in the years prior to this change (Prop. 1 S: 2011-2012, 2011, p. 35). Since then 
Bellona has been allocated NOK 1.3-1.8 million (USD 172,000-238,000) annually (Prop. 1 S: 
2012-2013, 2012; Prop. 1 S: 2013-2014, 2013; Prop. 1 S: 2014-2015, 2014). The majority of 
their income thus come from private sources, particularly companies. These private funds are 
                                                 
20 This section studies the Bellona Foundation exclusively and does not cover the Sahara Forest Project 
Company, Sahara Forest Project Foundation or Bellona Holding AS that are initiated by the Foundation but are 
separate legal entities (Brønnøysundregistrene, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d).  
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a combination of general donations, project based sponsorship, and advertisement fees on 
their webpages and publications.  
Political base: what distinguishes Bellona from most other Norwegian ENGO is its own 
network to decision makers internationally. Bellona is well connected with decision makers 
and bureaucrats from Norway as well as from other countries, particularly within EU but also 
beyond (Hauge, 2015; Helseth, 2015).  
Critical resource: Hauge (2015) points at some key strategic factors for their success. He 
highlights leverage as the main field – processing complex scientific knowledge in a 
systematic way and transmit that to decision makers in an understandable manner. The 
position they have internationally in the field of environment is built over the years, 
particularly starting with the efforts against atomic waste in Russia that among others engaged 
European and US authorities (Hauge, 2015). This case also accelerated their work 
internationally, and triggered a broad and valuable network with decision makers, UNFCCC 
Secretariat, scientists, NGOs, and businesses. They do have notable influx of private capital; 
however, both the political and financial base rely on the intellectual base. Hence, the latter is 
Bellona’s critical resource.  
5.2.2 Targeted Arena and Applied Strategies 
Bellona does not have a formulated strategy for each COP nor the UNFCCC process more 
generally. According to a former Senior Advisor Svend Søyland (2015) who was one of 
Bellona’s key actors at COPs along with the President Frederic Hauge, they had a more 
generic approach to the work they did at the COPs. Bellona has focused on technological 
solutions that politicians and business can apply, and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) has 
principally been their field of expertise in the recent years (Hauge, 2015; Helseth, 2015; 
Søyland, 2015). Additionally, they have worked on Sahara Desert Project – a project that 
enables food production in the desert with seawater and solar power, and other technological 
solutions that need help to start up while representing potential policies to assist decision 
makers to face both environmental and economic concerns (Hauge, 2015).  
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1) International negotiations and processes 
Bellona’s participation was at a peak at COP15 in Copenhagen. At this conference they had 
153 delegates who attended the event on their delegation, but only 43 were actually working 
for Bellona (Søyland & Helseth, 2015; UNFCCC, 2009b, pp. 116-118). The remaining 
delegates are partners and others without accreditation that Bellona accommodated. The 
following COPs saw a significant decrease: six each at COP16 and COP17, eleven at COP18 
(increase mainly due to the Sahara Forest Project), three at COP19, and only one at COP20 
(Søyland, 2015; Søyland & Helseth, 2015).  
Insider strategies 
Being a relevant ENGO for decision makers and business for Bellona means opening policy 
windows and business opportunities (Hauge, 2015). Distribution of knowledge and direct 
dialogue is therefore a preferred insider strategy that Bellona applies.  
Distribution of materials (policy papers, pamphlets etc.) has been important for Bellona. One 
aspect is the need for explanation – as they do promote (relatively new) technological 
solutions. Another aspect is connected to their focus on concrete tools that can assist countries 
and companies to face climate change targets. Thus, their magazine “101 Solutions to Climate 
Change” is a key example highlighted by several interview subjects – both from Bellona as 
well from other actors. In the magazine 101 concrete examples are presented, and it was 
distributed at COPs (Bellona, 2009a).  
Bellona’s network is a key factor that Hauge (2015) highlights. Two and a half year before 
COP15, he booked a table at a renowned restaurant in Copenhagen for the whole duration of 
the negotiations (two weeks), in order to accommodate lobby dinners with significant actors. 
Bellona hosted such informal dinners almost every evening. This illustrates their conscious 
approach to attract high profile figures from a COP. Furthermore, while some organisations 
are characterised by a high turnover, Hauge (2015) emphasises continuity as an essential 
element for Bellona in keeping valuable networks. The COP15 was a network boost for 
Bellona, and the following years were spent on preserving these, and developing new contacts 
(Bellona, 2011, pp. 34-35). In their 2013 annual report, Bellona claim they know the leaders 
and key personnel in all the major NGOs, the important Heads of Delegations, top executives 
from the industry, former heads of state, leaders of several UN organisations  and politicians 
in the EU and the US (Bellona, 2014, p. 24). 
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At COP15 Bellona booked a delegation room among state delegations (in addition to their 
exhibition pavilion). This, according to Hauge (2015) allowed them to stay after all other 
NGO representatives were denied access at the end of the negotiations, and furthermore, they 
let the Norwegian delegation use their rooms towards the end of the negotiations, thereby 
improving the relationship. Such designated rooms are also useful in carrying out lobby 
meetings at COPs. It must be noted that it is not common for NGOs to have delegation rooms, 
partly due to the costs related to renting a room. Not even all state delegations have rooms at 
COPs. This illustrates the resources Bellona put in this particular COP. While even booking 
of rooms is a strategic matter to Bellona, it has also contributed to negative sentiment among 
some negotiators. Partly due to a certain degree of distance, that negotiators wish to have 
when working but also due to a particular incident at COP16 in Cancun in which Bellona used 
the delegation’s secured Wi-Fi connection (that pose a certain security risk for the internal 
government communication). It might appear as a small issue but it actually still colour some 
negotiators’ opinion about the organisation.  
Bellona does not partake in the officially recognised ENGO constituency in the UNFCCC 
(through neither CAN nor CJN), and according to Hauge (2015) there are four main reasons. 
Firstly, Bellona’s main field of interest is not the negotiation text as mentioned previously in 
contradiction to CAN. Secondly, the foundation focuses on pragmatic solutions rather than 
politically not feasible demands as Hauge puts it. Thirdly, Bellona is also more positive to 
business – even willing to work with the fossil industry, and lastly and related to the former 
point, Bellona is fond of CCS dissentient to many ENGOs in the UNFCCC negotiations. 
Bellona is a member of other alliances such as the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) 
and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short Lived Climate Pollutants (CCAC), 
nevertheless, these do not lobby the UNFCCC platform (Helseth, 2015). Global Climate 
Network (GCN) is on the other hand a coalition in which Bellona cooperated with think tanks 
to promote policies that contribute to tackle climate change (Bellona, 2011, pp. 33-34).  
Outsider and mixed strategies 
Two tactics that may appear as outsider strategies but that certainly have aspects of insider 
strategy as well are seminars/side events and showcasing. Showcasing is an important 
strategy for Bellona to promote the technology that is explored to a limited degree by business 
and governments. As COPs are annual ‘climate happenings’, showcasing at these arenas is a 
tremendous opportunity. Showcasing carries elements from both outsider and insider 
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strategies. While it can be seen as media friendly stunts, this tactic can also be a way to trigger 
stakeholders’ interest and improve Bellona’s branding through the visibility that showcasing 
can bring about.  
The Sahara Forest Project’s “moment of fame” was during COP18 in Doha, Qatar. Selected 
delegates from the negotiations were brought to the Sahara Forest Project Pilot Facility to see, 
learn and taste produce made in the desert with seawater and solar energy, in order to 
illustrate the technological possibility and also the interest to allocate funds to invest further. 
120 guests visited the pilot facility including ministers, business representatives, and 
researchers, and it received global media coverage21 (Bellona, 2012, p. 28). The project has 
since been expanded to Jordan, and according to Hauge (2015) actors from other countries 
have also expressed their interest. Hauge (2015) claims he had a key impact in Doha 
becoming the host of COP18 – in order to give Qatar a concrete deadline in their pilot facility 
cooperation. When asked, he did not however respond to who/which channel that allowed 
him this influence. Thus, although it could be an interesting example of procedural lobby, 
without other sources, this remains as an unverified claim from one part.  
Side events can also be perceived as a mixed strategy. On one hand, it is an insider strategy if 
the goal is to create an arena for dialogue with stakeholders. On the other hand, it is also a 
potential arena to assert pressure. As illustrated by the number of delegates Bellona sent, 
COP15 in Copenhagen was a peak not just in participation, but also in the number of side 
events they organised. They had over sixty side events/seminars/workshops in Copenhagen, 
then around twenty the two following years, and fewer at COP18 in Doha when they focused 
on the Sahara Forest Project (Bellona, 2010; UNFCCC, 2014c).  
A clear outsider strategy on the other hand, is Bellona’s usage of its international network of 
journalists to criticise the Norwegian government. Norwegian governments do care about the 
country’s international reputation, and Hauge (2015) tells that the ‘phone started ringing’ after 
he was quoted in the Washington Post22 calling Norway a ‘selfish country of petroholics’. 
 
                                                 
21 Such as BBC, CNN, Al-Jazeera, CCTV (China Central Television), in addition to Norwegian and Qatari media.  
22 The quote appear to have been to the TIME Magazine when Frederic Hauge was featured as one of the 
global ‘heroes of the environment’. He told the Magazine “We're a nice little selfish country of petroholics” 
(Smith, 2007).  
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2) Domestic/foreign/regional climate policy and ratification  
Insider strategies 
One particular element that makes Bellona stand out among the three organisations studied in 
this thesis in regards to strategy is how easily their employees call government representatives 
and parliamentarians to let them know Bellona’s reaction on various statements. While many 
Norwegian NGOs keep to formalised meetings, hearings, and seminars, getting in touch in 
such a direct way differs from most other actors according to decision makers who have been 
interviewed. This was also confirmed by the Bellona representatives. This somewhat 
“unconventional” and informal communication secures that Bellona’s positions are 
communicated continuously beyond the formal channels. Additionally, they apply the regular 
tactics such submitting policy documents and concrete budgetary inputs, meeting with 
decision makers and bureaucrats/negotiators. Distribution of information materials, including 
reports are an integrated part of this strategy.  
On the regional level, Bellona has the most significant presence in Brussels among the 
Norwegian ENGOs. With its own office in Brussels since 1994, and formal cooperation with 
the EU, it has built a certain standing in the European political scene related to climate and 
energy. Their lobby on foreign governments is tightly interrelated to the EU lobby work 
according to the Director at Bellona’s Brussels office Jonas Helseth (2015). Helseth (2015) 
explains that the main target is the European Commission, and then the EU Presidency, as 
they are the most central actors in developing EU’s position in UNFCCC. Additionally the 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are used as a supplementary channel as, 
although they have limited impact on EU’s positions in the climate negotiations, they are 
beneficial as an indirect channel to their national parliaments (Helseth 2015).  
In order to influence the EU level, Bellona has decided to work with some key member states 
such as the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Germany. Part of the narrative Bellona builds 
around CCS in the European context, is that in order to include carbon intensive countries 
such as Poland on the path to a low-carbon economy, CCS is a ‘ticket in’ for those countries, 
which in turn may contribute to an agreement (Helseth 2015). Hauge (2015) stated that he 
received an email from the British Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change thanking 
him for Bellona’s effort to get Poland on board in the EU 2030 agreement.  
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For several years, Bellona had an office in Washington DC that was applied to lobby the US 
and Canadian governments.  Even after the office was shut down, they have continued 
cooperation at the bureaucratic level, particularly with the US Department of Energy, on 
among others technological development and knowledge sharing (Helseth 2015). Previously, 
while Bellona had their own staff in Washington D.C., they also lobbied politicians.  
Beyond those countries and regional inter-governmental organisations that are considered as 
key actors in the international climate regime, Bellona also works with governments on 
concrete projects. In the Sahara Forest Project they work directly with the governments of 
Qatar and Jordan. According to Hauge (2015) they have ongoing dialogue with additional 
national as well as local governments. These project-based relations add to Bellona’s effort to 
build an international network.  
Outsider strategies 
Again, seminars can be interpreted as mixed insider and outsider strategies. It is an essential 
strategy in order to transmit knowledge, lobby policies, network, and have a dialogue with 
decision makers, and opinion makers such as journalists.  
Though Bellona’s identity appears to be mostly an advisory type of ENGO today, the activist 
roots are still apparent especially in the domestic context. Particularly the Bellona President is 
known for straightforward comments – positive as well as negative. Bellona actively uses the 
media as a channel to reach decision makers domestically, as well on the regional level, and 
towards foreign governments. More details on the use of media will be explained in the 
section 4) public opinion, however, this section can highlight some examples that illustrate 
the way Bellona uses media to communicate to decision makers. In 2009, prior to COP15, 
they carried out a stunt where they presented Bellona’s ‘alternative white paper’. The table 
was turned, and politicians, including the Minister of Environment Erik Solheim, and 
government institutions were invited to a hearing. While being a stunt that was media 
friendly, the focus on constructiveness remained, and the hundred page long “white paper” 
did contain a comprehensive plan on how Norway should tackle climate change (Bellona, 
2009b). This is an example of how Bellona combines communicability, constructiveness, 
relevance to politicians, and sometimes a touch of activism in their strategy.    
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3) Target groups’ climate policy and behaviour 
Bellona (2015c) explains that since pollution does not know borders, there is basically no 
limit to who they could work with but they do point out that they will remain as an 
independent ‘watchdog’.  
Mixed strategies 
From its establishment in 1986 and into the 1990s Bellona used activist methods such as 
chaining themselves to places to protest against companies’ environmental violations. This 
approach has since been significantly toned down in the last decade (Bellona & Sæther, 
2011). While Bellona cooperates with business today, they have nevertheless, not been shy to 
criticise companies publicly.  
Bellona is the ENGO in Norway with the longest tradition for working closely with the 
business sector, and started its first business programme in 1998 (Bellona & Sæther, 2011, p. 
35). The organisation’s approach is to attract businesses by assisting them with competence 
on existing climate technology that can be implemented by each company. In addition to the 
direct contact with each business, Bellona has also forums in which businesses gather for 
knowledge sharing, as well as to cooperate on policy formulation (Bellona, 2015b). This close 
relation allows Bellona to affect Norwegian, and foreign, companies’, approaches on climate 
change, which in turn also may affect the political level. To apply the notion of green/grey 
BINGOs as conceptualised by Vormedal (2008), though the starting point may differ for each 
business, Bellona will pull the business actors to the greener end of the continuum.  
Bellona’s strategy on cooperating closely with business (even from the fossil industry) raises 
challenges between that collaboration and keeping the organisation’s environmental 
legitimacy. Bellona has been accused of ‘greenwashing’ (deceptive green marketing of) 
companies in exchange for funding, but has countered these allegations systematically for 
example in a series of articles and opinion pieces published in an online news site NA24 
(Simenstad, 2006; Stenerud, Sveinbjørnsson, & Selvik, 2006; Sæther, 2006a, 2006b). A tactic 
that Bellona applies is to report environment crimes to the police, and the Norwegian oil 
company Statoil that has previously sponsored Bellona has not been an exception while they 
were still a sponsoring partner. While cooperating on CCS, Statoil has also been criticised by 
Bellona on their wish to drill for oil in the Arctic, and their tar sand project in Canada. 
According to Bellona Managing Director Nils Bøhmer and Statoil Communication Director 
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Jannik Lindbæk Jr., they did not renew their agreement in 2008 due to disagreements and that 
they did not consider the partnership as fruitful any longer (Bøhmer, 2011; Ree & Helgesen, 
2011). Director of Bellona Europe, Jonas Helseth (2015), describes that it is in fact not always 
easy for companies to accept public criticism from Bellona directed at them or their sector. 
For example Shell is a Bellona partner in promoting CCS, and when Bellona criticised Shell 
for their interest in drilling oil in the Arctic, it was difficult to accept for the company. 
However, Helseth (2015) explains that most businesses in the end see their interest in letting 
Bellona follow its ideology and keep their green legitimacy. These relationships demonstrate 
the difficult balance of partnerships that Bellona faces in cooperating with businesses and 
remaining as an ENGO with legitimacy.  
Furthermore, Helseth (2015) points out that it is vital for Bellona to retain flexibility. He says 
that they will cooperate with business when that appears fruitful, however, that they also 
partner with other ENGOs, for example when industrial actors were sceptic about the EU 
Emissions Trade System (ETS)  (Helseth, 2015). Bellona also draws on expertise from 
scientists when working with business, as well as in promoting technological solutions to 
decision makers. These target groups are complementary while business appears to be their 
main target group.  
The Climate Conference in 2008 and 2009 (CC8 and CC9) that Bellona organised in 
collaboration with the Norwegian power company Hafslund (among others a producer of 
hydropower and district heating) and Club de Madrid (“the world’s largest forum of former 
democratic Presidents and Prime Ministers”) (Club de Madrid, 2015; Hafslund, 2015). This 
was a conference with high-level guests from business, politics, and academia including 
members of Club de Madrid (such as Norwegian Gro Harlem Brundtland and Costa Rican 
José María Figueres) (Bellona, 2008, 2009c). The latter has also helped Bellona in 
establishing relations with his sister Christina Figueres, the Executive Secretary of the 
UNFCCC (Hauge, 2015). Other notable guests were the economist Nicholas Stern and UN 
Special Envoys on Climate Change Ricardo Lagos. This conference series is both an 
illustration of the international status Bellona has established and a way in which they further 
develop their network and branding.  
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4) Public opinion 
Outsider strategies 
Bellona’s media coverage is quite extensive, and according to their annual report, they were 
the ENGO with the most media coverage in Norway in 2011 (Bellona, 2012). The other 
annual reports state that they have about 5,000 – 6,000 coverages annually (Bellona, 2011, p. 
22; 2012, p. 23; 2013, p. 18; 2014, p. 21). The media monitor searches through Retriever on 
the concrete COPs confirms a similar picture of high levels of exposure. Søyland (2015) 
explained that one of the measures taken was publishing articles on the Bellona website 
formulated so that journalists could easily apply it. Furthermore, in 2013 Bellona put an extra 
effort to boost the social media outreach.  
From the advisory ENGO perspective, one could expect decision makers and businesses as 
their main targets. Additionally, Bellona is not member based, therefore, they do not have the 
same incentives as a member based organisation in reaching the greater public. However, they 
do define all three groups as their target (Bellona, 2011, p. 22). More specifically, in the 2009 
annual report Bellona mentions the public as a target in relation to COP15, and draws the 
attention to their cooperation with Copenhagen Municipality on “Hopenhagen” – an 
exhibition and event area in the city centre (Bellona, 2010, pp. 11-12). Though not part of 
their main activity, Bellona also visits schools and have information stands across Norway to 
inform and involve the grass root in climate and environment issues (Bellona, 2014, p. 23). It 
appears that they therefore in addition to the pragmatic media outreach directed at decision 
makers and businesses, have an ideology driven effort to reach the public opinion as well.  
5.2.3 Summary: the Advisory ENGO?  
Bellona’s levels targeted and strategies applied in the period 2009-2014 based on the data 
collected can be summarised as illustrated in table 5.3 below:  
Strategies Levels targeted 
 
Insider strategies 
UNFCCC Domestic Foreign Regional Target 
group 
Public 
opinion 
Lobby decision makers Yes Yes Yes Yes n/a n/a 
Lobby the bureaucracy Moderate Yes Moderate Yes n/a n/a 
Lobby through alliances Yes Yes Yes Yes n/a n/a 
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Formal intervention/submissions No Moderate No Yes n/a n/a 
Scientists/other opinion-makers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes n/a 
       
Outsider Strategy       
Mobilising activists No  No No No No No 
Media  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Mixed Strategy       
Showcasing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seminars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 5.3. Strategies and levels targeted – the case of Bellona 
 
Comparing the above table 5.3 with Andresen and Gulbrandsen’s (2005) advisory ENGO 
type as presented in table 5.4, Bellona divert from these characteristics:  
 Advisory ENNGO 
Critical resources Intellectual base 
Arenas targeted 
International negotiations 
Domestic policy  
(Target groups) 
Strategy  Insider only 
Table 5.4 Relationship between NGO type and resources, levels targeted and strategies – Advisory ENGOs 
It appears that historical (activist roots) and ideological reasons contribute to the fact that 
Bellona targets the public although a member base does not play a significant part of neither 
their budget nor the functioning of the organisation. Furthermore, they approach target groups 
to a greater extent than for example NNV. Approaching target groups, especially businesses, 
are actually a fundamental element of their strategy. Consequently, Bellona does not fit into 
the advisory ENGO type.  
5.3 NSA’s strategy: the Discreet Business Lobbyist 
As a business association which is dominated by ships operating on fossil fuels, and also 
being involved in the Norwegian oil industry, there are paradoxes when promoting a ‘green 
profile’. Although the representatives from NSA argued that they want Norwegian shipping to 
be leading in green technology globally and ambitious ideas are presented in their 
environment strategy, there are still some hinders that should be highlighted. This is not as a 
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normative discussion or judgement (which is not the aim of this thesis) but rather an 
imperative interest to be aware of in analysing their strategy.  
Firstly, there is an internal disagreement within the sector (primarily between shipowners and 
shipbrokers) regarding the speed of the delivery that has a consequence for the level of 
emissions. The ship owners often have an interest in not exceeding a certain level of speed for 
the vessel, as higher speed requires more fuel which is of course costly. Additionally, they 
have an interest in maximising the potential of the route by stopping at several ports on the 
way from A to B. Shipbrokers on the other hand will often be interested in quick deliveries, 
which are more cost efficient from their perspective. This is particularly the case for so-called 
“hot markets” with high levels of competition (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015).  
Secondly, it must be noted that around 80 per cent of ships built and/or equipped in 
Norwegian shipyards are connected to the offshore oil and gas industry, and followingly, 
NSA argues in favour of increased activity in the oil sector and the opening of new offshore 
oil fields (Norges Rederiforbund, 2010a).  
Finally, profit can both be an enabling and hindering factor in adopting green solutions in a 
business sector. Vormedal (2008, p. 62) note, however, that within the diversity of BINGOs, 
it is “evident that business activities and mandates have moved towards the green(er) end of 
the spectrum, reflecting a more general shift in corporate strategies from opposition towards 
more accommodative and constructive approaches to climate change mitigation”. This also 
appears to be the goal of NSA. While they are aware that ambitions among their members 
vary, they as a business umbrella association would like to encourage green innovation and 
best practice sharing among their members, and furthermore lobby for regulations that allow 
the marine sector a smooth green shift (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). The Specialist Director in 
the Ministry of Climate and Environment that works with shipping (including IMO), 
Sveinung Oftedal (2015), noted that NSA do have a more climate friendly “positive voice” 
within the ICS.  
Taking these aspects into consideration, NSA is mixed in regards to their environmental 
ambitions. As presented in the theoretical chapter, Vormedal (2008) develops a scale from 
one (the most “grey” anti-emission control BINGOs) to four (the greenest most climate 
proactive BINGOs). NSA can be said to be a “middle green” BINGO (the third category on 
the continuum). This implies that their view is to “acknowledge/endorse need for climate 
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mitigation and GHG regulation”, the strategy and mandate are to “promote business-friendly 
regulations [and] level playing fields”, and it carries out “information-based lobbying and 
discursive tactics” (Vormedal, 2008, p. 41). Consequently, it fits into the more general 
development in Europe and North America since the turn of the century, in which corporate 
strategies have turned more to accommodation and cooperation rather than opposition 
(Vormedal, 2008, p. 40).  
5.3.1 Critical Resource 
Membership base: NSA is an umbrella organisation that consists of around hundred and fifty 
Norwegian shipping companies, roughly covering 1,400 ships (Norges Rederiforbund, 
2014c). However, as its membership is based on business and not individual membership, 
they do not fit into the classic sense of a membership base. In this analysis, as Andresen and 
Gulbrandsen (2005) describe this resource as a matter of among others gaining new members, 
this does not apply directly to  NSA. The explanation is that NSA does not have a competing 
association and shipowners recognise the benefits of being organised in the Norwegian 
society.  
Intellectual base: NSA has an extensive intellectual base through their employees and 
member businesses. From 2009-2014 NSA has had 40-50 full-time equivalents (FTEs) 
(Norges Rederiforbund, 2010b, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014d, 2015). Of these most of the 
employees are lawyers and advisors, however, only two work directly with environmental 
concerns (Norges Rederiforbund, 2014a; Sletner & Vaagland, 2015).  
Financial base: The operating revenue is not published in every annual report. As an 
illustration, it was NOK 123 million (USD 16,5 million) in 2014 (Norges Rederiforbund, 
2015, p. 16). A significant share of this are membership fees from the shipowners.  
Political base: As they represent an important sector with longstanding traditions in Norway 
they have access to politicians  as well as bureaucrats. The Norwegian shipping industry’s 
international presence, has historically allowed for close ties between NSA and particularly 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, there are traces of revolving door politics, with 
movement of personnel between bureaucracy/politics and NSA.  
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Critical resource: The membership base is in a certain manner an important resource, 
however, for the UNFCCC negotiations the relevance of this factor is limited. The intellectual 
base is restricted due to the low number of employees working concretely with climate. In the 
context of the climate negotiations, their financial and political base are the most significant 
resources and the latter is the resource that particularly stand out. 
5.3.2 Targeted Arena and Applied Strategies  
Unlike the other two organisations in this thesis, NSA rarely applies any outside strategy. 
Politicians as well as the NSA representatives pointed out that NSA is not a publicly vocal 
type of organisation. Being a BINGO, activism is not a strategy they apply either. The first 
three sections on arenas will thus, present the insider strategies the organisation applies. 
NSA’s media coverages on climate issues are very limited but will be briefly presented under 
the forth arena on public opinion.  
1) International negotiations and processes 
Insider strategies 
NSA has been less active at the actual UNFCCC negotiations compared to NNV and Bellona. 
Following the removal of the extended delegation, and despite their direct accreditation, NSA 
has deprioritised the COPs as they considered the negotiations itself to be a less effective 
arena of influence (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). For NSA, the bureaucratic level appears to 
have been a more vital channel to communicate their positions to the Norwegian authorities 
on climate matters relating to shipping. As a representative of a key industry in Norway, NSA 
naturally has meetings directly on the government level, nevertheless, in this particular field 
of subject the bureaucratic channel has been important (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015).  
Another imperative aspect for deprioritising COPs is that the detailed shipping related climate 
issues are negotiated in the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Thus, the IMO 
negotiations have a higher strategic priority than the UNFCCC. Furthermore, Sletner stress 
the fact that NSA is on the Norwegian delegation to IMO (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). IMO 
presents reports to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) 
under the UNFCCC. The fact that the shipping industry in general only has a limited number 
of delegates – the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) for example has only sent one to 
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four delegates per COP, may indicate a similar interpretation of the relevance of the 
UNFCCC to the shipping industry (UNFCCC, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 
2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012, 2013b, 2014b).   
While they were still on the extended delegation, the NSA representative to COP15 Gløersen 
called himself the “backbench consultant” (Hovland, 2009). This illustrates NSA’s approach 
fittingly. They are discreet in their lobbying but ensure that their members’ interests are 
properly communicated. Vormedal (2008, p. 43) described information-based lobbying as 
lobbying that “may involve providing governments with expert advice, technical reports and 
position papers, and assisting decision-makers directly with policy formulation and the 
writing of legal texts”. NSA has most certainly submitted most of these element but less so on 
concrete policy formulation and writing of legal text in the context of the negotiations. They 
have made their stance known on the need for a global regulatory framework (rather than 
domestic), and related to that, the need to avoid the distortion of competition. Furthermore, 
they also actively lobby within ICS (which will be discussed further in the next chapter). At 
COP18 for example, the NSA Director for Security, Environment and Innovation Hanna Lee 
Behrens pushed for a common proposal for emission reduction from the shipping industry 
(Andersson, 2011). 
Mixed strategy 
On showcasing, Sletner brought up the example of the ship Viking Lady at COP15 in 
Copenhagen (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). The fuel cell and combustion engines on board are 
powered by LNG (liquefied natural gas) which “significantly [reduce] harmful emissions 
compared with the traditional marine oils that commercial ships generally operate on” (Viking 
Lady, 2015). The ship is a collaboration between NSA member Eidesvik Offshore, DNV-GL, 
and Wärtsilä in the project they call the FellowSHIP (DNV-GL, 2015). This is also the only 
example of showcasing in relation to a COP, so this strategy is seldom applied directly in the 
UNFCCC arena by NSA.  
2) Domestic/foreign/regional climate policy and ratification  
Insider strategies 
Although NSA has not attended many COPs, they have made it clear to the Norwegian 
political authorities what their stances are on the negotiation text and given them inputs prior 
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to COPs (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). Sletner points out that it is a matter of prioritising the 
most effective channel for NSA. While some are more vocal in arenas such as the COP itself 
or on the extended Norwegian delegation, this is not the favoured tactic for NSA (Sletner & 
Vaagland, 2015). Sletner says that they would rather have direct meetings with the political 
leadership in Norway, and submit thorough policy papers prior to COPs (Sletner & Vaagland, 
2015). Former Minister of Environment (2012-13) Bård Vegar Solhjell confirms this 
approach. According to Solhjell (2015), NSA is not the organisation to scream the loudest but 
they will make their opinion known through direct meetings. The Political Advisor to the 
Climate and Environment Minister (2013-), Jens Frølich Holte (2015), also notes that NSA 
sends their political inputs – whether it is a policy or budget matter, effectively at the right 
point of time in the domestic political process. 
Sletner expressed that the EU was certainly an important channel to them when targeting the 
UNFCCC negotiations (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). In addition to being Head of Section on 
Environment in NSA, he is also the Chairman of a working group on energy efficiency in the 
European Community Shipowners' Associations’ (ECSA). NSA actively promotes their 
stances in this arena through the ECSA and directly from its office in Brussels.  
While keeping an eye on the greater picture regarding climate change, similar to Bellona, 
NSA prefers to be more “hands on” and develop concrete projects that allow a greener 
shipping industry. For example, NSA has a voluntary reporting system for its members on 
CO2 emissions as becoming aware is the first step toward reductions, according to Sletner 
and Vaagland (2015). Furthermore, NSA and its members engage in projects on development 
of green shipping technology.  
3) Target groups’ climate policy and behaviour 
Insider strategies 
For NSA, the main target group appears to be shipping business, particularly their own 
members. As previously presented, their member base is very diverse, with climate 
regulations being a larger threat to some member corporations than others. NSA has thus 
carried out internal efforts to encourage their members to agree on climate targets in the 
environment and climate strategy “Blue Sea – Green Future”. A key tactic has been to present 
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climate-friendly measures in terms of energy efficiency, and to facilitate knowledge-sharing. 
This arena will be more elaborately addressed in the next chapter.  
4) Public opinion 
Outsider strategies 
Public opinion is of limited importance for NSA compared to the other channels. Publicly, 
NSA portrays itself as a business association that takes Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
seriously, including on climate change. Looking through the media coverage during COPs 
(which is not substantial), their expression is ‘sober’ in that they are clear on their opinions 
and stances but they do not directly criticise others through the media. They argue in a factual 
manner, and proactively suggest benefits for actors that could potentially oppose their stances 
(e.g., leverage for developing countries that desire differentiated regulations). It appears as 
though public opinion is of a lesser importance (as long as there is no negative PR). Hence, 
this channel does not seem to be prioritised.  
5.3.3 Summary: the Lobbyist BINGO?  
Strategies Levels targeted 
 
Insider strategies 
UNFCCC Domestic Foreign Regional Target 
group 
Public 
opinion 
Lobby decision makers Yes Yes No Yes n/a n/a 
Lobby the bureaucracy No Yes No Yes n/a n/a 
Lobby through alliances Yes Yes No Yes n/a n/a 
Formal intervention/submissions No Yes No Yes Yes n/a 
Scientists/other opinion-makers No Moderate No Moderate No n/a 
       
Outsider Strategy       
Mobilising activists  No No No No No No 
Media  Moderate Moderate No No No Moderate 
       
Mixed Strategy       
Showcasing Moderate Yes No No Yes No 
Seminars No Yes No No Yes No 
Table 5.5. Strategies and levels targeted – the case of NSA 
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NSA’s levels targeted and strategies applied can be summarised as illustrated in table 5.5. 
Their interpretation of the effects of participating in an extended delegation also appears as a 
key reason for the decreased interest. As highlighted before, there are still shipping related 
topics in the UNFCCC – such as suggestions on international bunker fuel taxation. 
Nonetheless, particularly two strategic considerations appear to be relevant. Firstly, relevance 
of platform: decisions that may have a negative impact on their sector may not give the 
impression of being realistic to reach within the UNFCCC framework (in contrast to IMO). 
Secondly, the relevance of their presence: NSA may consider their interests covered by 
Norway through prior lobbying and non-state actors such as the International Council on 
Shipping (ICS), which represents the shipowners’ interests. This also confirms the 
observation by Vormedal (2008, p. 38) that the transnational organisations targeting the 
regional/international level are more active in the climate negotiations than nationally-based 
BINGOs. 
In chapter two, the approach for a lobbyist BINGO was presented as the following:  
 Lobbyist BINGO 
Critical resources Financial base 
Arenas targeted 
International negotiations 
Domestic policy 
Strategy  Insider only 
Table 5.6 Relationship between NGO type and resources, levels targeted and strategies – Lobbyist BINGOs 
NSA mostly fits into the description above. However, they do not prioritise the international 
negotiations in the UNFCCC any longer. On the other hand, they are active in IMO 
negotiations. What is lacking in the overview above compared to NSA’s practice, is that they 
target their own industry – both among their members and through their umbrella 
organisations. Additionally, the political base appeared to be more significant – both when 
studying their resources as well as after studying the strategies applied.     
5.4 Activist, Advisory, and Lobbyist NGOs? 
Concluding Remarks on Strategies  
Looking back at the Singaporean Minister Dr. Balakrishnan’s quote with a metaphor from 
surgery that illustrated how sensitive it is to keep the balance in order to reach agreements in 
the UNFCCC negotiations, it is intriguing to study the various approaches applied by NGOs. 
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This section will summarise and address the second research question: What type of strategies 
do these NGOs apply?  
This chapter presented and analysed NNV, Bellona, and NSA’s strategies by looking at their 
critical resources, arenas targeted, before considering whether they applied an insider/outsider 
or dual strategy. At first sight, NNV and Bellona appear as typical activist and advisory 
ENGOs, and it could be expected from the theoretical framework that NNV would have a 
dual and Bellona an insider approach. 
HoD Aslak Brun (2015) commented that while NNV is the organisation that make use of all 
the formal channels available, often arranging meetings to set an agenda, before criticising 
and pressuring through media, Bellona on the other hand is less visible in the ‘formal 
channels’ but in turn is very outspoken in the media. This experience thus differ from what 
could be expected from Andresen and Gulbrandsen concept of activist and advisory ENGO. 
In sharp contrast to what Brun noted, another person from the Norwegian delegation 
expressed that you can draw an axe from “noise” to technical expertise, and you would find 
NNV closest to “noise” and NSA at the other end while Bellona was somewhere in between. 
However, the same person also notes that in the UNFCCC negotiations NNV behaves much 
more like an expert and that other Norwegian NGOs represent the “noise”.  
This leads to the finding that both NNV and Bellona had a division of labour to a certain 
degree in having the President act as an “activist type” (though they also did lobby), and 
others from their organisation ensured purely lobbyist functions. NSA on the other hand, is 
mostly comfortable with its insider strategies, and fit well into the lobbyist BINGO type. 
Interestingly, as an umbrella association that covers a variety of shipping company, NSA 
furthermore highlighted internal lobbying.  
Specialised knowledge is a key resource relevant to NGOs strategies. As climate negotiations 
are highly complex and technical, “decision-makers often turn to NGOs for help in 
understanding the nature of the problems and the implications of various policy alternatives 
under consideration (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 74). This was also confirmed in the field 
research. The negotiators would evaluate, together with bureaucrats in Oslo, new propositions 
and draft texts on their own. Nevertheless, they were very open to suggestions and inputs 
particularly on such occasions when new texts were on the table. The information submitted 
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by NGOs in those situations are not the single source for the decision makers but still 
represent an essential policy windows in which influence may happen. 
Although many negotiators emphasised constructive inputs as the most effective, putting 
pressure is nevertheless not to be underestimated. From a bureaucratic point of view, the 
outsider strategy of creating public pressure may appear less relevant. Nevertheless, this 
strategy is rather a communication directed at politicians who do partake in the public debate. 
Hence, though the negotiators/bureaucrats may not be very receptive for this strategy, it may, 
on the other hand be effective in influencing the politicians.  
The parliamentary channel is also relevant for both the insider and outsider strategy. 
According to the President of the Parliamentary Committee on Environment and Energy, Ola 
Elvestuen (2014), he is of the impression that the ENGOs are more heavily involved in 
lobbying the parliament than the private sector. It should be noted that the Liberal Party 
(Venstre) is considered to be one of the environmentally friendly parties in Norway, and that 
he may have a selective depiction given the grey lobby may have prioritised the larger and 
less environmentally friendly parties. NNV and Bellona have in fact actively used the 
parliament both when disagreeing with the government as well as in order to cement their 
policies broadly. For NSA on the topic of climate, other arenas have been sufficient to secure 
their stances; hence, the need to lobby the opposition may have been lower.  
In addition to the concrete policy formulation, showcasing and ‘leading by example’ have 
been strategies that are more indirect but that may enhance the international climate 
negotiations by pushing/pulling industries in a greener direction – which in turn will make it 
easier for decision makers to take climate friendly choices. Both Bellona and NSA focus 
heavily on this strategy, though the former more publicly than the latter.  
Strategy naturally depends on their goals. NSA reaches its goals mainly through discreet 
lobbying. Their goals are on a concrete detailed (often regulatory) level on climate issues. 
Thus, engaging the public is not a primary tactic. Media also appears as a complementary 
method. In regards to publicity, Bellona is at the other end of the spectrum, as their goal is to 
promote technological solutions, visibility is a key, and is reflected in their choice of 
strategies as well. They focus on showcasing, networking, and projects. The UNFCCC for 
Bellona is thus a supplementary channel. NNV is the organisation among these three that 
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focuses the most on the UNFCCC negotiation process itself. This is closely linked to their 
REDD+ involvement, and general domestic climate ambitions for Norway.  
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6 Influence:  
Putting the Empirical Puzzle Together  
The chief negotiator for G77 and China in the Accra negotiations, Bernarditas Castro-Muller 
from the Philippines, compared the fruitless negotiations with the dance cha-cha-cha: Moving 
a few steps to the right, then forward, a few to the left, and then a hop backwards where you 
are ultimately back to square one. ‘Moving without going anywhere’ (Bals, Treber, & 
Harmeling, 2008). In these intricate and cumbersome negotiations, what are the contributions 
of the NGOs? Do they push the negotiations in a positive direction and present solutions, or 
simply dance along the climate cha-cha-cha?  
In the existing academic literature, there seems to be a broad agreement that non-state actors 
do have influence on international policy-making. While this research often focuses on 
transnational actors, can the same statement apply to Norwegian NGOs? There has certainly 
been a clear increase in the number of participating organisations, but what is their actual 
impact?  
So far, we have considered the channels available, and the strategies applied by three selected 
NGOs. Now the last research question will be targeted: do NNV, Bellona, and NSA have 
influence? The non-state actors’ impact will be assessed through among others their own 
evaluations in the interviews, the receivers’ impressions, fieldwork observations, and 
document analysis. As highlighted in the introduction, finding NGO influence in international 
environmental negotiations can be described as putting together “an interesting empirical 
puzzle” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 68). This chapter will thus gather the empirical puzzle 
pieces together to trace the influence of NNV, Bellona, and NSA.  
For each organisation their main strategic goals will be presented before looking into 
competing and converging interests in various arenas for those goals, which may affect the 
potential influence that the NGOs may achieve. Lastly, as presented in the theoretical chapter, 
this section will assess the influence based on the definition of NGO influence, and guided by 
the analytical framework developed by Betsill and Corell (2008). The framework emphasised 
issue framing, agenda setting, and positions of key actors regarding the process outcome, in 
addition to procedural and substantive issues in regards to the negotiation outcome (or 
outcome on targeted position in this case). NGO influence was defined as: when A 
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intentionally communicates to B so as to alter B’s behaviour from what would have occurred 
otherwise and bringing about A’s intended effects. The summary for each NGO will gather 
the evidences in order to assess whether NNV, Bellona, and NSA were successful in reaching 
their strategic goals and influence the climate regime.  
6.1 NNV’s Impact 
6.1.1 Strategic Goals  
In NNV’s international strategy it is emphasised that their goals internationally reflect their 
national priorities: nature conservation and hindering climate change (Norges 
Naturvernforbund, 2011a, p. 9). Two themes appear to be their key areas. As presented in the 
former chapter, REDD+ has been a central topic for NNV in the climate negotiation. 
Secondly, another primary concern for NNV is an agreement in the UNFCCC that consider 
the historic responsibilities, and interrelated to that are ambitious targets for GHG cuts in 
Norway.  
6.1.2 Competing and Converging Interests 
In a report from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009, pp. 148-150) to the 
Norwegian Parliament in 2009 (prior to COP15), the MFA highlights a new climate regime, a 
global emissions ceiling, cost effective mechanisms, CCS, and limiting deforestation and 
forest degradation as key issues for Norway in the UNFCCC. How did the Norwegian 
government end at this conclusion? 
REDD+ – “the Rainforest Billions” 
 “Through effective measures against deforestation we can achieve large cuts in 
greenhouse gas emissions - quickly and at low cost.  The technology is well known and has 
been available for thousands of years. Everybody knows how not to cut down a tree.” 
 – Prime Minister of Norway, 2005-2013, Jens Stoltenberg (2007). 
The “Lars & Lars letter” – the letters sent to the Norwegian government and parliament by 
NNV President Lars Haltbrekken and the Norwegian Rainforest Foundation (NRF) Lars 
Løvold – which encouraged Norway to contribute with NOK 6 billion (USD 820 million) 
annually to REDD+ (Løvold & Haltbrekken, 2007). This is a prominent example of effective 
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influence. The result was announced in the Stoltenberg speech two months later with half the 
amount of what NNV and NRF asked for, nevertheless, a significant amount that put Norway 
in a central position in the UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+.  
As explained in the former chapter, NNV’s strategy was to address the government and the 
opposition in the Parliament with a policy that had an appeal to several political parties. By 
further cementing it in the parliamentary climate agreement (Klimaforliket) they ensured the 
long-term survival of the Norwegian support for REDD+. Cost efficiency and giving Norway 
a favourable impression and position in the UNFCCC were leading arguments that 
contributed to secure the REDD+ support in Norway. Additionally, it circumvented the more 
contentious issue of making cuts in GHG emissions in Norway at a higher cost. It had thus an 
appealing framing.  
Several of the informants also point to Minister of Environment (later Minister of 
Environment and International Development) Erik Solheim who took personal interest in 
securing the NNV/NRF initiative. Hermansen and Kasa (2014, pp. 10-12) argues in a working 
paper that the fact that Solheim established a new section under the Ministry of Environment 
– the Climate and Forest Secretariat (KOS), affected the way the initiative was implemented 
“by bypassing bureaucratic establishments’” cautiousness.  
It must be noted that the extensive amount was drawn from the aid budget, which raised some 
criticism in Norway. However, it did not suffice to hinder the continuation of the Norwegian 
REDD+ efforts. Partly, this can be due to the legitimacy that NNV and NRF gave the 
initiative. This also happened in the context of a growing aid budget and state budget in 
general. The aid budget was doubled between 2004 and 2013 to become NOK 30 billion 
(USD 4 billion) (Utenriksdepartementet, 2012). Furthermore, there has been a political 
consensus to target 1 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) for aid in Norway, and by 
drawing from the aid budget, it hence served both this political purpose while containing the 
potential opposition from the fiscally conservative Ministry of Finance.  
In addition to the policy influence that NNV together with NRF accomplished, they also 
achieved a procedural victory as they gained a position in the Norwegian delegation through 
ForUM. This, combined with funds from Norad that actually originates from the “rainforest 
billions” (regnskogsmilliardene) as it is popularly called in Norway, gave NNV and NRF a 
shared full-time employee that followed up REDD+ and the international climate negotiations 
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more generally. The negotiators and politicians impression on the extent to which this 
position contributed to NNV influence through the international channel varies. While one 
Norwegian negotiator who had worked with NNV called this civil society position on the 
delegation simply as a communication channel for the government to the civil society and the 
greater public, another expressed that the NNV representative on the delegation was a 
beneficial sparring partner to brainstorm and develop the REDD+ policy further (Norwegian 
Negotiator, 2015). This varying perception may indicate a moderate influence through this 
position. On the other hand, this position does allow NNV a comprehensive insight 
(compared to NGOs without such access to a state delegation) to create relevant and targeted 
policies that can be applied through other channels.  
In the period from 2006-2014 Norwegian pledges surpassed those of the next five largest 
donors to REDD+ combined (Norman & Nakhooda, 2014, p. 14). The initiative also survived 
the government shift in 2013 in which the coalition government of the Conservative Party and 
the Progress Party came in power. Looking back to the definition of NGO influence, NNV 
certainly moved the Norwegian decision makers to a favourable position in their view. The 
Norwegian REDD+ finance is thus a prominent example of non-state influence towards the 
UNFCCC through the domestic channel. This has furthermore been followed up by more 
small-scale policy entrepreneurship in the following years with moderate influence.  
Norwegian Contribution to an Ambitious and Just Climate Agreement in the 
UNFCCC 
In their international strategy NNV stresses that the UN should remain as the platform to 
address climate change globally (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2011a, p. 24). They were for 
example sceptical in leaving emissions from the international shipping industry to IMO 
(Andersson, 2011). While working through various channels internationally, particularly 
through their networks, the domestic channel remains the main arena for NNV.  
In the previous chapter, it was highlighted how NNV strategically targeted the government on 
the 2020 GHG targets – and rather successfully so. In the most recent debate on Norwegian 
mitigation targets for 2030, however, NNV demanded that Norway should reduce its 
emissions by 80 per cent compared to 1990 levels. This is a very radical stance – even 
compared to other ENGOs (Sagmoen, 2015). As a contrast, in the report that the Ministry of 
Environment ordered from the Norwegian Environment Agency, which constitutes an 
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important foundation for the policy formulation, the most ambitious scenario described 
showed 43 per cent reduction by 2030 with the same base year (Miljødirektoratet, 2014, p. 
11). Interestingly this ambitious target is a consequence of being a democratically built 
member based organisation. The target was adopted in the NNV national board following a 
proposal by their youth organisation Nature and Youth. Paradoxically, Nature and Youth 
itself reduced its own ambitions to 60 per cent a few months later at their Congress following 
a debate that among others referred to the Environment Agency report. Accordingly, NNV 
ended up with the most far-reaching stance in this matter among the Norwegian ENGOs – a 
target that was perceived neither as politically feasible nor realistic. The Norwegian 
Parliament in the end adopted 40 per cent reductions by 2030 compared to the 1990 levels 
within the EU framework. On this concrete matter, NNV appears to have outmanoeuvred 
itself.  
On the other hand, NNV did show political craftsmanship when they proposed a broad 
climate settlement in the Parliament. As previously mentioned, all political parties in the 
Norwegian Parliament except the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) reached a compromise 
through a climate agreement (Klimaforliket). The agreeing parties settled on an updated 
version in 2012 (Innst. 390 S: 2011-2012, 2012). The Climate and Environment Minister Tine 
Sundtoft’s (2013-) Political Adviser Jens Frølich Holte explains that this agreement is 
respected and that it set the framework to a great extent on other climate policies (Holte, 
2015). Whether NNV managed to push for increased ambitions is harder to prove. The targets 
adopted were not as ambitious as the targets aspired by NNV. However, they had a strong 
procedural impact as Norway has a climate policy, which is cemented strongly, 
notwithstanding changes in government.  
NNV has voiced in favour of global climate justice, and that Norway in this context should 
contribute significantly, taking historical responsibilities and current capabilities into 
consideration. HoD Aslak Brun (2015) and the Political Adviser Holte (2015) exemplify 
NGO influence with the fact that several NGOs had criticised that the term justice23 was not 
included under a section on international climate in the Revised National Budget24 (RNB), 
                                                 
23 In Norwegian the terms “justice”, “equity”, and “fairness”, are not distinguished as clearly as in English – 
particularly in the way it is in the climate debate. The word rettferdighet simply covers the aforementioned.  
24 Not to be confused with the State Budget of Norway. The National Budget of Norway describes the state of 
the economy and the Government’s view on economic policies. As a matter of fact, the RNB actually mentions 
“just distribution” but not in terms of the classic climate justice (Meld. St. 2: 2013-2014, p. 100).  
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and that the Norwegian government had since started to refer to a “fair and ambitious 
agreement”. In the context of climate change negotiations, climate justice has been a 
contentious term, as it touches on the topic of burden sharing and the question of ‘who pays 
for what’. Norwegian authorities consciously use fairness instead of justice in English due to 
the connotations in the climate discourse. Additionally, neither Brun nor Holte had any 
additional explanation when asked whether adding the word fairness had any implication 
beyond language. Followingly, calling this usage of the term for influence appears as mere 
symbolism that give organisations “credit” without truly changing anything significantly.  
However, according to Holte (2015) climate justice is a matter that the Norwegian civil 
society has moved politicians the most from their original stance on the topic of climate 
change. He exemplifies with how he believes the parliamentary climate agreement 
(Klimaforliket) would most likely have looked differently without the NGO pressure on 
climate justice, and more concretely how Norway should ‘take responsibility’ by cutting 
domestically as well as internationally (which is the more cost efficient alternative) (Holte, 
2015).   
NNV has been active through alliances, particularly CAN, in the material available for this 
thesis, however, there has not been found clear traces of a boomerang effect in which they 
have bypassed the domestic level and influenced another state (most likely in cooperation 
with CAN) to affect the international negotiations and/or the Norwegian delegation. This is 
not to say that it has not happened but rather that the evidence is not clear. There is sufficient 
research indicating that CAN and other transnational networks have had influence on the 
UNFCCC negotiations, and NNV contributing to this could accumulate to influence together 
with others’ contributions. Nonetheless, activity does not equal influence. Proving a 
boomerang effect would therefore require interviewing, or by other means gather sufficient 
information, from state delegates from other countries, and then study if that in turn has 
changed the Norwegian position in the desired the direction. 
So has NNV had influence on the matter of improving Norwegian contributions to a just and 
ambitious climate agreement in the UNFCCC? As we have seen, only minor steps have been 
taken with only limited symbolic effect regarding climate justice, indicating low to moderate 
influence on issue framing. Ambitious demands can contribute to pressuring decision makers 
but in this case, NNV seems to have outmanoeuvred themselves from that discussion and not 
had significant impact on the positions of key actors. However, they have certainly moved the 
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political parties through the cross-party climate agreement initiative, as it ensured a firm 
framework for the Norwegian climate policy. Followingly, this is a clear sign of agenda 
setting.  
6.1.3 Summary: Effective Use of the Dual Strategy? 
Former HoD (2007-2009) Hanne Bjurstrøm (2015) expressed that if political influence is only 
measured by whether NNV reached the target of having the countries sign a binding treaty, 
then they have not had influence. However, she points out, NNV has influenced on other 
topics such as REDD+. Moreover, although not all issues can be dealt with on the spot during 
a negotiation, the inputs can nevertheless be brought to the domestic political decision-
making at a later stage, and back into the negotiations as the Norwegian position (Bjurstrøm, 
2015).  
NNV appears to balance the outsider and insider strategy on the topic of climate change. 
Sceptical comments directed at NNV mostly originated from people who had not worked with 
the organisation directly, and had built their impression through NNV’s outsider strategy in 
the media and through demonstrations. Those who had experienced their insider strategy on 
the other hand, considered NNV as a professional actor and distinguished the activist and 
lobbyist side of NNV, furthermore pointing out several successes in reaching their strategic 
goals.  
Looking at the REDD+ strategy of influence versus their promotion of 80 per cent GHG 
emission cuts in Norway by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels) illustrate an interesting paradox 
for an ENGO such as NNV. While the policy entrepreneurship of REDD+ and the 
parliamentary climate agreement bear traces of thorough analytical considerations on how to 
frame and promote a topic in order for the initiatives to win support, the mitigation target on 
the other hand appears unrealistic to many of the same parties that supported the 
aforementioned initiatives. NNV therefore appears to have substantial competence in 
influencing, while sometimes being coloured by its ambitious member base driven by 
ideology rather than pragmatism. This on the other hand is typical for many activist ENGOs, 
and can be a way to create pressure but the line between that and outmanoeuvring themselves 
is a difficult line to walk.  
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6.2 Bellona’s Impact 
6.2.1 Strategic Goals  
As we have seen in the previous chapter on strategy, in all the arenas Bellona is active on, 
transmitting knowledge on technological opportunities is vital part of their strategy. 
Promoting CCS in Norway, abroad, and building recognition for the technology in the 
UNFCCC has been of primary importance. Furthermore, the Sahara Forest Project (SFP) is 
another flagship of theirs.  
6.2.2 Competing and Converging Interests  
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) – Controversy, Crash-landing, and Success 
The report from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009, pp. 148-150) to the 
Norwegian Parliament in 2009 (prior to COP15), as mentioned in the former section on NNV, 
presents CCS as one of the key issues for Norway in the climate negotiations. The Norwegian 
position papers from COP15 and COP16 list CCS as one of the four prioritised negotiation 
topics; moreover, inclusion of CCS in the UNFCCC’s Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) is supported as a Norwegian position from COP15 to COP17 (when it was finally 
formalised) (Miljøverndepartementet, 2009, 2010, 2011).  
According to Bellona’s director from the Brussels office, they played a key role together with 
country parties such as Norway, United Kingdom, and USA, in promoting CCS to become a 
part of CDM which was reached in Durban at COP17 (Helseth, 2015). Although Bellona does 
not usually focus on the negotiation text, it was important for this matter as it would give the 
technology a recognition by the UN, which was considered as valuable in Bellona’s efforts to 
promote CCS more generally.  
Tracing a clear causation on CCS in decision maker’s policy positions, or in the negotiations 
more generally, to Bellona is however tricky. HoD Brun (2015) suggested that it was rather 
parts of the fossil industry itself in his impression that pushed for CCS. In the study by 
Vormedal (2008) she finds that BINGOs have influenced the UNFCCC negotiations in 
making CCS a part of CDM. On the other hand, some of that knowledge on CCS in general 
and interest for this technology may have originated in Bellona’s cooperation with these 
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businesses in Norway and abroad. One thing that can be said with greater certainty is that 
Bellona has shaped the domestic debate on CCS. While most other ENGOs in Norway have 
not been that positive towards CCS, Bellona’s support has allowed businesses and politicians 
the legitimacy that an ENGO approval can give to a technology. In comparison, the debate on 
CCS has been more negative in some other European countries such as in Germany.  
Gas plants, as well as CCS, have been contentious political topics in Norway, and the former 
has even contributed to dissolving a government (which is rare in the modern Norwegian 
political context). Thorbjørn Jagland was the first Prime Minister to put CCS on the 
governmental agenda. Tjernshaugen (2011, p. 233) who studied the growth of political 
support for CCS in Norway principally gives Bellona the credit for playing a “key role as 
policy entrepreneur, and started promoting CCS as a potential compromise solution during the 
years 1995–1996”, and furthermore points out that Jagland explicitly thanked Bellona’s 
initiative.  
The centre-left government (2005-2013) started a full-scale CCS plant at Mongstad in 
Western Norway with the estimated cost of NOK 25 billion (USD 3.4 billion), and the then 
Prime Minister Stoltenberg described the project as Norway’s “moon landing”. A few days 
after the election in which the Stoltenberg government lost its election, however, they 
announced that after investing NOK 7.4 billion (USD 1 billion) on research, the full-scale 
project was not perceived as feasible and followingly scrapped (Haugan, Husby, & 
Eisenträger, 2013; Innst. 161 S: 2013-2014, 2015, p. 38). Frederic Hauge condemned the 
termination and execution of the project, calling it the ‘ugliest political crash landing’ he has 
seen (Haugan et al., 2013).  
According to the Office of the Auditor General of Norway, the business interest to apply CCS 
may have diminished due to the high costs in the Mongstad project (Innst. 161 S: 2013-2014, 
2015, p. 3).  In comparison, the full-scale CCS facility at Boundary Dam coal plant in Canada 
cost less than the aforementioned investments prior to the ending of the project (Bertelsen, 
2014). This could followingly affect the political parties’ perception of CCS. The governing 
parties do, however, confirm that they will still adhere to the commitments made in the 
Sundvollen Declaration of the Solberg government (2013-) which states that they wish to 
support the development of a cost efficient CCS technology, and at least one facility with 
CCS (Innst. 161 S: 2013-2014, 2015, p. 25). 
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Initially, the decision to develop a full-scale CCS plant at Mongstad had been a significant 
victory for Bellona. They were one of the most prominent actors arguing in favour of the 
technology and that Norway should become a leading country in CCS. Bellona also 
cooperated on CCS with two of the industrial companies involved in the project, Statoil and 
Norwegian Shell. While most other Norwegian ENGOs have been sceptic to CCS, Bellona 
has been the primary ENGO voice in the media, hence giving the technology a ‘green 
legitimacy’ in the Norwegian public.  
Bellona’s insistent push for this technology, particularly through lobbying of politicians and 
business executives, also appear to have been fruitful. Bellona has thus addressed the 
Norwegian politics on CCS through all four arenas: international, domestic/foreign/regional, 
target groups, and public opinion. Looking at the aforementioned pieces of evidence and 
putting the empirical puzzle together, it appears that on the topic of CCS, Bellona seem to 
have had influenced through issue framing, agenda setting, and moving the Norwegian 
position in UNFCCC (through political changes), business interest, and public opinion (in 
Norway, and partly in Europe) into a favourable direction in their view.  
Sahara Forest Project (SFP) – “Seeing is Believing” 
Bellona’s most apparent success on SFP, is the pilot facility in Qatar and the agreement with 
Jordan. In a video interview the Jordanian Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Dr. 
Malek Kabariti points out that “seeing is believing; first you have to convince the people that 
this technology will work in our region” (Sahara Forest Project, 2013). This is essentially, 
what Bellona aimed at when they invited a group of selected guests from COP18 in Doha to 
an excursion to the pilot facility, and feeding the delegates cucumbers produced in the middle 
of the Qatari desert. 
As mentioned in chapter four on channels, Hauge claims to have affected the decision of 
locating COP18 in Doha. According to Hauge (2015) the Qatari authorities had been slow in 
the beginning of the process, and that he “took come phone calls” to make Doha the location 
of a COP, so that it would be the deadline for Qatari government to finish the facility by then. 
Hauge (2015) would not name whom he spoke to, therefore, it has not been possible to verify 
to what extent Bellona has affected this decision.  
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The Qatar Pilot Plant was developed as a joint project by SFP in cooperation with two 
fertiliser companies, the Norwegian based Yara and the Qatari Qafco (Sahara Forest Project, 
2015). The CEO of Qafco had commented at the opening that “it is a pilot facility. We see 
that it works but we have yet to see its profitability” (Alstadheim, 2012). The Sahara Forest 
Project Launch Station in Jordan on the other hand was supported by the Norwegian Ministry 
of Climate and Environment with NOK 11.5 million (USD 1.9 million), with additional 
funding originating from the Grieg Foundation and other philanthropic sources  (Sahara 
Forest Project, 2014). Its main purpose is to conduct feasibility studies. According to Hauge 
(2015) there are also other interested parties in various countries.  
As mentioned in the former chapter on strategy, SFP received extensive attention from 
international media at the opening of the facility in Qatar in conjunction with the COP in 
Doha. The SFP signing ceremony with Qatari and Norwegian Prime Ministers and Foreign 
Ministers earlier that year led to “several hundred articles” according to Bellona’s annual 
report (Bellona, 2013, p. 18).  
In other words, Bellona has been successful in mobilising both private and public capital in 
support for the SFP concept. Moreover, they accomplished to reach the public in many 
countries through the media, and possibly target groups to expand the project further. They 
have thus accomplished agenda setting, moderate issue framing, and moved the positions of 
key actors. Whether they will succeed in reaching their long-term target to have the SFP 
concept commercially implemented beyond pilot plants and feasibility studies remains.   
6.2.3 Summary: Showcasing for Success?  
Analysing Bellona’s influence has been tricky at times. The issue surrounds contradicting 
information on their activity as well as influence. According to Sveinung Oftedal (2015) – a 
bureaucrat who works with environment issues related to shipping (which is also a topic that 
Bellona lobbies on), Bellona as well as other NGOs have a tendency to take larger credits 
than their real influence deserve. This comment leads to the point about the difficulties in 
analysing the data. As discussed in the third chapter on methods, there is a risk in both NGO 
representatives as well as politicians speaking too highly, or exaggerating the NGOs 
influence. The impression is that Bellona sometimes exaggerates its importance and 
accomplishments both in media as well as in documents such as their annual reports. As with 
statements from other actors, this was tackled by searching for information that would 
96 
 
verify/modify/contradict the claims. Critical statements, such as from Oftedal and several 
others during the field work, may also simply be an indication that they did not represent a 
(successful) channel for Bellona. Although they represent a relevant channel, Bellona (or 
other NGOs for that matter) may simply have targeted other channels. In other words, these 
types of statements alone are not evidence of influence, or lack of thereof.  
Are these technological innovative projects truly realistic in the eyes of the decision makers 
and business owners? Moreover, can the application of the technology, or mentioning of it in 
position papers and/or negotiation text, be attributed to Bellona’s lobbyism? The decision 
makers interviewed did recognise CCS as a key issue for Bellona for example but did express 
that the fossil industry’s wish was more essential in including this technology in the official 
position of Norway. Norway’s economy is largely dominated by the fossil industry, namely 
oil and gas. On the other hand, it can also be that Bellona’s lobbyism towards the business 
sector has influenced the position of these industries. On this point, it is thus problematic to 
conclude on the direction of causation. Previous research on CCS in Norway, however, do 
credit Bellona significantly for both transmitting expertise, lobbying politicians/target groups, 
and creating public support (or at least soothed opposition).  
Although activity does not equal influence, it is fair to say that the extensive amount of side 
events, workshops, and lobby meetings they have carried out, is at least an indication of 
knowledge transmission. In the chapter that addressed channels, the attention was drawn to 
the fact that several negotiators emphasised that contributing with solutions in a policy 
vacuum was a strategy from non-state actors that was highly appreciated. Bellona has in the 
recent years consciously targeted this channel. Hauge (2015) is critical to what he calls 
symbolic demands from ENGOs that only create political pitfalls, and they rather focus on 
building technological and lobby expertise. Despite Hauge’s critical comments in the media, 
the Political Adviser in the Ministry of Climate and Environment explained that in his 
impression climate authorities seek expertise from Bellona (Holte, 2015).  
The ideas Bellona promote are based on existing technologies, sometimes gathered in a new 
concept such as SFP. Although many find Bellona’s showcasing intriguing, some decision 
makers and negotiators hesitate, as many of the projects are very costly. This is for example 
reflected in the “hearing response” from the Environment Minister Solheim to Bellona’s 
white paper stunt in 2009 as highlighted in the former chapter. Solheim expresses gratitude 
for an ambitious white paper with interesting solutions, however, he also notes that evaluation 
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of costs had not been properly taken into consideration, and doing so would strengthen 
Bellona as a discussion partner in developing climate policies (Bellona, 2009b, pp. 132-133). 
For the realisation of Bellona’s ideas, support and collaboration with the business sector 
therefore seems to be a key in moving projects from concept to execution.  
6.3 NSA’s Impact  
6.3.1 Strategic Goals  
As noted under the former chapter on strategy, NSA can be considered to be a “middle green” 
business actor in Vormedal’s (2008) terminology.  In their environmental strategy “Blue Seas 
– Green Future”, they consider climate change as “one of the greatest challenges we face”, 
that they have “responsibility to help ensure sustainable growth and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions” (Norges Rederiforbund, 2014b, p. 17). A key target highlighted both in the 
strategy and in the interview with Sletner and Vaagland (2015) from NSA’s Environment 
Section, is that NSA wish an international agreement on emission reductions from 
international shipping. Additionally, both sources also emphasise engaging target groups in 
the development of green technology for shipping as an important issue that NSA prioritise.  
6.3.2 Competing and Converging Interests  
International Regulations for Emission Reduction – “the absence of stick” 
Sletner and Vaagland (2015) express that proper Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification 
(MRV) system is one of the types of regulations that the industry needs. As an illustration 
they exemplified with EU’s MRV system, and how just the act of measuring emissions is an 
action that raises awareness, and in the next step turn into emission reduction. Sletner pointed 
out that after all, it is simple human psychology, nobody wants to be the worst, and Vaagland 
added that it is like “carrot and stick – just that the carrot in this case is the absence of stick”. 
These comments illustrate NSA’s approach to climate related regulations and shipping – 
promoting incentives that will indirectly be disincentives to pollute.  
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There are three key steps in NSA’s tactics and impacts in promoting a regulatory framework 
that cut GHG emissions from shipping: 1) convincing NSA members; 2) convincing 
colleagues internationally and; 3) lobbying the Norwegian government & EU.  
Convincing NSA members 
Firstly, the member base of NSA is diverse from large-scale shipowners, with tremendous 
capacity to adapt and even carry out their own technological development, to smaller 
companies with old polluting ships. This and other factors such as the diverging interests 
regarding the speed of the ship and fuel consumption as shed light on in the former chapter 
have previously made the topic of climate change contentious within NSA. Therefore, the 
first step was actually an internal shift.  
An important and effective strategy appear to have been – as is done in IMO – framing GHG 
cuts as energy efficiency. This is a key in understanding NSA’s (and other relatively 
progressive shipping actors’) approach to climate change. Vaagland summarised it simply; 
CO2 is the most important GHG and the easiest to deal with, since CO2 in shipping equals 
fuel, and fuel equals costs, if you reduce emissions, you have also reduced costs (Sletner & 
Vaagland, 2015).  
Furthermore, Norwegian ships are technological advanced in a global context, and there was 
hence the argument that Norwegian shipping could attack the issue head-on, and aim at 
becoming a leading actor in green technology for ships. This would then allow them an 
advantage when GHG regulations would be implemented (NSA has had a basic assumption 
that this will take place, only depending on when and in which arena).  
Followingly, NSA has been able to adopt, relative to similar BINGOs, a somewhat ambitious 
climate and environment strategy, and become a positive voice within the international 
shipping sector. That leads to the next step. 
Convincing colleagues  
The second step was to target their international colleagues, particularly in ICS. Sletner and 
Vaagland (2015) expressed that not all ICS members are equally ambitious on the topic of 
climate change, and that they work to influence within this international network as well. The 
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Norwegian IMO negotiator Oftedal (2015) also noted NSA’s positive contribution from a 
climate perspective within ICS.  
NSA take upon this role because they have an interest in it, and they are also open about it. 
Sletner for example says NSA promotes transparency because it benefits their members 
(Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). Instead of only having domestic (or regional) regulations in 
place, pushing for common international regulations will benefit the NSA members as it will 
avoid competition distortion. It is, however, difficult to trace concrete influence from NSA, 
which has changed the course of ICS. What can be said in this regard is thus only NSA’s role 
and activity in the international context.  
Lobbying the Norwegian government & EU 
In the interview with HoD Brun (2015) he noted repeatedly that he had not heard directly 
from NSA since he was appointed in 2013. Nevertheless, he had a clear understanding of 
what NSA’s strategic interests were in the negotiations. When asked where the source of his 
knowledge was, after pausing and reflecting, Brun answered that it was from other 
bureaucrats. Although a HoD is not directly lobbied, this illustrates how other channels can be 
fruitful to penetrate a policy field to affect the Norwegian position in the UNFCCC 
negotiations.  
In the previously mentioned report from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009, 
pp. 148-150), it states that “as long as the UNFCCC system does not cover emissions from 
international transport, it is particularly important for Norway to work actively towards cuts in 
these emissions within IMO and ICAO” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 
149). This report was published prior to COP15, and in the position paper to this COP, 
emissions from international shipping is furthermore listed as one of the four prioritised areas 
in the negotiations for Norway (Miljøverndepartementet, 2009, p. 6). Soon after COP20 in 
Lima, the Ministry of Climate and Environment presented a white paper about mitigation 
commitments for 2030. In this document, the government expresses the continued view that it 
shall work with climate and environmental regulations for the maritime industry through IMO 
(Meld. St. 13: 2014-2015, 2015, p. 25).  
The Norwegian position on international shipping in UNFCCC and NSA’s views appear 
coherent. For the first of these COPs, the papers mention sending a clear signal to IMO, while 
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confirming that the detailed discussions should be taken in IMO (Miljøverndepartementet, 
2009, p. 16; 2010, p. 17). From COP17 it turns to a statement about not hindering IMO’s 
efforts on emission reduction (Miljøverndepartementet, 2011, pp. 21-22). Behind these 
policies is the conflict between developing countries that wish the inclusion of the CBDR 
principle (differentiation) and the richer countries that seek a level playing field for the 
industry. As explained in chapter four, the former reflects a UNFCCC principle while the 
latter is what can be found in the IMO Convention. Hence, NSA as well as the Norwegian 
government have preferred issue de-linkage from UNFCCC. In the Norwegian COP19 
position paper, it describes that the UNFCCC negotiations on shipping has greatly faltered 
due to this disagreement of principle. As a leverage for the developing countries Norwegian 
position papers, as well as NSA’s former representative in the extended delegation Terje 
Gløersen, suggested that climate financing that originates from international shipping should 
be aimed at developing countries (Hovland, 2009; Miljøverndepartementet, 2009, p. 16; 2010, 
p. 17).  
The Norwegian COP19 position paper also notes that there has been no substantial decisions 
in the UNFCCC body SBSTA that discusses shipping, and reporting from IMO is the only 
expectation they have (Miljøverndepartementet, 2013a, p. 35). This trend appears to have 
continued, and at COP20 it was simply stated “not prioritised” (Miljøverndepartementet, 
2014, p. 17). Hence it confirms NSA’s deprioritising of the UNFCCC – both due to their 
views already been mostly covered by the Norwegian positions and as a consequence of lack 
of any relevant decision-making.   
Does this coherence originate in NSA’s influence? A bureaucrat that NSA highlighted in their 
lobby effort was Specialist Director in the Ministry of Climate and Environment Sveinung 
Oftedal who has been a key actor at the IMO meetings and also been a negotiator in 
UNFCCC. Interestingly, Oftedal (2015) expressed that the NSA had little influence on the 
Norwegian IMO delegation specifically nor on his policy field more generally (in the sense of 
steering the directions in environmental policies). According to him, these policies are 
established on the basis of a wide range of views and interests, and not only one; he 
furthermore added that relevant knowledge derived from other sources, for example, technical 
expertise was exerted from a Norwegian company called DNV-GL that works amongst others 
on certifying ships (Oftedal, 2015). On the other hand, Sletner also mentioned that NSA 
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regularly met Ministers. The political leadership did in fact express that NSA got their 
message through to them (Holte, 2015; E. Solheim, 2015; Solhjell, 2015).  
Vaagland noted that changing the industry’s attitude takes time but that for NSA it has been 
important to promote emission reduction in the shipping industry. It appears as if they have 
been successful in this internally among their members, as NSA has been able to both adopt 
moderately ambitious environment strategy, and promote this stance. These are both signs of 
issue framing, agenda setting, and changes in the positions of key actors. There is also 
evidence pointing to that they have been active in promoting this view internationally among 
their European and international colleagues. However, evidence of influence was harder to 
pin point (similar to NNV and CAN). This would require studying these networks more 
extensively. Thirdly, there was significant coherence between Norwegian and NSA policies. 
As an important sector with long standing traditions in Norway, and well connected into the 
political leaders in Norway, they have certainly been able to communicate their positions to 
the decision makers. On the question, relating to the definition of influence in this thesis, 
whether the receivers of the communication would have acted differently in the absence of the 
lobby efforts, Norwegian authorities would likely have taken consequences for the business 
sector into consideration to some extent. However, partly due to their discreet lobby strategy, 
it is difficult to concretely point at evidence on whether Norwegian authorities would have 
acted differently.  
Green Solutions for Shipping 
The other main approach of NSA is (similar to Bellona) the “hands on approach” that would 
aggregate to a more ambitious target in the UNFCCC, as Sletner put it (Sletner & Vaagland, 
2015). As explained above, the shipping angle to climate change in NSA (as well as IMO and 
indirectly to the UNFCCC) is energy efficiency. Hence, the development of green technology 
partly surrounds this topic.  
NSA has worked with best practice sharing among its members on both operational as well as 
technological energy efficiency matters. Furthermore, they also support green technology 
transfer, which is a topic in UNFCCC as well. When asked about the cost perspective to 
technology transfer (after all NSA’s members are profit driven), Sletner explained that the 
members would perhaps not share the newest valuable innovation but that joint ventures and 
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other types of collaborations did enable shipping companies to contribute on this matter 
(Sletner & Vaagland, 2015).  
According to Sletner, the first significant step was convincing NSA members as explained in 
the former section, then, he explained, the second step on the matter of technology was the 
Working Group of Five (WG5) (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). WG5 is an energy efficiency 
project with five of its members: Torvald Klaveness, Wilh Wilhelmsen, Höegh Autoliners, 
BW Gas, and Grieg Star (Norges Rederiforbund, 2014b, p. 20). First, they studied how they 
could actually measure energy efficiency, as there was no adequate measuring method. Then, 
they applied the technologies on five ships that the companies put in the project’s disposal to 
study the effects. The results were first shared internally in the group, then in NSA, before 
making it public through NSA’s Fram Project (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). The Fram Project 
built on the WG5 initiative, and as a part of the project a cooperation was established between 
NSA, World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), DNV-GL (Norges Rederiforbund, 2014b, p. 
20). The cooperation’s purposes is to “establish a common system for collecting, verifying, 
storing and reporting greenhouse gas emissions data from the Norwegian fleet”, and to 
“establish a forum for goal-oriented work on energy efficiency at individual shipping 
company level and in partnership between the companies” (Norges Rederiforbund, 2014b, p. 
20). Through this NSA aspire to cut emissions from Norwegian vessels as well as showcasing 
internationally how a climate friendly system for shipping can be established.  
The Jordanian Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Dr. Kabariti’s expression: “seeing 
is believing” can also be applied to this case. Furthermore, to take the essence of what Sletner 
and Vaagland explained, ‘knowing leads to changing’. Researching measuring methods and 
potential solutions are important in regards to the climate negotiations, as it can contributed to 
a greener business voice, and followingly a policy change among states. However, the 
concrete effects exerted on the UNFCCC negotiations are hard, if not impossible, to measure. 
These efforts by NSA, its members, and partners, are still an important contribution to 
escalate climate negotiations in a positive direction, as it among others contribute to issue 
framing.  
6.3.3 Summary: the Subtle Sway and Sailing Solutions? 
As a sector that can be targeted by decisions in the UNFCCC, NSA’s lobby angle is naturally 
different from NNV or Bellona. The main aspect is to lobby any agreement that may affect 
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the shipping industry in a desired direction. The shipping industry domestically as well as 
internationally is diverse, and NSA appears to have been a climate friendly driving force 
among its members and within ICS. The domestic result is, however, more visible on actually 
moving key actors’ behaviour.   
In NSA’s case, their policies are mostly coherent with the Norwegian governments’ stances. 
However, the information on whether they have caused a change in the receiver’s behaviour 
varies, as we have seen, and their discrete lobby strategy also made it more difficult to 
evaluate the influence. Bureaucrats tended to have an impression of limited impact from 
NSA, which diverged from what the politicians stated in their interviews.  
The green technology projects also certainly contribute to concretisation that is needed both in 
regards to an MRV systems for shipping as well as to commercialise green shipping 
technology further. These developments can potentially be an enhancing force in the climate 
negotiations as well, as it gives negotiators as well as business concrete alternatives to the 
fossil approach. Concrete influence beyond the participating parties in these projects, 
however, have been hard to trace. 
6.4 Evaluating the Impact – Concluding remarks on 
Influence 
This chapter has approached the third research question regarding to the extent to which the 
NGOs succeeded in reaching their strategic goals by looking at two strategic areas for each 
organisation. The analysis was guided by the definition of NGO influence and Betsill and 
Corell’s framework for NGO influence in climate negotiations.  
The nature of issues and the comprehensiveness differs extensively between the organisations 
in this study. As has been illustrated both the REDD+ initiative and CCS requires more 
immediate resources – human and financial, from authorities in the implementation, while 
NSA’s demands have in the case of the UNFCCC negotiations been more of a regulatory 
nature. NSA’s technological projects do also require such resources but as a BINGO, these 
resources have been available within their sector.  
On a general note, it is intriguing the extent to which the impressions of influence diverged. 
An essential part of the explanation can be mirrored in the aforementioned knowledge and 
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analysis of the political process. As it has been highlighted, it also appears as a matter of who 
in the end is the key actor that changed the position – although one receiver of a message 
declines, another may accept.  
If the answers from, particularly many negotiators whom I met during the fieldwork, are to be 
emphasised, Norwegian NGOs are simply there as a channel for the Norwegian delegation to 
communicate with the outside world (media, the Norwegian public, transnational NGOs and 
their members).  Many also claimed the NGOs do not have influence on the Norwegian 
delegation. Limited examples of influence such as those presented by HoD Aslak Brun and 
Political Adviser Holte do not point much of an impact either. HoD Brun (2015) listed up 
examples in which the Norwegian government in various ways rephrased their existing 
policies (without changing the content), by adding or subtracting certain terms such as 
“fairness”. On the latter, he explained that they recognised that the Norwegian public care 
about climate justice, while inserting a different meaning to it than what appears in the 
concrete suggestions on climate justice in the UNFCCC negotiations, (Brun, 2015).  
Nevertheless, NGOs do seem to have had impact on what Norway works on in UNFCCC. 
One of the most prioritised topics on the Norwegian delegation (also financially) is REDD+. 
This seems to have originated largely from NNV and the Norwegian Rainforest Foundation’s 
common lobby effort to put it on the Norwegian government’s climate agenda. Furthermore, 
the pieces of the empirical puzzle also indicate that Bellona has influenced Norwegian CCS 
position. NSA on the other hand, has applied an inward looking approach that they seem 
rather successful in, while it is difficult to prove the direction of causation regarding the 
coherence between NSA and the Norwegian authorities’ policies in the climate negotiations.  
Not surprisingly, political feasibility appears to be a key. This does not only imply moving the 
lobby target from position A to B but also in some cases moving the target from A to B by 
demanding the target to move to C. This can be done through a push as well as a pull (for 
example by creating a policy window) or a combination of these. The cases in which the three 
non-state actors influence are characterised by thorough knowledge of the process (what 
happens when and where, who the key actors are, and whom to lobby with) and analysis of the 
target and how to move the target from the current position.  
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7 Conclusion: NGO Professionalism 
The UNFCCC negotiations are sometimes compared to a travelling circus. An extravagant 
show that travels the world with activists in polar bear costumes and colourful political 
figures with provocative speeches and ‘camera friendly’ activities. Some of the negotiators 
are even characterised as entertaining, particularly with their rich metaphors. In this 
“travelling circus” with thousands of delegates competing for attention, which channels are 
available and applied? Which strategies do Norwegian NGOs apply? In the end, does it matter 
– do NGOs have influence? The starting point of the thesis was rather pessimistic. Based on 
the data collected and analysis conducted, however, it increasingly became apparent that 
NGOs are in fact capable of influencing. 
7.1 Summing Up the Study 
The study’s research questions were:  
1) Which channels of influence are available for the Norwegian non-state actors into the 
UNFCCC negotiations from 2009-2014?  
2) What type of strategies do these NGOs apply?  
3) To what extent do they succeed in reaching their strategic goals?  
The second chapter started by getting an overview through a literature review, before 
discussing how NGO influence is an interesting angle in international relations as it may 
challenge the state-centric perspective that has dominated regime theory. After placing the 
thesis in the current academic debate, the chapter explored relevant theories for each research 
question. The first and second research questions were guided by Andresen and 
Gulbrandsen’s conceptualisation of the four arenas that NGOs target: 1) international; 2) 
domestic; 3) target groups and; 4) public opinion, in addition to their activist/advisory ENGO 
types and the insider/outsider strategies. Decision-making in foreign countries and on the 
regional level was included in the second category together with the domestic political 
channel. In order to integrate the BINGO perspective, Vormedal’s (2008) notion of 
green/grey BINGO lobbying was inserted, and a theoretical framework to analyse the 
strategies of the three selected NGOs. Theory regarding the third research question on 
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influence was approached by firstly developing a definition that would be fruitful in the 
analysis of this thesis. The definition by Betsill and Corell (2008) was the starting point, and 
supplemented. The definition together with Betsill and Corell’s framework for analysing 
NGO influence served as a guide in analysing NGO influence.  
Cases were then carefully chosen, and the third chapter firstly presented and discussed the 
selection, before describing the various methods applied (field study, informant interviews, 
and document analysis), and how they complement each other in the research process. 
Furthermore, these methods were discussed, and counterstrategies to for the methods’ 
weaknesses were then put forward. The three chosen cases were NNV (a member based 
ENGO), Bellona (an advisory ENGO), and NSA (a lobbyist BINGO).  
 The following three chapters systematically addressed the three research questions guided by 
the theoretical framework. The fourth chapter mapped and analysed the channels available for 
Norwegian NGOs in approaching the UNFCCC negotiations from various angles. The 
aforementioned levels from Andresen and Gulbrandsen guided the data collection and 
analysis. The following chapter also applied an adjusted version of their theory to study the 
types of strategies and arenas targeted for each NGO. The former chapter then approached the 
third research question to analyse the extent to which each NGO reached their strategic goals 
and more generally, to what extent they influenced the climate negotiations.  
7.2 Main Findings 
Based on the data and analysis on the channels available, the strategies applied, and the 
influence of the selected NGOs, what are the main findings? Furthermore, what can be said 
across the three cases?  
The fourth chapter found formal and informal access, and restrictions. It was particularly 
interesting to explore the counter strategies applied whenever one channel was restricted or 
closed. Limiting access to the negotiation areas moved the lobbyism outside; ‘closed doors’ at 
the NGOs’ domestic delegation, led NGO delegates to apply the boomerang effect (often 
through alliances); increasing use of informal informals made NGOs use the indirect channels 
through state parties or simply adopt the tactic themselves – such as Bellona’s daily lobby 
dinners during COP15. While some NGOs carried out direct lobbying through meetings with 
delegations, coordination through alliances, and policy dissemination through policy papers, 
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other NGOs was primarily present for the ‘climate happening’. As the COPs attract world 
leaders and key figures in the international climate community, these arenas are also applied 
as a channel to network, exchange ideas, and explore possibilities for partnerships, through 
numerous side events, showcasing, etc.  
The third arena is somewhat interlinked with this aspect of the COPs being a climate 
conference as well. Both through this arena but also by approaching directly, target groups 
can in fact be a channel for NGOs. Skodvin (2012) for example highlighted scientists’ 
influence, even possessing some degree of formal power. Engaging business actors to support 
a position or neutralising opposition can be efficient channel to indirectly target the climate 
negotiations. This arena was particularly utilised by NSA and Bellona. In NSA’s case, it 
pacified potential internal opposition while in Bellona’s case, it is both a source of finance – 
particularly to realise concrete projects, but also in order to build an alliance to lobby from 
several angles, as illustrated in the case of CCS.  
NNV on the other hand appeared to target the domestic and international channel with a dual 
strategy through lobbying, supplemented with media and to some extent activism. 
Additionally, public opinion was also targeted with the latter two tactics. Though Bellona 
does not have the same member based incentive to be vocal in the media, they certainly 
utilised this channel. They seemed motivated by branding, attracting potential partners, and 
perhaps with a hint of the organisation’s activist roots. NSA is not as vocal compared to the 
other two. They favour a subtle lobby strategy meeting bureaucrats and politicians directly. 
Furthermore, when they did in fact appear in the media, they did not voice criticism directly 
through this channel. NSA rather kept a clear but constructive approach.  
The domestic channels are highly valued by particularly nationally oriented NGOs, as the 
geographical proximity both allows easier networking and lower costs. However, foreign and 
regional decision-making arenas are applied both in bypassing the organisation’s domestic 
governments but also in order to build broader alliances, and/or due to the specific 
country/regional institution’s position in the UNFCCC negotiations.  
The strategic approach in NNV’s REDD+ initiative for Norway, and the parliamentary 
climate agreement are prominent examples of carefully planned agenda settings – which also 
moved key actors. They achieved both procedural and substantive success in these two 
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initiatives. The influence has on the other hand been much more limited in regards to climate 
justice in terms of changing key actor’s behaviour in a desired direction.  
What makes Bellona stand out from the other Norwegian NGOs, is its carefully developed 
international network – which they make well use of. Though they are often criticised by 
decision makers of promoting expensive projects with unknown feasibility, their persistent 
push and pull, seem to allow them success as seen with CCS in Norway (before the “crash-
landing”) and SFP – which mobilised public and private funding.  
Though it is not equally evident how much NSA has influenced the Norwegian position on 
shipping, due to the conflicting information, and lack of third party information (as they to a 
great extent carry out discreet insider strategies); however, they do appear to have pulled the 
shipping industry domestically, and perhaps also internationally, in a greener direction.  
Professionalism is a key in all cases. Knowledge as a resource encompasses not only technical 
knowledge of climate change but also knowledge of the political process (procedural and 
cultural) domestically and internationally. Though they vary greatly in their approach, the 
three non-state actors that this thesis has studied can all be characterised as professional in 
their strategic work to influence decision makers’ positions.  
7.3 Explanatory Value and Analytical implications 
The explanatory value of the theoretical frameworks chosen in this thesis will be discussed, 
and suggestions on how these should be adjusted. An adaption of the table by Andresen and 
Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 172), with BINGO theory from Vormedal (2008) integrated to it was 
presented in chapter two:  
 Activist ENNGO Advisory ENNGO Lobbyist BINGO 
Critical resources Membership base Intellectual base Economic position 
Arenas targeted International negotiations 
Domestic policy 
Target groups  
Public opinion 
International negotiations 
Domestic policy  
(Target groups) 
International negotiations 
Domestic policy 
Strategy  Dual strategy: insider and 
outsider 
Insider only Insider only  
Table 7.1. Analytical Framework for the NGOs’ Strategies.  
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At first sight, NNV, Bellona, and NSA do seem to fit well into the categories of activist 
ENGO, advisory ENGO, and lobbyist BINGO respectively. However, as it has been 
highlighted in the previous chapters, all three non-state actors in this research appears to apply 
quite a mix of strategies and targeting different levels. They therefore do not seem fully fit 
into the framework developed in chapter two based on Andresen and Gulbrandsen’s 
“relationship between [green] NGO types and resources, levels targeted and strategies” as 
illustrated in table 7.1. NNV did not appear to focus on target groups. Furthermore, Bellona 
on the other hand did approach the public opinion and target groups while to a varying degree 
the international level.   
On critical resources, in order to integrate BINGOs better, the BINGO’s place in the national 
economy may be more relevant than the financial resources available for an organisation – as 
this is what often give BINGOs public legitimacy. It is also intriguing to see how Bellona 
mobilised resources. Many NGO studies consider resources more or less as a static or at least 
stable value. Bellona has, nevertheless, mobilised public as well as private funds, and built a 
comprehensive international network in a relatively short amount of time. Though most 
organisations do in fact have a rather stable set of resources, this case challenges this idea.  
Moreover, showcasing, side-events, and seminars are difficult to clearly place into the insider 
and outsider strategies. One approach to handle this, is to study the intentions of NGO actors 
in order to determine whether the event has an insider or outsider strategy intention. However, 
in the cases highlighted in this thesis, the intentions also were sometimes easy to categorise 
but at other times, it was clearly mixed.  
Another complication was related to the NGOs’ media coverage. Again, the intentions may be 
difficult to determine, moreover, the target of the message can be mixed. If a non-state actor 
presents a green technology in the media for example, it could be aimed at creating accept for 
the technology so that it would be included in the UNFCCC (as in the case of CCS in CDM); 
it could be directed at the politicians and/or business as a target group to mobilise funding or; 
it might just be for branding purpose – or a combination of these.  
Despite these challenges (that may be accommodated by various means), as it has been 
illustrated in the thesis, Andresen and Gulbrandsen’s framework was very useful in analysing 
the selected NGOs.    
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7.4 Proposals for Further Research and Concluding 
Remarks 
Similar to the exercise in this thesis that asserted the lobbyist BINGO into Gulbrandsen and 
Andresen’s conceptualisation of ENGO types and the respective arenas targeted and strategies 
applied, it could be interesting to examine how other NGO (RINGOs, TUNGOs, YOUNGOs 
etc.) could be included in a common framework. Another research angle is to look further into 
whether there is a boomerang effect from the three organisations in this thesis. On a general 
note, detailed and comparative analysis on non-state actors’ influence in various UN 
negotiations would be interesting in order to highlight the difference in impact depending on 
the negotiation field, stakes, and level of non-state participation. Lastly, the analytical 
framework by Betsill and Corell (2008) was consciously applied in order to allow other 
researchers to carry out comparative studies for example with other Norwegian NGOs, other 
countries’ NGOs and so on. There is an intriguing variety of NGOs that can be studied which 
may highlight the captivating and complex UNFCCC negotiations further.  
 
The research started with a somewhat pessimistic perspective on whether non-state actors had 
influence in midst of the somewhat disordered UNFCCC negotiations. Can influence truly 
occur in a situation that is chaotic at the first sight? After looking into existing research and 
adding my own empirical data and analysis of three Norwegian non-state actors, the potential 
and actual influence became much more apparent. While there are organisations with various 
motives for partaking in the UNFCCC process, if non-state actors are willing and capable, 
there are channels that can be utilised in order to make an impact. Let me in the end borrow 
Wendt’s “power is what states make of it”, and rephrase that to ‘channels are what NGOs 
make of it’. 
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9 Appendix 
 
9.1 Request and Informed Consent  
This request (in either Norwegian or English) was sent by email to the interview subjects 
beforehand, and then distributed at the beginning of the interview.  
Request for participation in the research project: 
 «Climate Changing Civil Society?» 
Background and purpose  
The study wants to examine Norwegian civil society's channels of influence, the choice of 
strategy, and assessment of impact to the negotiations in the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). This is a Master's thesis study at the Department of Political 
Science, University of Oslo (UiO). You are requested to participate because you hold a key 
position - with knowledge of the relevant processes and/or outcomes. 
 
What does the participation in this study imply? 
Participation involves interview and any written supplementary questions (mainly via E-mail, 
unless otherwise agreed). The student will also attend COP20 (with UiO accreditation) and 
meetings between civil society and the Norwegian government. The observations will not 
involve the collection of personal data, unless otherwise agreed. The questions will deal with 
Norwegian civil society participation and influence in the UN climate negotiations. Data will 
be recorded with notes and audio recordings, unless otherwise agreed. 
 
What happens to your information?  
All personal information will be treated confidentially. Only the student and supervisor, 
Professor Arild Underdal will have access to personal data, unless otherwise agreed upon. 
Persons wishing anonymity will be assured this.  
 
The project is planned to be completed on 25th May 2015. After the completion, the data 
material will be anonymized by delinking the name lists, e-mail addresses and other direct or 
indirect personal identifying information, unless otherwise agreed. Audio or video recordings 
(which can identify individuals) in connection with the project will be deleted or censored to 
make the data anonymous. Being anonymous implies that it will not be possible to link 
individuals to the information in the study. 
 
Voluntary participation  
It is voluntary to participate in the study, and you can at any time withdraw your consent 
without giving any reason. If you withdraw, all your information will be anonymised. 
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If you have questions about the study, please contact the master student Naomi Ichihara 
Røkkum (email: naomi.rokkum@gmail.com or phone: +47 470 19 560) or her supervisor 
Professor Arild Underdal (email: arild.underdal@stv.uio.no or phone: +47 22855241).  
 
The study is reported to the Privacy Ombudsman for Research, Norwegian Social Science 
Data Services (NSD). 
 
Consent for participation in the study 
I have received information about the study and am willing to participate 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(Signed by the project participant, date) 
 
 I agree to participate in the interview 
 I agree that personal information (eg. name and title) may be published 
 
9.2 Interview Guide 
Master thesis study:  «Climate Changing Civil Society? » by Naomi Ichihara Røkkum, UiO 
Type of interview:  Semi struktured interviews with key informants  
Phase 1: Setting the framework  
1. Information (5 min) 
Welcome 
Short presentation of student and the study 
Topic of the interview (background, aim) 
Ask if anything is unclear  
2. Formalities (5 min) 
Make audio record. Explain why and deletion after the end of the project. 
Written consent from the participant. 
Do you have any questions? Is anything unclear? 
Start audio record. 
Phase 2: Experiences   
3. Opening questions: (5 min) 
Ask the informant to introduce herself/himself by name and relevant background (role, 
position) 
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4. Transition questions: (5 min) 
What experiences have you had with the UN climate negotiations? 
Follow-up questions 
Phase 3: Focusing  
5. Key questions: (30 min) 
How can Norwegian civil society influence the UN climate negotiations?  
Follow-up questions: 
- Other indirect channels via the public and/or local/national/regional (ie. EU, AU, 
ASEAN) authorities? 
Which strategies do the civil society actors apply?  
Check list:  
- Which channels of influence? 
- Which topics? 
- What is your perception of Bellona/Naturvernforbundet/Rederiforbundets’ strategy? 
In your opinion, did the civil society actors succeed in reaching their goals? Please exemplify. 
Check list:  
- Which channels of influence? 
- Which topics? 
- What is your perception of Bellona/Naturvernforbundet/Rederiforbundets’ strategic 
success? 
- Ensure that both successes and failures are covered 
Follow-up questions 
Phase 4: Recap    
6. Summary (ca. 10 min) 
Follow-up questions 
Summarize findings 
Have I understood you correctly? 
Is there anything you would like to add? 
Thank you for the interview. Please get in touch if you have any questions.  
 
 
